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Abstract 
Fraud is a growing problem in the not-for-profit (NFP) sector; this problem increases because of 
the lack of fraud-prevention preparation had by NFP financial professionals.  Furthermore, asset 
misappropriation is the most commonly perpetrated occupational fraud in NFPs.  Although 
approximately 90% of all reported frauds are asset misappropriation, a gap in existing research 
results in limited data regarding asset misappropriation in NFPs.  This study contains an 
extensive examination of peer-reviewed research regarding fraud topics, with an emphasis on 
asset misappropriation.  The conceptual framework incorporated the Fraud Management 
Lifecycle Theory, the Fraud Triangle Theory, the Theory of White-Collar Crime, and the 
Routine Activity Theory.  The project followed a qualitative exploratory case study design, 
interviewing fifteen participants to achieve data saturation. Recruitment included purposive 
sampling and snowball sampling.  After interviews, data was analyzed using open coding, axial 
coding, and cross-case examination.  The data revealed nine major themes, four that answered 
the main research questions and five that identified discoveries beyond the scope of the study. 
Each theme proved the need for additional research regarding fraud in the NFP sector, and 
demonstrating the need for this study. 
Key words: not-for-profit, asset misappropriation, fraud, preparation, prevention, detection, 
management, segregation of duties, fraud-prevention training   
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Section 1: Foundation of the Study 
Section 1 contains a thorough explanation of the foundation of the study.  Included in this 
section are the background of the problem, problem statement, purpose statement, conceptual 
framework, and the significance of the study.  The principal investigator identifies the chosen 
method and design for the study, and addresses the assumptions, limitations, and delimitations of 
the project.  This section concludes with an exhaustive literature review. 
Background of the Problem 
Studies conducted by The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) and Binder 
Dijke Otte Global (BDO), a public accounting, tax, and consulting firm, revealed that fraud 
within the Not-for-Profit (NFP) sector is a significant problem. The ACFE discovered “…that 
the typical organization loses 5% of its revenues to fraud each year” (Archambeault, Webber, & 
Greenlee, 2014, pp. 1194-1195).  BDO’s study revealed NFPs in Australia and New Zealand 
incurred a loss of $2,916,616 over a two-year period (Kummer, Singh, & Best, 2015).  The BDO 
study surveyed 645 participants, 12% reported fraud in that period; furthermore, not all 
participants answered every question in the survey.  The majority of fraud activity reported came 
from small organizations with 21-50 employees.  These organizations believed the entire amount 
of current and past fraud loss was not discovered (Kummer et al., 2015).  The significant losses 
NFPs experience each year demand a higher level of research regarding better identification, 
management, and prevention techniques.  
Fraud in not-for-profits. According to Zack and De Armond (2015), fraud is easier to 
perpetrate in NFP organizations because many NFPs lack resources to implement strong anti-
fraud policies, such as effective internal controls.  Kummer et al. (2015) further explains that the 
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atmosphere of trust, difficulties in verifying revenue streams, and shortage of qualified 
employees increases NFP fraud risk. 
Asset misappropriation. All fraud causes harm; however, asset misappropriation is the 
most prevalent within NFPs and impacts revenue as well as reputation (Archambeault et al., 
2014).  When fraud occurrences in an organization are publicized, it negatively affects public 
opinion of the entire sector (Santos, Laureano, & Moro, 2019).  Asset misappropriation is the 
stealing or misusing of organizational resources (Kennedy, 2018); a person, or group, perpetrates 
this fraud against a company (Harris, Petrovits, & Yetman, 2017).  Johansson and Carey (2016) 
reveal that approximately 90% of fraud cases are asset misappropriations.  
However, there is limited data on fraud in NFPs as most organizations manage the 
problem internally to preserve their reputations (Harris et al., 2017). Because NFP fraud research 
is underdeveloped compared to the for-profit sector, further research is vital to determine ways 
of reducing fraudulent behavior in NFPs (Archambeault & Webber, 2017). The ACFE identifies 
three sub-categories of asset misappropriation: theft of cash receipts, fraudulent disbursements of 
cash, and other schemes (Kennedy, 2018).  
Theft of cash receipts. Theft of cash includes skimming and cash larceny (Kennedy, 
2018). Skimming involves removing cash from an organization before it enters the accounting 
system (ACFE, 2017b).  Because there is no record of cash received, no audit trail exists, making 
detection difficult (Marden & Edwards, 2005).  Cash larceny is the theft of cash or checks 
already entered into the accounting system without the employer’s consent (ACFE, 2017b).  
Fraudulent disbursements of cash. Fraudulent disbursements of cash include check 
tampering, billing, expense reimbursements, payroll, or cash register disbursements (Kennedy, 
2018).  Check tampering is intercepting, altering, or forging employers’ checks.  Billing schemes 
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involve submitting invoices for false or inflated goods/services or invoices for personal or 
duplicate purchases, and acquiring the payment (Kramer, 2015).  Expense reimbursement fraud 
is common and involves employees falsifying business trip claims resulting in overcompensation 
of business expenses (ACFE, 2017b).  Payroll fraud involves false compensation claims resulting 
in issued payments by the employer.  Finally, cash register disbursement fraud occurs any time 
someone makes false entries on a cash register to hide the theft of cash (Kennedy, 2018). 
Other schemes. Other asset misappropriation schemes include misappropriation of cash-
on-hand, and non-cash misappropriations (Kennedy, 2018).  The theft of cash-on-hand occurs 
when anyone steals physical cash, often a petty cash fund, from an organization (Grippo, 2012). 
Non-cash misappropriations involve stealing inventory assets to use or sell (Simeunović, Grubor, 
& Ristić, 2016). 
Common fraud prevention and detection techniques. The 2018 ACFE report to the 
nations revealed that asset misappropriation is the most common form of fraud; thirty-two 
percent occur due to weak internal controls (ACFE, 2018c).  Further research indicates that strict 
internal controls, a corporate culture of intolerance, effective audit teams, stringent segregation 
of duties, and improved whistle-blowing policies decrease asset misappropriation (Bakri, 
Mohamed, & Said, 2017; Johansson & Carey, 2016). Miceli and Near (1992), define whistle-
blowing as, “The disclosure by an organization’s member [or former member] of illegal, 
immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers to persons or organizations 
that might be able to effect action” (p. 15).  A study of 1,483 companies discovered that 51% of 
companies with whistle-blowing policies detected fraud; however, only 33% of those without 
them were able to detect fraud (ACFE, 2014).  Additional studies state finding ways to control 
the opportunity for fraud is vital; such processes as "use it or lose it" vacation policies, random 
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audits, and task rotation limit the opportunity for any one employee to perpetrate fraud (Jones, 
2014).  
Problem Statement 
The general problem to be addressed is the significant level of fraud in NFP 
organizations.  According to the ACFE organizations lose approximately 5% of revenues each 
year to fraud (Kummer et al., 2015).  Asset misappropriation fraud is the most common fraud 
NFPs experience (Archambeault et al., 2014; Bradley, 2015; Kennedy, 2018). BDO Global, a 
public accounting, tax, and consulting firm, conducted a 2 year study and discovered that NFP 
organizations suffered a loss of $2,916,616 due to fraud (Kummer et al., 2015).  After 
completion of another study in for-profit and not-for-profit entities, the ACFE discovered that 
fraud causes the average organization to lose 5% of its revenues (Archambeault et al., 2014).  
Fraud is often easier to perpetrate in an NFP organization due to the environment of trust 
and lack of governance practices regarding internal controls (Kummer et al., 2015).  Because of 
the Enron and WorldCom scandals, accounting professionals sought more in-depth forensic 
accounting education, to better prepare for their profession (Kramer, Seda, & Bobashev, 2017). 
The harm that fraud causes to NFP entities suggests that improving fraud prevention, detection, 
and management preparation could significantly reduce losses.  The specific problem to be 
addressed is the significant level of fraud, specifically asset misappropriation, in NFP 
organizations within South Central Pennsylvania, and the subsequent losses experienced by 
NFPs each year. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study is to investigate the experiences of 
professional accountants in NFP organizations within South Central Pennsylvania who have had 
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experiences with asset misappropriation.  This study explores methods that will improve fraud 
identification, management, and prevention tools and techniques within NFP organizations in 
South Central Pennsylvania.  To determine this information, the principal investigator will seek 
to answer various research topics by interviewing accountants who work in companies that have 
experienced asset misappropriation and their managers.  The purpose of this study is to 
understand how accountants believe they were prepared for their experiences through various 
training tools and identify ways to improve their preparation.  This study will also suggest how 
NFP organizations might better train employees regarding fraud prevention, detection, and 
management.  Finally, this study will be beneficial to other NFP organizations outside South 
Central Pennsylvania by educating accountants and leaders in improving fraud preparation 
techniques. 
Nature of the Study 
This study will use a qualitative multiple case technique.  The principal investigator 
believed the qualitative method was appropriate for studying shared experiences of individuals in 
the accounting department of NFP organizations.  The multiple case study design enables the 
principal investigator to collect experiential data from NFP accountants and managers.  This will 
identify how NFPs and their accountants can improve their fraud prevention, detection, and 
management skills.  The principal investigator rejected other qualitative designs including 
narrative, phenomenology, grounded theory, and ethnography because they are not as effective. 
Finally, the principal investigator excluded the quantitative and mixed method designs as they 
would not yield the necessary experiential data. 
Discussion of method. Qualitative research is best suited for this study because it 
explores the meaning that individuals attribute to a specific phenomenon (Creswell, 2014).  By 
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understanding experiences, numerical solutions are absent, eliminating objectivity and using 
opinions and personal experiences to develop conclusions (Basias & Pollalis, 2018; Dodgson, 
2017).  Daher, Carré, Jaramillo, Olivares, and Tomicic (2017) state that qualitative research 
describes the perspective and views of the participants.  The differing views and experiences 
increase the knowledge of the researcher, enabling them to form meanings and themes that 
explain the phenomenon (Creswell, 2014).  
The principal investigator excluded quantitative methodology because the study is 
subjective and the data gathered would not be objectively quantifiable.  Quantitative research 
methods include experimental and survey designs (Creswell, 2014; Watson, 2015).  Both 
produce results in a numerical form that facilitate conclusions (Samii, 2016; Watson, 2015). The 
study will determine ways to improve fraud prevention, detection, and management techniques 
by reviewing experiences of accountants. A quantitative design would not effectively collect the 
necessary data. 
Finally, the principal investigator rejected mixed method designs for this study because it 
would not enhance understanding.  The mixed methods approach combines qualitative and 
quantitative data collection and analysis techniques to create a complete picture of a study 
(Cameron, & Molina-Azorin, 2011; Cameron, Sankaran, & Scales, 2015; Creswell, 2014; 
Harrison, 2013).  Although the mixed method yields a thorough analysis, its techniques would 
not benefit this research. 
Discussion of design. This study will follow a multiple case study design.  Case studies 
explore an experience within its true context to gain a deeper understanding (De Massis & 
Kotlar, 2014).  Multiple case study designs enable the principal investigator to explore 
similarities and differences among cases (Lashgari, Sutton-Brady, Søilen, & Ulfvengren, 2018, 
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Adams, Jones, Lefmann, & Shepphard, 2014).  Studying multiple cases, with varying 
perspectives, will improve depth and clarity of the investigation (Arghode & Wang, 2016). 
Vohra (2014) explains that the principal investigator strengthens the results using replication of 
patterns by first providing a within-case analysis consisting of a detailed description of each 
case and its themes, then reviewing themes in all cases, known as cross-case analysis 
(Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2018).  The other qualitative designs, including narrative, ethnography, 
grounded theory, and phenomenology do not meet the needs of this study. 
There are three types of case study designs: exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory 
(Scholz & Tietje, 2002).  In a descriptive case study, the principal investigator must follow an 
existing theory or model to guide data collection.  The data that is collected in this form of case 
study is used to explain a phenomenon that occurs within the set of collected data (Gerring, 
2004; Zainal, 2007).  The descriptive case study is used to describe a phenomenon in the 
environment it occurred in (Baxter & Jack, 2008).  Because the principal investigator is not using 
a pre-existing theory to identify how fraud prevention, detection, and management can be 
improved in NFPs, this design is inappropriate.  
The explanatory case study design tests cause-and-effect relationships (Scholz & Tietje, 
2002).  Researchers use this theory to identify why a phenomenon occurs, first forming a theory 
then testing it against collected data (Zainal, 2007).  The principal investigator is not trying to 
understand why fraud occurs, but how it can be better prevented, detected, and managed. In the 
explanatory case study design, each case only falsifies a theory (Zainal, 2007).  However, the 
principal investigator aims to gather additional information beyond the hypothesis to develop 
best practices for improving the skills of NFP accountants, making the explanatory design 
inadequate. 
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This study will follow the exploratory case study design. Exploratory designs are similar 
to pilot studies; they examine a phenomenon that is not widely addressed in existing research 
(Fahy, 2013; Hollow, 2014).  Using the exploratory design, the researcher asks general questions 
about the topic that allow for further in-depth questions as the phenomenon is studied (Zainal, 
2007).  According to Baxter and Jack (2008), exploratory studies “…explore those situations in 
which the intervention being evaluated has no clear, single set of outcomes” (p. 548).  Because 
fraud prevention, detection, and management techniques are changing and improving, studying 
them in relation to asset misappropriation in NFP organizations using an exploratory design is 
ideal. 
Narrative. The narrative design studies the lives of individuals, which the principal 
investigator is not proposing (Creswell, 2014).  Narrative research includes autobiographies, 
biographies, life stories, and personal experiences (Creswell, 2007).  The researcher gathers the 
stories of individuals using in-depth data collection involving: participants telling stories about 
their lives, recalling memories about events, and conversations had between friends and family 
(Syed & Nelson, 2015).  This design explores how participants navigate life experiences; the 
study and results scrutinize the individual, rather than the phenomenon (McAlpine, 2016). 
Ethnography. The ethnography design is not appropriate for this study because it will not 
include groups from shared cultural backgrounds (Creswell, 2014; Dodgson, 2017). 
Ethnographic research reveals the actions that people take and allows the researcher to infer the 
motives behind them (Jerolmack & Khan, 2014).  This design studies individuals who share 
similar cultural backgrounds including: beliefs, practices, languages, and values (Bass & 
Milosevic, 2016).  The only controllable similarity in this study is the job position of each 
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participant.  Because the principal investigator cannot guarantee that the beliefs, behaviors, and 
values of participants are similar, the ethnographic design would not work. 
Grounded theory. Furthermore, the principal investigator does not intend to build 
theories grounded in data from prior research, making the grounded theory design inappropriate 
for this project (Creswell, 2014).  Grounded theory requires tracing results through previous data 
and supporting developed theories with prior findings (Goulding, 2017).  This study will use 
prior research as well as new ideas from participants to develop conclusions about improving 
fraud prevention, detection, and management, making the grounded theory design inappropriate. 
Phenomenology. Phenomenology explores the participants’ meaning of a topic 
(Dodgson, 2017).  Researchers using phenomenology report how participants viewed their 
experiences differently (Creswell, 2007).  The goal of this research is not to understand why a 
specific phenomenon has happened to the participants and how it affected them, but how it was 
able to happen (Creswell, 2014).  Additionally, phenomenology does not encourage the principal 
investigator to impose specific methods on the phenomenon, making it unsuitable for this study 
(Groenwald, 2004). 
Summary of the nature of the study. Using a qualitative multiple case study 
approach, the principal investigator will explore the understandings of accountants and 
managers towards occupational fraud to gain various perspectives.  Analyzing several cases 
allows the principal investigator to gain an in-depth understanding of the fraud prevention, 
detection, and management techniques employed by NFPs.  Using the qualitative method, the 
investigator can explore the life experiences of accountants and managers in NFP organizations 
to form conclusions about improving processes. 
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Research Questions 
RQ1. What forms of asset misappropriation fraud occur in NFPs within South Central 
Pennsylvania?  
RQ2. What preparations have NFP accountants within the study population had that 
would equip them for fraud prevention, identification, and management, if any?  
RQ3. How quickly is asset misappropriation fraud identified and managed within NFPs 
in South Central Pennsylvania? 
RQ4. Of the properly detected cases within NFPs, what was the outcome?  
Answering these questions will aid the researcher in achieving the purposes of the study. 
Answers will reveal the forms of asset misappropriation fraud occurring in South Central 
Pennsylvania and how equipped accountants in NFPs are to manage it.  Additionally, these 
questions will analyze how well accountants are prepared for fraud prevention, detection, and 
management prior to obtaining an accounting position, and how to improve preparation.  These 
questions will find gaps in literature and practice, enabling managers to accurately determine the 
strengths and weaknesses of their accountants’ fraud management capability.  Finally, these 
questions will help develop steps to improve fraud prevention, detection, and management skills 
in NFP organizations.  
Conceptual Framework 
The principal investigator integrated the Fraud Management Lifecycle Theory, the Fraud 
Triangle Theory, the Theory of White-Collar Crime, and the Routine Activity Theory to build a 
framework for this study.  Research suggests that when organizations take steps to protect 
themselves, they detect fraud sooner and lower fraud risk (Amasiatu & Shah, 2018; Coleman, 
1987; Reynald, 2016; Schuchter & Levi, 2016).  
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The fraud management lifecycle theory – subsection A of appendix A. Wilhelm 
(2004) proposed the fraud management lifecycle theory in 2004, which balanced fraud 
management components to minimize financial and societal costs of fraud.  The fraud 
management lifecycle stages include deterrence, prevention, detection, mitigation, analysis, 
policy, investigation, and prosecution (Adomako, 2017; Amasiatu & Shah, 2018; Ocansey, 
2017).  Deterrence involves all activities in place that discourage fraudulent behavior, including 
certainty and severity of punishment (Nagin, Solow, & Lum, 2015).  Prevention techniques 
include actions and activities that prevent fraud perpetration (Amasiatu & Shah, 2018, 
Wilhelm, 2004).  Detection identifies existing fraud, and mitigation limits the extent and 
amount of fraud losses (Amasiatu & Shah, 2018).  The analysis stage determines the factors 
that led to existing fraud occurrences, despite precautions.  Policy gathers information to 
develop new guidelines reducing future fraud occurrences (Wilhelm, 2004).  The final two 
stages, investigation and prosecution, consider the detected fraud, builds a case against the 
offender, and determines the appropriate course of action (Amasiatu & Shah, 2018; Wilhelm, 
2004). 
Wilhelm (2004) believed that when the stages are not cohesive and balanced, companies 
cannot benefit from fraud detection technologies.  However, when business leaders adhere to the 
stages and provide attention to each, they can mitigate fraud risk (Adomako, 2017; Maisey, 
2014; Nabhan & Hindi, 2009). NFP organizations experience fraud because they “…often fail to 
manage ongoing risks” (Gentenaar & Solomon, 2015, p. 26). This fraud has led to a 5% loss of 
revenue each year (Archambeault et al., 2014). There is a need for research regarding what NFP 
organizations do to manage risk and what tools are best to help do so to meet their mission 
effectively. 
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The fraud triangle – subsection B of appendix A. Cressey developed the fraud 
triangle in 1953 to better explain fraud events (Archambeault et al., 2014; Lokanan, 2018; 
Schuchter & Levi, 2016).  The triangle has three components: pressure, opportunity, and 
motivation (Archambeault et al., 2014; Burke & Sanney, 2018; Morales, Gendron & Guénin-
Paracini, 2014).  Pressure can come from financial need, a threat to an individual, or pressure to 
perform (Burke & Sanney, 2018; Schuchter & Levi, 2016).  Opportunity occurs when there is a 
lack of effective controls, such as an ineffective board of directors managing individuals in 
positions of financial trust, high turnover, or a single person controlling management 
(Dellaportas, 2013; Roden, Cox & Kim, 2016).  Motivation results from the inability to share 
one's problems with others, leading to the absence of rational judgment (Dellaportas, 2013).  
To reduce fraud, NFPs must interrupt the fraud triangle. Improving internal controls and 
implementing policies that provide protection for whistleblowers can limit opportunity 
(Archambeault et al., 2014; Macgregor & Stuebs, 2014).  NFPs operate under a bond of trust, 
opening organizations to fraud by creating opportunity (Kummer et al., 2015). These 
organizations also tend to assume that because of their noble cause, workers would not steal from 
them.  The assumptions and beliefs of NFPs necessitate research that will provide a realistic view 
of their fraud risk, and management techniques. 
The theory of white-collar crime – subsection C of appendix A. The theory of white-
collar crime, developed by Sutherland in the 1940s, states that high ranking individuals in 
respectable occupations can perpetrate crimes (Lokanan, 2015).  Researchers believed crime 
was a problem amongst immigrants and the poor; this theory proved those ideas wrong by 
analyzing powerful and privileged individuals who were also capable (Coleman, 1987). 
Sutherland was influential in Cressey’s development of the fraud triangle, as he also felt that 
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fraud was a people problem (Lokanan, 2015).  The environment of trust that NFPs have makes 
them unsuspicious of the individuals who can, and do, perpetrate crimes (Kummer et al., 2015). 
Sutherland believed the core commonality among white-collar crimes was the violation of that 
trust (Shichor, 2018).  Research describing ways NFPs can lower fraud risk will reveal why 
accountability and healthy skepticism of individuals in positions of financial trust, or of high 
status is necessary. 
The routine activity theory – subsection D of appendix A. Cohen and Felson 
developed the routine activity theory in 1979, suggesting that for a crime to be perpetrated three 
components must exist together: a motivated individual, a viable target, and the absence of 
capable guardians (DeLiema, 2018; Reynald, 2016).  The model first helped explain street 
crimes but is also beneficial in examining financial crimes (DeLiema, 2018).  The theory 
explores how individuals can be at risk for victimization because of their routine activities (de 
Melo, Pereira, Andresen, & Matias, 2017).  Research reveals that an individual’s activity 
patterns change dependent on season, day of the week or hour of the day; those pattern changes 
alter the risk for victimization (de Melo et al., 2017).  This same theory applies to the daily 
activities of an organization’s employees.  
The routine activity theory stresses the need for a capable guardian (Skogan, 2015). 
Churches and small NFP organizations struggle with segregation of duties and finding qualified 
and consistent help, lowering the probability that a capable guardian exists (Carey, Knechel & 
Tanewski, 2013; Thornhill, Troy & Domino, 2016).  Researching the existing fraud prevention, 
detection, and management techniques used by NFPs will identify potential gaps in protection 
against fraud. For example, NFPs are known to have cash revenue that is difficult to verify and 
easy to steal making them a viable target (Kummer et al., 2015). This study will suggest fraud-
Running Head: FRAUD IN NOT-FOR-PROFITS 14 
prevention techniques to NFP organizations by using the routine activity theory to lower 
victimization and increase capable guardianship of assets. 
Discussion of the relationships between concepts. Each of the theories identifies 
additional protection against fraud to an organization when implemented properly.  The 
relationship between the concepts can be seen in Figure 1.  Although each concept is 
independent of one another, when combined the effectiveness of preventing, detecting, and 
managing fraud increases.  The use of the white-collar crime theory may serve to increase 
skepticism of employees and their employers by generating awareness of the potential 
fraudsters within their organization.  Because anyone can perpetrate fraud, NFPs must address 
the environment of trust that exists and introduce an increased level of accountability.  
Research suggests that a higher level of accountability improves NFPs’ reputations (Becker, 
2018).  
The fraud triangle and the routine activity theories offer opportunities to determine 
internal control weaknesses and to detect ongoing fraud.  Employers and employees can find 
ways to reduce internal weaknesses by appointing capable guardians and employing strong 
internal processes.  Finally, employers can implement the fraud management lifecycle to protect 
against future fraud by identifying existing and past fraudulent behavior and taking action to 
discourage and prevent fraud.  Employers can create an effective culture of fraud prevention by 
introducing policies that stimulate awareness, including: unannounced audits, task rotations, 
strict segregation of duties, whistleblower policies, and intensive on-the-job training.  Fraud 
prevention, detection, and management can also deter fraud, educate employees, and mitigate 
any potential fraud. Ninety-percent of NFP fraud cases are asset misappropriations (Johansson & 
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Carey, 2016), this reveals the need for research regarding new policies and procedures in NFPs 
to minimize fraud risk. 
 
Figure 1. Relationships between concepts. (Format from: Sahloul, 2019). 
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Summary of the conceptual framework. This study will integrate the theories of the 
fraud management lifecycle, the fraud triangle, white-collar crime, and routine activity. 
Utilizing these theories, NFPs can gain a clearer perspective of how to lower fraud risk. 
Understanding the aspects of each theory enables NFP accountants and leaders to develop tools 
and techniques to implement in their organizations to lower fraud risk.  Individuals must first 
understand the white-collar crime theory, that anyone can perpetrate fraud.  Accountants and 
leaders can then develop policies, internal controls, and procedures that will improve fraud 
prevention and detection and enable them to manage fraud effectively.  Utilizing the concepts 
in the fraud management lifecycle, the fraud triangle, and the routine activity theory, NFP 
organizations can strengthen existing protection against fraud. 
Definition of Terms 
Asset misappropriation. Asset misappropriation is the theft, embezzlement, or misuse 
of company assets (Archambeault et al., 2014; Harris, et al., 2017). The different forms include 
skimming, cash larceny, theft of equipment or inventory, check tampering, and theft of cash-on-
hand (Gupta & Gupta, 2015; Kennedy, 2018). 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE). ACFE is the largest member-based 
anti-fraud organization in the world, containing nearly 85,000 members. They provide anti-fraud 
training and education to reduce business fraud worldwide and help the accounting profession 
gain confidence with the public (ACFE, 2019a). 
Bribery. Bribery is “Accepting or offering something of value in exchange for influence 
or power” (Waddell, Self, & Sullivan, 2017, ¶ 6). 
Check Tampering. Check tampering involves intercepting, altering, or forging 
employers’ checks (Kramer, 2015). 
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Conflict of interest. Conflicts of interest occur when an employee or auditor engage in a 
transaction for an employer, in which they have an undisclosed economic or personal interest 
that will affect the organization (Reed, Bagley, & Marden, 2012; Wright, Johnson, & Dorr, 
2006).  
Economic extortion. Economic extortion is similar to bribery, except the suggestion of 
payment comes from the individual receiving the item(s) of value (Wright et al., 2006). The 
suggestion of payment can be a threat, or actual harm (Reed et al., 2012).  
Financial statement fraud. Financial statement fraud involves the intentional 
misrepresentation of an organization’s financial statements (Albrecht, Holland, Malagueño, 
Dolan, & Tzafrir, 2015; Self, Fudge, Sullivan, & Harrington, 2016).  This fraud involves the 
incorrect use of accounting principles and publishing of manipulated financial statements that 
cause a reader to change their opinion or decision about the company (Zhou & Gaurav, 2011). 
Perpetrators of this fraud are trying to avoid negative repercussions of reporting a company’s 
true financial standing and protect the organization (Albrecht et al., 2015). 
Fraud. Fraud occurs when someone willfully misrepresents or conceals a material fact to 
gain something for themselves, including money or property that does not belong to them 
(Cepeda, Gerardo, Perez, & Rivera, 2015). 
Fraud risk. Fraud risk is the exposure a company encounters due to the capability of an 
individual to combine all three components of the fraud triangle (ACFE, 2016c).  
Internal Controls. Internal controls are a set of policies and procedures put in place by 
the organization’s board, management, and other personnel to ensure objectives are being met 
with reasonable assurance and limited risk (Zakaria, Nawawi, & Salin, 2016).   Additionally, 
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they are measures used to detect errors, fraud, and irregularities, to protect assets, and confirm 
transactions are correct (Adetiloye, Olokoyo, & Taiwo, 2016). 
Kickbacks. Kickbacks occur when an individual gives gifts or money to another person 
to receive favorable treatment, commonly regarding contract obtainment (Batter, 2015). 
Not-for-profit (NFP). An NFP is an organization that cannot distribute its net earnings to 
anyone who maintains control over it, including members, officers, board members, or trustees 
(Chelliah, Boersman, & Klettner, 2016). 
Professional skepticism. Professional skepticism requires a business person to have a 
questioning mind and to critically assess evidence regarding audits (Brazel, Jackson, Schaefer, & 
Stewart, 2016; Grenier, 2017).   Professional skepticism helps prevent and detect corrupt 
management practices (Grenier, 2017).  
Segregation of duties. Segregation of duties is the proper allocation of work, disallowing 
a single person to perpetrate and conceal fraud through their normal duties (Kobelsky, 2014). 
Skimming. Skimming is fraud that occurs when a perpetrator takes cash from an 
organization before it appears on the company’s accounting records (Maguire, 2017). 
Task rotation. Task rotation involves cross-training employees on multiple jobs and 
periodically rotating responsibilities (Jones, 2014). 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). The AICPA is the 
largest member association that represents the accounting profession and has been serving the 
public since 1887 (AICPA, 2019).  The AICPA sets ethical and auditing standards for private, 
nonprofit, and governmental agencies.  They grade the Certified Public Accounting (CPA) 
examination and provide specialty credentials to CPAs studying specific topics (AICPA, 2019). 
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). Congress passed SOX in 2002 as a response to 
numerous financial scandals in the U.S. (Chiu, Chien, & Lin, 2017; Zhang, 2007).  The act 
aimed to prevent deceptive accounting and management behavior by requiring stricter penalties 
for misconduct and proper management of conflicts of interest (Chiu et al., 2017; Park, 2016; 
Zhang, 2007). 
Whistle-blowing. Whistle-blowing is an act within business in which an existing or 
former employee reports illegal, unethical, or illegitimate behavior to someone who can take 
action and effect change (Henik, 2015; Lee, Pittroff, & Turner, 2018).  Through whistle-blowing, 
employees have a voice to encourage ethical change in an organization (Henik, 2015). 
Assumptions, Limitations, Delimitations 
The principal investigator began this study with four assumptions and four limitations. 
The principal investigator explains the assumptions, limitations, and delimitations of the study in 
this section. 
Assumptions. The principal investigator grouped following four assumptions into two 
categories: assumptions about the participants and assumptions about the findings. 
Assumptions about the participants. An assumption held by the principal investigator 
was the expectation of participants to answer interview questions honestly.  Literature reveals 
that this is not always accurate (Vrij et al., 2017).  This is particularly true regarding sensitive 
information.  Participants are hesitant to share more information regarding sensitive issues, such 
as fraud, if they sense a negative reaction from the interviewer, even if the reaction is 
unintentional (Pickard, Roster, & Chen, 2016).  Additionally, the principal investigator held the 
assumption that many NFP accountants and leaders within South Central Pennsylvania 
understand the definition of asset misappropriation fraud. Researchers have determined that 90% 
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of fraud occurring in NFPs is asset misappropriation (Johansson & Carey, 2016).  However, the 
definition of asset misappropriation is broad, meaning that the participants could hold a different 
understanding than the principal investigator (Kennedy, 2018). 
Mitigating risks associated with participants. To alleviate risk related to dishonest 
interviews, the principal investigator will attempt to remain unbiased by not providing thoughts 
or opinions about participants’ specific situations. Researchers have also shown that asking 
unexpected questions leads to honest answers, as the interviewee does not have time to prepare a 
response (Parkhouse & Ormerod, 2018).  The principal investigator asked specific questions to 
each interviewee to retain uniformity across cases.  However, the interviewee did not know the 
questions beforehand, eliminating the possibility of planning answers.  To encourage 
comprehensive and uninhibited responses, the principal investigator protected all information 
provided reminded participants that they were free to withdraw from the study for any reason.  
To mitigate the risk of misunderstanding, the principal investigator began the interviews by 
explaining the definition of asset misappropriation, as it related to this study. This provided 
clarity and resulted in responses that were relevant.  
Assumptions about the findings. The principal investigator assumed the findings would 
reveal that the NFPs studied have a lack of fraud prevention, detection, and management tools 
implemented.  Research indicates that NFPs have weaker internal controls and lack individuals 
with financial expertise (Greenlee, Fischer, Gordon, & Keating, 2007; Kummer et al., 2015). 
Moreover, Greenlee et al. (2007) explains that NFPs lack the regulatory resources to take 
appropriate action when fraud exists.  Another assumption was that recognizing the lack of fraud 
prevention, detection, and management tools would help managers and accountants recognize 
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their fraud risk and encourage them to implement tools to reduce risk (Archambeault & Webber, 
2017; Panepento, 2008).  
Mitigating risks associated with findings. There is risk in assuming that all NFPs have a 
lack of fraud prevention, detection, and management tools implemented and their employees lack 
financial expertise.  Assuming this, the principal investigator ignores the idea that some NFPs 
have avoided fraud. To mitigate this, the principal investigator scrutinized peer-reviewed articles 
about NFP fraud and sought information about how NFPs in South Central Pennsylvania have 
been able to avoid fraud.  Additionally, there is risk in assuming that the research findings would 
enable managers and accountants to significantly reduce fraud risk.  Not all NFP organizations 
have the resources to implement stronger fraud prevention, detection, and management tools. 
Conducting the research and reporting findings would not necessarily lead to lower fraud risk in 
all NFP organizations.  The principal investigator conducted extensive research regarding tools 
that are free to implement as well as those that use company resources to provide a wide array of 
fraud prevention, detection, and management tools for different sized NFPs. 
Limitations. The principal investigator separated the following limitations into two 
categories: limitations concerning the participants and limitations concerning the principal 
investigator. 
Limitations concerning the participants. The most prominent limitation is the small 
sample size. De Beuckelaer and Wagner (2012) explain the importance of avoiding 
generalizations when using a small sample.  However, Marshall, Cardon, Poddar, and Fontenot 
(2013) explain that the adequate number of interviewees for a multiple case study is variable, 
with the majority of one-author studies containing 11 to 20 interviews. Creswell (2007) believes 
that a multiple case study should not exceed five or six cases.  The principal investigator believes 
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that the achievement of data saturation is possible with a smaller sample size using a multiple 
case study design.  
Additionally, limitations exist because of the sensitivity of the topic.  Research identifies 
fraud as a sensitive topic (Groenitz, 2016).  Because of the negative consequences of revealing 
occurrences of fraud in an organization, there might not be willing participants.  Fraud occurring 
in NFP organizations are more likely to attract attention and cause the reputation of the company 
to be at risk (O’Brien, 2013).  To avoid negative public attention, many NFP organizations 
manage fraud internally (Harris et al., 2017).  Finally, there was a limitation regarding the 
potential for participants to withhold information.  Participants might be uncomfortable sharing 
certain information that could damage the reputation of a colleague or the company (Mealer & 
Jones, 2014).  To alleviate these limitations, the principal investigator informed all potential 
participants of their anonymity and of the protection of their information, including interview 
responses.  The principal investigator also conducted interviews at a neutral location with a 
reserved room to protect privacy.  
The final limitation exists because the principal investigator could only contact 
participants whose NFP organization had contact information available online.  The principal 
investigator had no way of contacting participants whose organizations did not list contact 
information on websites including Google, Pennsylvania Association Nonprofit Organization 
(PANO), and NFP websites.  Because of this, self-selection was involved in the recruiting 
process.  To alleviate this limitation, the principal investigator included purposive snowball 
sampling in the recruitment process, encouraging recruited participants to pass the invitation on 
to other NFP professionals who fit the study criteria. 
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Limitations concerning the principal investigator. One limitation concerning the 
principal investigator was the ability for them to recall information accurately during and after 
each interview.  The principal investigator mitigated this with a recording device.  During each 
interview, the principal investigator recorded the conversation and transcribed it later to analyze 
and compare to other interviews.  The use of a recording device also allowed the principal 
investigator to listen to the interviews again to detect answers that needed clarification. 
Furthermore, during interviews, the principal investigator repeated any information that was 
confusing or needed clarification to avoid reporting incorrect information. 
Delimitations. The principal investigator studied fraud in NFP organizations within 
South Central Pennsylvania. The study only examined the prevention, detection, and 
management of asset misappropriation fraud within the participating organizations.  The 
principal investigator excluded other types of fraud from the study to focus all attention on the 
most common in NFPs (ACFE, 2018c).  The principal investigator delimited the research by 
ensuring all participants had earned a bachelor’s degree, at minimum.  This increased the 
probability that the participants had an educational background in accounting and understood 
common fraud prevention, detection, and management tools.  
Furthermore, the principal investigator did not limit the participant pool to only NFPs 
with known fraud.  By selecting from all NFPs, the principal investigator gained a deeper 
understanding of effective fraud prevention, detection, and management techniques.  The 
principal investigator included 15 NFPs.  The smaller sample size allowed the principal 
investigator to focus more attention on each case, gaining more data about the effectiveness of 
the tools and techniques used. 
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An open-ended questioning technique further delimited the study.  The principal 
investigator determined that using rating scales and/or dichotomous scales would be ineffective 
in understanding the true experiences of the participants because they would limit their 
responses.  The principal investigator sought to explore the experiences the participants had with 
asset misappropriation and obtain their opinions, for this reason, open-ended questions were 
most effective (Weller et al., 2018). 
Significance of the Study 
This study will further the field of accounting by reducing gaps in literature related to 
techniques that prevent, detect, and manage fraud. NFP accountants and leaders will benefit from 
this research by learning effective means of fraud prevention, detection, and management.  These 
tools will enable their organizations to meet their mission and reduce loss. 
Reduction of gaps. Unlike the for-profit sector, there is minimal research regarding 
fraud in the NFP sector due to their preference for managing it internally (Archambeault et al., 
2014; Harris et al., 2017).  This study adds to existing literature by providing an analysis of 
various NFP organizations’ fraud prevention, detection, and management techniques, and how 
management uses them to reduce fraud risk and loss.  The research will investigate asset 
misappropriation, an action that makes up approximately 90% of NFP fraud cases (Johansson 
& Carey, 2016).  
Benefits for accountants and leaders. Accountants and leaders in NFPs will benefit from 
this study’s results by education of effective fraud identification, prevention, and management 
tools. NFP organizations struggle to find qualified, long-term help, as many workers are 
volunteers (Carey et al., 2013; Thornhill, et al., 2016).  This research will enable leaders to better 
qualify themselves and employees on effective fraud prevention, detection, and management 
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techniques.  The study’s results will help NFP organizations protect themselves from fraudsters 
by teaching them to recognize fraud risk, and how to change policies and procedures to lower 
risks. 
Implications for biblical integration. The Bible examines fraud and deceit thoroughly, 
explaining why it is evil, and the results of perpetrating fraud. The book of Proverbs has a 
wealth of wisdom related to the topic. In Proverbs 10:2 Solomon says, "Treasures gained by 
wickedness do not profit, but righteousness delivers from death" (ESV).  Later in Proverbs 
chapter 11, Solomon states, "A false balance is an abomination to the Lord, but a just weight is 
his delight" (Proverbs 11:1).  These verses indicate the consequences of fraud and the benefit of 
righteous behavior.  Studies verify that NFPs that experience fraud are more likely to have 
negative reputations and potential decreases in donations (Harris et al., 2017; Santos et al., 
2019). Through a Biblical lens, it is evident that fraud does not profit but yields destruction for 
NFP organizations.  
The Bible teaches that, “You shall not steal; you shall not deal falsely; you shall not lie to 
one another” (Lev. 19:11, ESV).  Leviticus 6:2 elaborates saying, anyone who deceives their 
neighbor about things entrusted to them, steals, or cheats a neighbor is sinning (NIV).   In 
Proverbs 1:19, Solomon explains that the path of those who gain profit dishonestly leads to the 
destruction of their own lives (NIV).   Conversely, those who deal justly and gain profit honestly 
are a delight to the Lord (Proverbs 11:1, ESV).  Studying Biblical text demonstrates that business 
people seeking success need to follow the Lord’s ordinances, be honest, trustworthy, and avoid 
fraud.   However, even with the knowledge and laws imparted, fraud was still a problem.  It is 
written in John 12:6 that Judas, a disciple of Jesus and keeper of the money bag, often “helped 
himself to what was put in it” (NIV).  
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Finally, the Bible expresses the value of being good stewards.  The parable of the three 
servants is one example of good stewardship (Matthew 25:14-30, NIV).  In relation to fraud, 
good stewardship means protecting the organization using fraud prevention, detection, and 
management.  Keller (2012) describes work as a way to serve others within the community, and 
that “Your daily work is ultimately an act of worship to the God who called and equipped you to 
do it…” (p. 80).   By learning policies and processes that can protect an organization from fraud, 
NFP accountants and leaders are worshipping the Lord through good stewardship and serving 
their community by building a stronger organization.  
Relationship to field of study. The topic of fraud relates directly back to the field of 
accounting.   Regardless of significant efforts to reduce fraud, it still exists within NFPs 
(Bradley, 2015).   NFP executives indicate that the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 reduced fraud (Nezhina & Brudney, 2012).   However, when comparing yearly reports 
from the ACFE between the years of 2004 and 2018 the average dollar amount of loss has 
remained steady, averaging $100,000 each year for NFPs (ACFE, 2004, 2006, 2014, 2016d, 
2018c).  Furthermore, in 2002, the AICPA issued the Statement on Auditing Standard No. 99 
(SAS 99), making auditors responsible for detecting fraud (Buchholz, 2012).  This regulation 
did not solve the problem, because auditors still do not discover most frauds (Bradley, 2015), 
creating scandal and reputational backlash (Buchholz, 2012; Cole, 2017).  The stagnation of 
fraud detection and prevention indicates the need for in-depth research that will provide 
suggestions to limit further loss.  
Fraud creates problems for NFP organizations including: loss of donor support, loss of 
trust, and a stained reputation (Archambeault & Webber, 2018).  To combat these consequences, 
many NFP organizations choose not to report fraud and manage it internally (Bromley & 
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Orchard, 2015).   If organizational leaders could be educated about effective fraud prevention, 
detection, and management techniques, and encourage employees to play a participative role in 
fraud prevention, they could lower their risk (Bradley, 2015).   Internal controls in NFPs are 
verifiably weak, this study will teach accountants and leaders to improve existing policies and 
procedures, and lower fraud risk (Archambeault & Webber, 2018).  This study was designed to 
examine asset misappropriation, which causes significant economic damage to organizations 
(Mustafa & Youssef, 2010).  The need to reduce economic impairment in NFP organizations 
relates directly to the study of accounting. 
Summary of the significance of the study. This accounting-based study on fraud in 
NFP organizations will fill some gaps in literature by providing analysis of tools and techniques 
NFP accountants and leaders can use to prevent, detect, and manage fraud effectively. 
Specifically, this research will examine asset misappropriation fraud.  The Bible teaches the 
problems that fraud can cause for organizations and individuals.  This research will benefit 
organizations, as well as accountants and leaders, by using a Biblical viewpoint to teach the 
best ways to manage fraudulent behavior.  NFP leaders and accountants will learn valuable 
techniques to protect against fraud, allowing them to be good stewards of their assets and 
further their missions. 
A Review of the Professional and Academic Literature 
Fraud is a constant and growing problem within NFP organizations (Bradley, 2015).  In 
this literature review, the principal investigator will discuss research regarding; occupational 
fraud, the prevalence of fraud in NFPs and its effects, theories that help NFPs understand fraud 
prevention, detection, and management, and common tools and techniques to deter fraud.  Each 
topic contains sub-categories explained in detail.  The principal investigator will identify each 
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topic’s relevance to the study.  Examples of NFP fraud and its effects further explain the 
problem.  Reviewing existing literature and research, the principal investigator will explore gaps 
that this study will fill.  The principal investigator will analyze existing literature to gather data 
regarding fraud prevention, detection, and management practices.  The study results will 
incorporate existing literature to develop best practices for NFPs to reduce fraud and related risk. 
The principal investigator reviewed professional and academic source literature.  Of the 
183 sources referenced, 147 were published after 2014.  However, the principal investigator used 
older sources if they provided relevant information not discovered elsewhere.  To maintain 
professional standards, sources came from peer-reviewed journals, magazines, and websites of 
accounting and finance professionals.  This literature review will explain the problem the 
principal investigator is studying and will explain how it relates to previous research and fills 
gaps in existing literature. 
Fraud. Fraud is a criminal or deceptive act intended to provide a benefit to the 
perpetrator, such as financial gain (Arboleda, Guzman-Luna, & Torres, 2018).  Occupational 
fraud, also called white-collar crime, is fraud perpetrated against an organization by an 
employee (Moore, 2018; Suh, Nicolaides, & Trafford, 2019).  When the fraudster perpetrates 
occupational fraud, they use their position within the company for personal enrichment 
(Bradley, 2015).  
Fraud has consistently been a problem in for-profit and NFP organizations, resulting in an 
average of 5% loss of revenues per year (Aris, Arif, Othman, & Zain, 2015; Etheridge, 2015; 
Lowe, Pope, & Samuels, 2014).  Existing literature does not categorize percentage of loss by 
sector.  However, the distinction is important but requires further research. The ACFE 
discovered, in a study of 2,690 cases of occupational fraud, detection took approximately 16 
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months (ACFE, 2018c). Because of the repercussions of reporting and publicizing fraud, many 
organizations prefer to manage it internally (Harris et al., 2017).   Some organizations find little 
benefit in reporting fraud to major authorities if they can manage the issue internally (Bonny, 
Goode, & Lacey, 2015).  Still, other companies determine to manage fraud privately to avoid 
consequences of public attention, such as reputational damage or loss of future funding 
(Archambeault et al., 2015). 
Scandals at companies including Enron and WorldCom revealed that stricter anti-fraud 
regulations were needed (Lowe et al., 2015).   As a result, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX) and the Statement on Auditing Standard No. 99 (SAS 99) were passed.  They imposed 
stricter requirements on managers and auditors and more severe penalties for fraudulent actions 
(Jessup & Nance, 2011).  Although SOX is typically associated with public and private for-profit 
entities, there are provisions that relate to NFPs (Saxton & Neely, 2018).  Although the SOX 
requirements for NFPs are more lenient, they can follow mandates specific to public and for-
profit companies to improve fraud prevention, detection, and management techniques and protect 
against such occurrences (Archambeault & Webber, 2018).  
Occupational fraud includes three categories: corruption, financial statement fraud, and 
asset misappropriation (Moore, 2018; Suh et al., 2019; Timofeyev, 2015).  Each category 
contains sub-categories that define specific types of each fraud.  Although each fraud is unique, 
they all share four elements; 1) The perpetrators act in secret, 2) The actions violate the trust of 
the employer, 3) The purpose of perpetrating the fraud is to gain an undue benefit, and 4) They 
cost the company assets, revenues, or reserves (Holtfreter, 2005).  In the following sections, the 
principal investigator will expand upon each type and pinpoint the specific frauds that make up 
the broader categories.  
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Corruption. The ACFE utilizes a fraud tree (Figure 1) to categorize occupational fraud, 
the first branch is corruption (ACFE, 2019c).  Corruption exists when an employee 
inappropriately uses their influence in a business dealing to obtain a benefit for themselves that 
conflicts with their duty to their employer (Greenlee et al., 2007; Harris et al., 2017; Holtfreter, 
2005; Kummer et al., 2015; Timofeyev, 2015).  The ACFE’s 2018 report to the nations indicates 
38% of the 2,690 cases of fraud surveyed included forms of corruption.  Of these cases, the 
average duration of the scheme was 22 months (ACFE, 2018c).  Because corruption is 
compatible with other frauds, it often occurs in connection with another form (Moore, 2018). 
The ACFE supports this, indicating that only 9% of cases exist as corruption only (ACFE, 
2018c; ACFE, 2016d; ACFE, 2014).  
Tunley, Button, Shepherd, and Blackbourn (2018) state that corruption limits innovation, 
distorts fair competition, and creates an opportunity for more severe crimes.  Research suggests 
that countries with high levels of corruption have lower levels of growth; however, the results of 
corruption in businesses are less direct (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016).  Business people rationalize 
their corrupt actions, creating a false sense of ethical standing (Rabal & Kühlmann, 2009). 
Managers might convince themselves that corruption, such as bribery, is another form of 
competitive advantage (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016).  In the NFP sector, corruption is easier to 
perpetrate due to lack of accountability, particularly regarding small donors.  To deter these 
practices, NFPs can maintain independent voting boards, release the names of board members, 
and voluntarily publish audit results (LeClair, 2018). Corruption includes: bribery, kickbacks, 
illegal gratuities, economic extortion, and conflicts of interest (ACFE, 2019c; Hauser, 2018; 
Wells, 2017).  
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Bribery. Bribery is an exchange between two individuals for some form of privilege or 
benefit (Dávid-Barrett, 2017). There are two classifications of bribery: commercial bribery and 
official bribery (ACFE, 2018b). Commercial bribery is offering something of value to another 
individual to receive a “…transaction opportunity or advantageous transaction condition” (Jiejiao 
& Dehua, 2015, p. 93). Official bribery involves a public or foreign official (Griffiths, 2016). 
Until the 1990s, bribery of foreign officials was a common, expected, and accepted practice. 
However, in 1997 the Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
met and signed a treaty to deter bribery worldwide (Teichmann, 2018).  Despite the actions of 
the council, the ACFE has seen an increase in bribery risk (ACFE, 2018a).  Bribery risk can be 
reduced by increased financial reporting transparency because it exposes management’s 
stewardship to the public (Khalil, Saffar, & Trableski, 2015). 
Kickbacks. Kickbacks are a bribe that the seller of a product gives to entice a buyer to 
purchase their product or service (Chow, 2014).  To deter this fraud, legislators passed two laws. 
In 1972 the Anti-Kickback Statute passed prohibiting kickbacks from taking place between 
businesses in the healthcare industry (Crane, Kingsbury, Lovitch, & Roll, 2014).  Between 1946 
and 2011, the government created, passed, and improved the Anti-Kickback Act, which applied 
to the broader business community and prohibited kickbacks related to any federal contract 
(Batter, 2015).  Both laws enforce strict penalties on the employees who offer or receive 
kickbacks (Batter, 2015; Crane et al., 2014).  The ACFE suggests looking for warnings (also 
labeled “red flags”) that are typical of kickbacks and protecting the organization against them. 
Some of these red flags include: significant increases in vendor charges, quickly made payments 
to specific vendors, increased expense reimbursements prior to gaining a new contract, and 
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vague or suspicious accounts with high balances in the chart of accounts (ACFE, 2019b; Tie, 
2010).  
Illegal gratuities. Illegal gratuities are a form of commercial corruption similar to 
bribery; something of value is given, offered, or promised (Winkelman, 2018).  The main 
difference is that to prove bribery, intent must be shown, however, to prove illegal gratuities, the 
item of value must have been given in return of an act being done (Winkelman, 2018).  Hauser 
(2018) explains that illegal gratuities are a reward for a “…favorable discretionary decision 
being made” (p. 3).  This is another difference from bribery. Rather than the item of value 
encouraging a favorable outcome, it is a reward given after making a decision (Baader & 
Krcmar, 2018). Auditors provide suggestions for preventing actions related to illegal gratuities 
including: preserving whistleblower hotlines and implementing policies prohibiting employees 
from accepting gifts from vendors or customers (Jeppesen, 2018).  
Economic extortion. Any advantage gained by coercion or threat is economic extortion 
(Hauser, 2018).  Economic extortion is a form of commercial corruption (Jeppesen, 2018). 
Similar to bribery, extortion involves a payment made of something of value; the difference is 
that the suggestion of payment comes from the individual receiving the benefit (Wright et al., 
2006). According to FindLaw (2019) economic extortion is a felony in the United States. 
Avoiding corruption is vital for organizations to retain positive reputations with the public. 
The ACFE (2019a) provides guidance to reduce the risk of economic extortion within 
organizations, including:  
1. Analyze email, social media, and other sources for common ownership. 
2. Review employee weekend work activity. 
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3. Identify employees who download and send company information to individuals 
outside of the organization. 
4. Detect email contacts that are known shell organizations.  
By remaining vigilant over employees’ actions, employers can lower risk of economic extortion. 
Conflicts of interest. Conflicts of interest occur when an employee partakes in a 
transaction within an organization, in which they have an undisclosed personal or economic 
interest affecting the company (Reed et al., 2012).  Catchick (2014) explains that a conflict of 
interest exists when an employee can abuse their professional position for personal gain.  When 
an employee, specifically a CPA, recognizes that a conflict exists, the AICPA requires the 
conflict be revealed to all parties involved and the threat be evaluated (Rood, 2017).  A conflict 
of interest is not automatically corruption (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2008). Alternatively, 
corruption always involves a conflict of interest.  All forms of corruption result in personal gain 
by exploiting professional position (Timofeyev, 2015).  
Conflicts of interest can be limited with appropriate segregation of duties, maintaining 
whistleblower hotlines, providing strict guidelines for what constitutes a conflict of interest, and 
preapproval of vendors (Jeppesen, 2018).  Rood (2017) suggests employees refer to the acronym 
ACE: awareness, communication, and exit when managing potential conflicts of interest.  First, 
the employee needs to be aware of any existing or potential conflicts of interest and evaluate the 
risk involved. Secondly, they need to communicate the risk to others, such as a manager.  Using 
proper communication, the employee with the conflict discloses it to any affected parties, 
refrains from making or voting on any decisions related to the conflict, and provides 
documentation regarding the conflict and how the employer can remain objective (Catchick, 
2014; Rood, 2017).  Finally, if the risk is significant, the employee with the conflict must remove 
Running Head: FRAUD IN NOT-FOR-PROFITS 34 
themselves from any related transactions (Rood, 2017).  Following the ACE steps, organizations 
can implement policies that require disclosure of conflicts and risk determination and 
management. 
Financial statement fraud. Financial statement fraud is the intentional misrepresentation 
of a company’s financial statements with the intention of deceiving the statements’ users 
(Albrecht et al., 2015; Nindito, 2018).  This fraud is mainly top-down and affects the perpetrator, 
the organization, and society (Albrecht et al., 2015).  Financial statement fraud is the least 
common occupational fraud but, on average, it results in financial losses approximately seven 
times higher than asset misappropriation and three times higher than corruption (ACFE, 2014; 
ACFE, 2016d; ACFE, 2018c).  Between the years of 2014 and 2018, approximately 10% of the 
cases that the ACFE identified involved financial statement fraud.  Of the 2,690 cases reported 
by the ACFE in 2018, the ones related to financial statement fraud resulted in an average loss of 
$800,000 each and lasted approximately 2 years.  
Financial statement fraud is significantly harmful because its effects are widespread. 
Auditors can be affected by legal ramifications from not detecting financial statement fraud, the 
company's reputation is negatively impacted when fraud is publicized, and investors can 
experience losses in the economy and stock market (Huang, Lin, Chiu, & Yen, 2017; Tang, Liu, 
Yang, & Wei, 2018).  Research from the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission (COSO) (2010) used a sample of 311 companies that experienced 
financial statement fraud and discovered 28% went bankrupt after the fraud discovery, and 47% 
were delisted from the stock exchange involuntarily.  These consequences make financial 
statement fraud a major concern for organizations and their existing and potential investors 
(Tang et al., 2018). 
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Financial statement fraud occurs for various reasons.  The most common motivator is the 
desire to avoid the consequences of publishing the company's actual financial performance 
(Albrecht et al., 2015).  Huang et al. (2017) explain that pressure and incentive come from 
various sources: pressure to meet expectations from analysts, compensation bonuses incentives, 
pressure to obtain external financing, or pressure to conceal poor performance.  In past cases of 
financial statement fraud, the perpetrator was not benefiting personally from the fraud, rather the 
motivation was to preserve leadership, or company status (Fraud Magazine, 2003).  
Although financial statement fraud is time-consuming and expensive to detect, there are 
ways that organizations can prevent, identify, and manage it effectively (Tang et al., 2018).  
One way to limit this fraud is to alter employee incentives, making management behavior align 
with shareholder goals (Albrecht et al., 2015).  Furthermore, strengthening internal controls and 
segregation of duties prevents fraud perpetrated by a single employee and decreases risk 
(Munteanu, Copcinschi, Luschi, & Lăceanu, 2017).  According to the ACFE (2019a) financial 
statement fraud includes: fictitious revenues, timing differences, improper asset valuation, 
incorrect liabilities, and unsuitable disclosures.  
Fictitious revenues. Fictitious revenue schemes result from increasing the revenue of a 
company by creating journal entries of revenue for undelivered goods and/or services (Zack, 
2013).  Perpetrators record this revenue in one of three ways: recording sales without connecting 
it to a specific customer, recording sales to a fake customer, or recording fake sales to a real 
customer (Zack, 2013).  Another fictitious revenue scheme is channel stuffing. Channel stuffing 
falsely increases revenue and earnings by shipping more product than a customer can sell 
(Donegan, Ganon, & Johnson, 2017; Schoen, Hughes, & Kowalsky, 2017). This practice can 
interrupt the timing of cash flows, damage customer relationships, and has legal ramifications 
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(Donegan, et al., 2017).  Cases of fictitious revenue discovered at companies such as Enron and 
Satyam Computer Services increase the need for segregation of duties and internal controls that 
limit such risk (Haswell & Evans, 2018; Zack, 2013).  
A common sign of fictitiously recorded revenue is the existence of significantly overdue 
accounts receivable (ACFE, 2016a).  From an internal or external auditor’s perspective, 
significant and late receivables, no traceable documentation for sales, a sudden increase in sales 
with all other company operations staying constant, or poor cash flows status are red flags to 
monitor (Fraud Fighting, 2017b).  Prevention of financial statement fraud helps organizations 
remain reputable.  The ACFE (2019a) offers five techniques for companies to implement to 
lower their risk: 
1. Compare incentives monthly to pinpoint any unusual spikes. 
2. Locate revenue recognized at the end of a period including reversed or partially 
reversed revenue and identify the cause. 
3. Scrutinize monthly gross margin and investigate any outliers. 
4. Review sales to customers missing company information. 
5. Analyze employee emails, looking for trigger words such as “incentive/pressure, 
opportunity, and rationalization” (¶ 6).  
Organizations can enhance their fraud prevention, detection, and management tools by 
implementing techniques and supporting increased internal controls and appropriate segregation 
of duties. 
Timing differences. Timing differences involve the recording of revenues early and/or 
expenses and liabilities late (Wells, 2001).  This recording difference results in the shifting of 
revenues or expenses to alter the reported earnings (ACFE, 2016a).  The most common 
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motivation for perpetrating financial statement fraud using a timing difference is to make a 
specific period appear better than it was (Zack, 2013).  Making a period appear stronger allows 
the perpetrator to meet requirements needed to receive loans or revenue goals related to 
compensation bonuses (Wells, 2001).  
Monitoring and limiting risk of financial statement fraud involving timing differences to 
the extent possible is vital.  McGee and Byington (2015) offer a few suggestions, including:  
1. Analyzing rapid growth or profitability compared to other organizations in the same 
industry. 
2. Monitoring the number of days sales remains in receivables, especially items with 
unusual growth. 
3. Investigating unusual declines in the number of days purchases are in accounts 
payable. 
Making employees and leaders aware of red flags for timing difference schemes 
decreases potential risk (McGee & Byington, 2015).  Dedicating time to locate indicators will 
limit long-term loss by recognizing fraud and reducing the associated expense.  
Improper asset valuation. According to the ACFE (2019c), improper asset valuation is 
the incorrect valuation of a company’s asset(s).  The most common assets to be miss-valued 
include inventory, accounts receivable, and fixed assets (Hasan, Omar, Rahman, & Hossain, 
2016).  Improper asset valuation mainly to inspire a potential buyer during acquisition, or to 
obtain loans from financial institutions (Fraud Fighting, 2017c).  Skaife and Wangerin (2012) 
discovered that improper asset valuation was the second most common reason target 
organizations in an acquisition failed to make the deal, resulting in reissued financial statements.  
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Perpetrators can value assets improperly using different methods. The easiest method is 
to report assets that the company does not own (Zack, 2013).  During audits, requesting the 
documentation for the asset in question may identify this fraud; all owned assets require 
documentation proving their ownership; missing documents are a red flag.  Other ways to value 
assets incorrectly include misclassifying inventory, implementing the inventory flow model 
improperly, using the wrong labor and overhead rates, manipulating vendor invoices to increase 
per-unit costs, or failing to document an impairment loss on inventory (Zack, 2013). Perpetrators 
manipulate accounts receivable by creating fake accounts receivables or failing to recognize 
uncollectable accounts (Fraud Fighting, 2017c). 
Incorrect valuation of assets is a problem, but there are ways to detect related risk. 
McGee and Byington (2015) state that employees and management should investigate the 
following red flags: 
1. Unusual gross margin growth in comparison to other companies in the industry. 
2. Revenue, assets, expenses, and liabilities established using estimates. 
3. Excessive growth in the number of days sales are in receivables, or purchases are in 
inventory. 
4. Changes in depreciation and fixed assets relationship. 
5. Purchasing new assets if others in the industry are reducing assets. 
6. Increased obsolete inventory and allowance for bad debts. 
If employees and managers heed these warning signs, there greater likelihood of 
detecting fraud and lowering risk.  By implementing anonymous reporting channels, such as 
whistle-blowing policies, organizations lower fraud risk further, enabling employees to report 
fraud without fear of negative consequences (Kaplan, Pany, Samuels, & Zhang, 2012).  
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Incorrect liabilities. The ACFE’s (2019b) fraud tree (Figure 1) indicates that incorrect 
liabilities include the overstatement and/or concealment of liabilities and expenses. Liabilities 
and expenses are overstated to lower the amount of profit recorded, allowing avoidance of 
making payments to shareholders and paying less tax on taxable profits (Fraud Fighting, 2017e). 
Understating, or concealing, liabilities is simpler because omitted transactions are more difficult 
to detect than falsely recorded ones (Hegazy & Kassem, 2010).  The three methods for 
concealing liabilities or expenses are omissions, capitalized expenses, and failure to disclose 
warranty costs and liabilities.  Liabilities are understated to allow an organization to obtain a loan 
or meet a debt covenant (Wei, Chen, & Wirth, 2017).  Recording decreased liabilities affects the 
debt-to-equity ratio determined by dividing total liabilities by total equity (ACFE, 2017a). 
Higher ratios make obtaining loans more difficult; if liabilities are understated, the company will 
have a lower ratio, increasing the opportunity of receiving a loan. 
According to McGee and Byington (2015), there are warning signs that can signal 
concealment of liabilities, including:  
1. Negative cash flow when earnings are increasing. 
2. Unusual growth in gross margin. 
3. Decreasing accounts payable when other companies in the industry are making 
vendor payments longer. 
4. Excessive involvement of nonfinancial managers in accounting principal selections. 
5. Establishing revenues, assets, expenses, and liabilities based on estimates. 
Concealed liabilities and expenses understate an organization’s indebtedness 
(Dimitrijevic, 2015).  This manipulates the reader of financial statements; manipulation affects 
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the granting of loans, deceives suppliers, attracts new investors, and stabilizes and/or alters the 
company’s share prices. 
Unsuitable disclosures. Unsuitable or improper disclosures (Figure 1) involve the 
inappropriate disclosure of information related to subsequent events, related-party transactions, 
changes in accounting principles, or contingent liabilities if it is material in nature (Bond Beebe, 
2016).  Management must accurately disclose material changes and provide any additional 
information that affects shareholders (Fraud Fighting, 2017d).  Because some disclosures involve 
subjective figures or complex accounting changes, management can find ways to omit or alter 
information to make it more favorable.  One significant disclosure to shareholders is related 
party transactions; using this, management identifies how the party connects to the company and 
how to manage the transaction to avoid fraud (Fraud Fighting, 2017d).  Boyle, Boyle, and 
Carpenter (2014) explained that from 2003-2005 over 25% of the civil enforcement actions taken 
by the SEC involved improper disclosure fraud.  However, in 2013, the percentage of improper 
disclosure actions decreased to 11% due to the SEC’s introduction of the accounting quality 
model that detects and prevents financial statement fraud.  
Although there has been a decrease in improper disclosure cases reviewed by the SEC, it 
is still crucial that organizations watch for indicators of potential fraud.  Common signals that 
companies should investigate for improper disclosures include: 
1. Domination of management by a single person or small group with no controls. 
2. Ineffective audit committees. 
3. Ineffective implementation and enforcement of ethical standards and management 
values. 
4. Rapid Increase in profitability compared to others in the industry. 
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5. Increased complex or unusual transactions at the end of a period. 
6. Increased unusual related-party transactions. 
7. Overly complex organizational structures. 
8. History of violation of regulatory laws. 
9. Management attempting to justify incorrect accounting based on materiality. 
10. Limited information access for the auditor (McGee & Byington, 2015).  
Heeding warning signs for incorrect disclosures can lower fraud risk and establish a 
reputation of honesty with investors. 
Asset misappropriation. Asset misappropriation is the fraud tree’s third branch (Figure 
1).  Asset misappropriation is the theft or misuse of company assets (Le & Tran, 2018). 
According to the ACFE’s report to the nations, 89% of the 2,690 cases studied involved asset 
misappropriation, costing companies an average of $114,000 annually (ACFE, 2018c).  These 
statistics demonstrate that asset misappropriation is the most common, but least costly, 
occupational fraud. Because of the different types of asset misappropriation, duration varies, 
ranging from 12 months for register disbursements to 24 months for payroll schemes (ACFE, 
2018c). 
Schemes involving asset misappropriation typically begin with minor thefts and increase 
over time as the perpetrator gains confidence (Albrecht, Kranacher, & Albrecht, 2008). 
Approximately two-thirds of asset misappropriation cases involve one perpetrator, however, 
research from the ACFE reveals that losses can be four times higher when collusion exists. 
Employees become involved in asset misappropriation schemes for different reasons: pressure 
from financial struggles, a negative attitude, or relationship with the company, temptation from 
poor internal controls and easily accessible assets, or the belief that they deserve what they steal 
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(LaVine, 2018).  The environment of trust and lack of internal controls makes organizations such 
as NFPs especially susceptible to asset misappropriation (Harris et al., 2017). 
Although asset misappropriation is the most common occupational fraud, there are signs 
indicating if it is occurring.  The varying forms of asset misappropriation each have different 
warning signs to heed (Kassem, 2014).  However, investigating journal entries, source 
documents, receipts, payee information, and invoices are vital (ACFE, 2016a).  Receiving 
invoices from vendors with consecutive invoice numbers suggesting the organization is the 
vendor’s only customer is a red flag for a billing scheme (Kramer, 2015).  Because asset 
misappropriation enables the perpetrator to gain financial benefits more quickly than other forms 
of fraud it is important to be conscious of any unusual changes in employee behavior and/or 
lifestyle (Albrecht et al., 2008).  However, this responsibility is not just an auditor’s or a 
manager’s, research has proven that tips are the most common form of detection (Kramer, 2015).  
Because of the general nature of the definition, the ACFE separates asset 
misappropriation into nine sub-categories that make up three main categories (Kennedy, 2018). 
The three categories are theft of cash receipts, fraudulent disbursements of cash, and other 
schemes.  Each of the categories is delineated further to discuss the specific forms of asset 
misappropriation: skimming, cash larceny, billing schemes, expense reimbursement schemes, 
check tampering, payroll schemes, cash register disbursements, misappropriation of cash-on-
hand, and non-cash misappropriations. 
Theft of cash receipts. Theft of cash receipts is the fraud tree’s first branch under asset 
misappropriation (Figure 1).  It involves stealing customer payments and other receipts (Forensic 
Accounting Services, LLC, 2008).  The basic definition of theft of cash receipts is, stealing cash 
(Wells, 2007).  Unlike other forms of fraud, theft of cash receipts does not require the perpetrator 
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to create false documents or forge signatures (Wells, 2017). The two most common forms of 
theft of cash receipts are skimming and cash larceny.  
Skimming involves taking cash from an organization before recording it in the 
accounting system (ACFE, 2017c).  Because of ease of execution, skimming is a common 
occupational fraud, occurring in 11% of cases (ACFE, 2018c).  Skimming can take 18-24 
months to detect and causes companies approximately $50,000 in loss annually (ACFE, 2014; 
ACFE, 2016d; ACFE, 2018c).  This form of theft of cash receipts can involve sales and accounts 
receivables (ACFE, 2016b).  The simplest form is skimming of sales, which involves a customer 
sending payment and the employee taking the payment without recording it on the books. 
Skimming receivables is more complex as the record of sale exists; taking the payment leaves 
the account overdue forcing the perpetrator to alter account balances or lap payments to hide the 
stolen funds. Because skimming can occur whenever funds enter the company, anyone who 
manages payments has the ability to skim (Wells, 2017).  Skimming is difficult to trace from 
audit trails because the payment never enters the accounting system (ACFE, 2017c). 
Though skimming is easy to perpetrate, there are ways that organizations can prevent 
victimization. Video monitoring spaces where employees manage cash, appropriately 
segregating duties, and performing inventory counts compared to current records, minimizes 
opportunity for fraudsters (ACFE, 2016b; Kramer, 2015).  Prevention methods do not identify all 
fraud, making detection techniques equally as important.  Companies can detect skimming by: 
investigating complaints from customers about payments not being posted to accounts, 
performing physical inventory counts, comparing the dates of payments to their posting dates to 
search for lapping, investigating uncollectable accounts with high balances, and reviewing 
employee bank accounts for similar names to the company’s (ACFE, 2016b; ACFE,2019a).  
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The second form of theft of cash receipts is cash larceny, the stealing of cash receipts 
from an entity after recording it in the accounting system (Byington & McGee, 2012).  Although 
cash larceny is a problem for businesses to be cognizant, it has proven to "…occur twice as often 
in small businesses" (Verschoor, 2014, p. 11). The ACFE report to the nations shows between 
2014 and 2018 that cash larceny is becoming more prevalent (ACFE, 2014; ACFE, 2016d; 
ACFE, 2018c).  In 2014, 8.9% of the 1,483 cases studied involved cash larceny (ACFE, 2014). 
However, in 2018, 11% of the 2,690 cases involved this fraud (ACFE, 2018c).  Cash larceny 
lasts approximately 18-24 months and costs the organization an average of $75,000 per year. 
The two main forms of cash larceny are theft of cash from the register, and cash larceny 
from deposits (ACFE, 2016b).  Theft of cash from the register, which involves opening the 
register and taking cash, is the simplest form (ACFE, 2016b).  Cash larceny from deposits occurs 
when an employee takes cash or checks from an organization's deposits before depositing them 
into the bank (Byington & McGee, 201a).  Companies can take precautions to lower risk and 
detect cash larceny more quickly by analyzing deposit slip books, using surveillance, 
investigating unusual deposits in transit, and following up on questions and complaints from 
customers about payments not being posted (ACFE, 2017b).  Business practices including strict 
segregation of duties, performing regular bank reconciliations, stamping checks as "For Deposit 
Only," and storing the bank deposits in a secure location will help prevent cash larceny 
(Byington & McGee, 2012). 
Fraudulent disbursements of cash. Another branch of the fraud tree is fraudulent 
disbursements of cash (Figure 1).  This form of asset misappropriation is the most common 
(ACFE, 2017b; Wells, 2017).  A study conducted by Andon, Free, and Scard (2015) revealed 
that 132 of the 192 cases of fraud studied involved fraudulent disbursements of cash. The ACFE 
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separates fraudulent disbursements of cash into five sub-categories: billing schemes, payroll 
schemes, expense reimbursement schemes, check and payment tampering, and register 
disbursements (ACFE, 2018c).  
Billing schemes cause an employer to issue payments by submitting false, inflated, or 
duplicated invoices, or invoices for personal purchases (Kramer, 2015).  A study by Sow, 
Basiruddin, Rasid, and Husin (2018) discovered that billing schemes are the most prevalent fraud 
in small businesses.  According to the 2018 ACFE report to the nations, billing schemes are 
involved in 20% of fraud cases and cost organizations approximately $100,000 per year (ACFE, 
2018c).  The ACFE reports proved that billing schemes go undetected for approximately two 
years (ACFE, 2014; ACFE, 2016d; ACFE, 2018c).  Billing schemes are easily perpetrated by an 
employee who has access to billing and accounting functions (Anand, Dacin, & Murphy, 2015). 
One common billing scheme involves shell companies, a fake company used to bill the 
victim for goods or services never received (Lowe et al., 2015).  Employees could also create a 
fictitious organization that acts as an intermediary between a legitimate company and the victim 
company earning profits on payments to the real vendor (Lehman & Weidenmier, 2005).  When 
perpetrated it often leaves a trail of signs that auditors can follow. Common warning signs 
include vendors’ name matching employee’s initials, vendor addresses matching employee’s 
address, vendor data missing, high-volume activity for new vendors, invoices that are lacking 
fold marks, or invoices being numbered consecutively (ACFE, 2017b; Kramer, 2015; Lehman & 
Weidenmier, 2005).  Investigating warning signs, and conducting unannounced reviews of 
vendor websites, vendor activity, duplicate purchase orders, sequential invoices, refunds 
distributed, and analytical reviews can help detect fraud and lower risk (ACFE, 2017b; ACFE, 
2019b).  
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A payroll scheme exists when someone initiates a false compensation claim, resulting in 
the employer issuing payment (Alleyne & Elson, 2013).  According to the 2018 ACFE report to 
the nations, payroll schemes were involved in 7% of the 2,690 fraud cases examined, and cost 
organizations approximately $63,000 annually (ACFE, 2018c).  This fraud can take two to two 
and a half years to detect and occurs 2.6 times as frequently in businesses with less than 100 
employees than those with more. 
The two forms of payroll schemes utilized include inflated claims for compensation by 
falsification of data and the theft of paychecks made out to a former or false employee (Daigle, 
Morris, & McSwain, 2017; Maguire, 2017).  Although individuals involved in payroll fraud are 
more likely to act alone by falsifying timecard data, it is common for an employee with payroll 
responsibilities to be involved (ACFE, 2014; Maguire, 2017).  Conducting periodic reviews of 
payroll records can help detect and prevent payroll schemes.  Signs to look for include payroll 
checks with no deductions and checks made out to employees who no longer work for the 
organization.  
Conducting reviews comparing payroll checks to human resources’ employee records can 
ensure that fake or former employees are not receiving payments (Maguire, 2017).  Furthermore, 
employers should establish proper segregation of duties; never allowing payroll staff to generate 
their own paychecks (Kappel, 2018).  Segregation of payroll tasks is vital; the same person 
should not hire employees, process payroll, and manage payroll accounting.  Additionally, 
employers can conduct internal audits, create a separate bank account for payroll funds, and 
routinely ensure proper payment of taxes to lower payroll scheme risk. 
Expense reimbursement schemes are the third branch of the fraud tree (Figure 1) and 
involve employees submitting false or inflated claims for reimbursement of business expenses 
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(Delaney, Coe, Coussens, & Reddington, 2015).  The ACFE report to the nations indicates that 
expense reimbursement schemes are included in 13% to 14% of fraud cases and can cost 
organizations $30,000 - $40,000 annually (ACFE, 2014; ACFE, 2016d; ACFE, 2018c).  The 
ACFE also indicates that expense reimbursement schemes have an average duration of two 
years.  This form of asset misappropriation occurs approximately twice as frequently in 
organizations with less than 100 employees than those with more than 100 employees.  Expense 
reimbursement schemes occur most commonly in the religious, charitable, social services, and 
professional services industries (ACFE, 2018c). 
Expense reimbursement schemes include: mischaracterized expenses, overstated 
expenses, fake expenses, or duplicate expenses (ACFE, 2017b).  Because the claimed expenses 
often occur when the employee is not with someone who can verify them, detecting expense 
reimbursement fraud is difficult (McGee & Byington, 2008).  However, there are ways to 
prevent and detect these schemes effectively.  Maguire (2017) suggests comparing employees’ 
historical expense trends and comparing employees with similar travel requirements to detect 
excessive reimbursement claims.  Other detection techniques include comparing travel dates with 
dates on receipts, obtaining random confirmations from clients for business meal expenses, and 
having the expenses reviewed by a manager outside of the employee’s department (McGee & 
Byington, 2008).  Prevention of expense reimbursement schemes is ideal; to effectively prevent 
this fraud, research suggests setting up an accounting system that identifies duplicate payments, 
not allowing cash advances, being consistent with travel policies, informing employees that 
periodic audits of expenses will be conducted, and requiring receipt documentation for expenses 
claimed (Maguire, 2017; McGee & Byington, 2008; Wells, 2017).  
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The fourth branch of asset misappropriation is check or payment tampering (Figure 1). 
Check or payment tampering involves taking company checks and making them payable to 
oneself (Fraud Fighting, 2017a).  The 2018 ACFE report to the nations revealed that check and 
payment tampering was the costliest form of asset misappropriation, costing approximately 
$150,000 per year (ACFE, 2018c).  This fraud was involved in 12% of the 2,690 cases studied, 
and took two years to detect.  Check and payment tampering occurred 2.75 times more 
frequently in businesses with less than 100 employees than those with more than 100 and was 
most commonly present in the professional services industry.  The most common ways to 
perpetrate this fraud include forged maker, forged endorsements, altered payees, and authorized 
endorsement schemes (Fraud Fighting, 2017a; McGee & Byington, 2013). 
Check and payment tampering are unique because the perpetrator does not have to create 
false documentation to steal funds, they simply obtain company checks and forge them (McGee 
& Byington, 2013).  However, the perpetrator can be anyone within the organization with access 
to unsecured checks (Marden & Kaenzig, 2013).  Detecting this fraud can be problematic 
because the perpetrator is often the same individual who conducts bank reconciliations, allowing 
them to alter information and cover their tracks (McGee & Byington, 2013).  To prevent check 
or payment tampering, segregation of duties should exist that prevent one employee from issuing 
checks and reconciling bank statements.  Other forms of detection include; finding missing, 
duplicate, or out of sequence checks and investigating checks that were paid but do not match the 
check issued (Debenham, 2016). 
In the ACFE fraud tree, register disbursement schemes are the last branch under 
fraudulent disbursements (Figure 1).  This fraud is the least common form of asset 
misappropriation, occurring in only 2%-3% of fraud cases (ACFE, 2014; ACFE, 2016d; ACFE, 
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2018c).  Register disbursements cost organizations approximately $20,000-$30,000 annually and 
take approximately one year to detect.  This form of theft commonly occurs in the sales 
department of retail organizations (ACFE, 2018c). 
Register disbursements include false refunds and false voids (ACFE, 2010; ACFE, 
2017b).  A false refund occurs when the perpetrator enters a transaction on the register indicating 
a return but keeps the issued funds for themselves.  A false void occurs when the employee at the 
register keeps a receipt from a customer and processes a voided sale keeping the money for 
themselves (ACFE, 2019e).  Employers can detect register disbursement fraud by comparing the 
number of voided sales by the sales clerk and investigating any outliers, reviewing refunds 
greater than the sales price of an item, and investigating voids or refunds under the review limit 
(ACFE, 2017b; ACFE, 2019b).  Prevention techniques include: preserving security of access 
codes to registers, conducting random cash counts of register drawers, maintaining supervision 
within the register locations, requiring and reviewing documentation for voids and refunds, and 
implementing segregation of duties regarding preparing a register count and ensuring it agrees to 
register totals (ACFE, 2010; Wells, 2017). 
Other schemes. Theft of cash-on-hand and theft of inventory and non-cash assets are the 
final two fraud tree branches (Figure 1). Theft of cash-on-hand occurs when physical cash that is 
kept at the business including cash secured in a vault, or petty cash, is stolen (ACFE, 2017b; 
Kennedy, 2018). The ACFE reveals that theft of cash-on-hand is the least costly fraud, resulting 
in an average loss of $20,000 per year (ACFE, 2018c). This form of asset misappropriation fraud 
exists in approximately 11%-15% of fraud cases and takes between one and one and a half years 
to discover (ACFE, 2014; ACFE, 2016d; ACFE, 2018c).  The arts, entertainment, and recreation 
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industry experiences theft of cash-on-hand most often, commonly in the customer services 
department (ACFE, 2018c). 
The cash register is the likeliest place for theft of cash to occur; employees can steal the 
cash at any point during a transaction (Fraud Fighting, 2017f).  This fraud differs from skimming 
because there is a transaction recorded. Employers can detect theft of cash by counting the till 
every time an employee leaves for the day and reconciling cash-on-hand with the balances 
shown in the accounting system (ACFE, 2019b).  Implementing policies that deter employees 
from stealing, such as counting the till between users or using cameras to monitor the spaces 
where cash is can prevent this fraud.  
Non-cash misappropriations are the final branch of the ACFE’s fraud tree (Figure 1). 
This is the theft of physical items of value, or the misuse of non-cash assets such as equipment 
(Albrecht et al., 2008).  Non-cash fraud occurs in approximately 21% of cases, costs 
organizations $98,000 annually, and takes approximately 18 months to identify (ACFE, 2018c). 
Unlike all other forms of asset misappropriation, non-cash theft occurs more often in companies 
with over 100 employees than those with less.  Theft of non-cash assets occurs most frequently 
in the purchasing department of retail organizations. 
The two forms of non-cash misappropriations are misuse of non-cash assets and theft of 
non-cash assets (ACFE, 2019b).  Misuse of non-cash assets includes using company computers, 
cars, and office supplies for personal use (ACFE, 2017b).  Theft of non-cash assets involves 
taking inventory or scrap and selling it later for personal financial gain.  Misuse is equally as 
harmful as theft of non-cash assets because using business assets for personal reasons causes 
deterioration that decreases its value and minimizes its productivity levels (ACFE, 2017b). 
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Although non-cash misappropriation is common, there are a significant number of ways to detect 
and prevent it. Effective detection tools include:  
1. Performing physical inventory counts to compare recorded amounts to actuals. 
2. Identify and investigate increases in bad debt expenses. 
3. Investigate any unexplained entries in perpetual inventory records. 
4. Look for signs of altered invoices. 
5. Perform historical analysis of inventory levels to detect shrinkage. 
6. Compare stock turnover. 
7. Compare ratios and trends in inventory to identify significant changes between 
periods (ACFE, 2017b; ACFE, 2019b; Ashcroft, 2011; Maguire, 2017).  
In conjunction with detection techniques, employers can utilize prevention tools to lower 
fraud risk related to non-cash misappropriation. Performing unplanned inventory counts, 
implementing strong segregation of duties and physical controls, and establishing a high moral 
environment can help prevent misappropriation of non-cash assets (Ashcroft, 2011; Daigle et al., 
2017; Maguire, 2017). These techniques encourage employees to have high ethical standards and 
deter theft and misuse by showing employees that management is closely monitoring non-cash 
assets 
Prevalence of fraud in NFPs and its effects. Fraud in NFP organizations is a growing 
problem (Bradley, 2015).  According to the ACFE (2018c), 9% of the 2,690 fraud victims were 
NFPs, and fraud cost those organizations approximately $75,000 annually.  Depending on the 
type of NFP, the average loss can vary; religious NFPs suffered revenue losses of $90,000 per 
year.  The true number of NFP fraud cases that exists is higher than what the ACFE studied; 
many NFPs prefer to manage fraud internally to avoid the costs related to publicly disclosing 
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scandals (Harris et al., 2017).  Although the losses incurred by reported NFP fraud was less 
than what for-profit organizations lost, the cost associated with NFP fraud is more than just 
financial.  The ACFE does not try to quantify the dollar amount associated with indirect loss 
such as effects on reputation (Archambeault & Webber, 2018).  
This review focuses on asset misappropriation as it is the most common form of fraud in 
NFP organizations (Archambeault & Webber, 2018; Harris et al., 2017; McDonnell & 
Rutherford, 2017).  The lack of internal controls, environment of trust, difficulty in verifying 
cash revenue streams, reliance on volunteers, and lack of resources makes NFPs particularly 
susceptible to asset misappropriation (McDonnell & Rutherford, 2018).  Although asset 
misappropriation is a less costly form of fraud identified in NFPs, there is a significant lack of 
research in this sector (Harris et al., 2017). In the following sections, the principal investigator 
will discuss specific forms of asset misappropriation fraud within NFP organizations and the 
effects that this fraud has on revenue and reputation.  
Examples of NFP asset misappropriation fraud. NFPs are not exempt from fraud; they 
are often more susceptible because of their lack of controls, the difficulty of verifying cash 
revenue, and an environment of trust (Kummer, et al., 2015). Examples of asset misappropriation 
in NFPs are numerous, some causing more financial harm than others do, but each one leads to 
distrust and high costs for the victim organization. Some examples of NFP asset 
misappropriation include: 
 The Leonardo DiCaprio Foundation was created to bring attention to 
environmental issues and fund solutions (Varner, 2016). In 2016, authorities 
discovered that the charity was part of an embezzlement scheme receiving $3 
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billion from the Malaysian state fund that was supposed to be promoting 
economic development in the country (Park, 2016).  
 In 2016 the chief executive officer (CEO) and chief operating officer (COO) of 
The Wounded Warrior Project was charged with spending lavish amounts of 
charitable funds on conferences and business travel (Fox News, 2016). The 2014 
tax statements identified $26 million spent on business travel and conferences, a 
substantial increase in spending from the $1.7 million in 2010. As a result, the 
organization fired the two men and has begun improving financial responsibility 
(Varner, 2016). 
 The executive director of the Finnish American Home Association (FAHA) 
embezzled $139,000 from the NFP organization using check tampering (Callahan, 
2018). 
 The treasurer of the Tri-Boro Youth Soccer Club was guilty of stealing $120,000 
from the NFP (Pennington, 2016). Mr. Farley was skimming funds that parents 
paid in cash and checks for their children to be in the league. 
 Amy Young, the director of family support at LifeLinks in Chelmsford 
Massachusetts, was guilty of stealing over $135,000 in taxpayer money meant for 
disabled children (Rasmussen, 2019). She had been using company funds to pay 
for gym memberships, doctor and dentist bills, electronic equipment, and home 
contractors.  Discovery of her fraud occurred when she had the NFP write a check 
to a bowling alley, claiming she had a Family Support Parents Night Out, but was 
paying for her sorority reunion party (Rasmussen, 2019). 
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These examples are a few of the asset misappropriation cases within NFP organizations. 
Though publicizing fraud occurs, many cases are not, organizations manage them internally as a 
means of avoiding scandal (Harris et al., 2017). Each of the fraudulent cases above had financial 
and reputational repercussions. Though some are able to overcome the scandal, others are not. 
Research suggests that over one-fourth of NFPs that have a publicized case of fraud do not 
survive more than three years beyond publication (Archambeault & Webber, 2018). Learning to 
properly detect, prevent, and manage fraud will help NFPs survive longer and achieve their 
missions more effectively. 
Effects on revenue. Fraud has detrimental consequences for NFP organizations.  A major 
consequence is the loss of revenue.  An analysis of fraud cases between January 2016 and 
October 2017 revealed that organizations lose 5% of their revenue to fraud annually (Moritz, 
2018).  The ACFE report to the nations studied 2,690 cases of fraud and discovered that  9% of 
them involved NFP companies, they lost approximately $75,000 annually (ACFE, 2018c). 
Although the number of recorded frauds is lower for NFPs and the amount of financial loss is 
significantly less, the loss they experience is often more damaging due to their minimal resources 
(ACFE, 2018c; Archambeault et al., 2015). When the public heard about fraud within United 
Way, their fundraising dropped from $90 million to $19 million over the next three years (Lee, 
2016).  Because NFPs rely primarily on donations as a source of revenue, losing significant 
support imposes mission meeting difficulties (Archambeault & Webber, 2018).  When fraud 
occurs in an organization, revenue decreases in two ways; by the amount stolen and by the 
amount that is lost in future revenue, such as donations. The dual effect on revenue is a major 
cause for NFPs to take action against fraud. 
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Effects on reputation. The effects that NFP fraud has on revenue are significant, but the 
effects on an NFP's reputation may be more so. With the growing levels of fraud, potential 
donors are more cautious with their funds and are researching NFPs before donating 
(Archambeault et al., 2015).  Charity rating sites such as Charity Watch and Charity Navigator, 
enable donors to separate the ethical from the unethical.  Although each site uses different 
metrics to measure morality, Charity Watch specifically identifies material asset 
misappropriation so its users will know how donations are spent.  Because NFP organizations 
rely on donations, many organizations chose not to report fraud to law enforcement for fear of 
bad publicity (Maguire, 2016).  The example of United Way suggests that a stained reputation 
can affect existing resources as well as future revenue due to donor perception (Lee, 2016). 
When fraud exists in an NFP organization, one consequence may be diminished ability to 
attract new personnel and volunteers (Santos, et al., 2019).  At the Wounded Warrior Project an 
Army Staff returning from Iraq admired the work the organization did and accepted a job.  Two 
years later he quit because he discovered purposeful mismanagement of donation revenue (Fox 
News, 2016).  This organization spent significant sums of money on lavish conferences and 
catered parties. After determining the misappropriation, the company fired those in charge of the 
spending and new leaders began to rebuild the NFP’s reputation. Ernst & Young (2019) 
discovered that in 2017, 82% of respondents would look for a new job if they discovered the 
company for which they worked was involved in fraudulent activities.  Furthermore, 93% of 
individuals stated that compliance culture and ethical behavior was an important factor in taking 
a job, or not.  Two out of five individuals would also be willing to take a pay cut to work for 
ethical organizations (Ernst & Young, 2019). 
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Theories on fraud prevention, detection, and management. Theories in qualitative 
research are an approach to answering a specific inquiry (Bradbury-Jones Taylor, & Herber, 
2014).  Because the characteristics of fraud are often missed before it occurs, theories help 
explain how it occurs and how to protect against it (Vousinas, 2019).  Fraud theorists seek to 
identify the major factors that make up fraudulent activity, so businesses can recognize 
suspicious behavior or activity, preventing fraud. The fraud triangle is one of the most well-
known and widely accepted theories to explain fraud (Sorunke, 2016).  Although the fraud 
triangle is popular, there are other theories used to explain how and why fraud occurs.  In the 
following sections, the principal investigator discusses the fraud triangle, the fraud 
management lifecycle theory, and the routine activity theory.  Each theory contributes specific 
ideas and explanations to the topic of occupational fraud and, when used together, provide a 
deeper understanding that can help employers protect their businesses. 
The fraud triangle. Donald Cressey developed the fraud triangle in 1953 (Lokanan, 
2015). The theory postulates that fraudulent activity occurs in the presence of three factors, 
pressure, opportunity, and rationalization (Huang et al., 2017; Huber, 2017; Morales et al., 
2014).  Cressey studied 250 criminals over a five-month period to determine what led to fraud 
perpetration (Abdullahi & Mansor, 2018).  This theory increases understanding of all 
occupational fraud; however, research indicates that the root causes of asset misappropriation are 
the elements of the fraud triangle (Bakri et al., 2017).  Pressure includes the circumstances of the 
perpetrator, which causes stress and leads to fraudulent behaviors (Mangala & Kumari, 2015). 
Opportunity is the ability to perpetrate fraud without punishment (Johansson & Carey, 2016). 
This element exists in poor workplace conditions such as weak internal controls that employees 
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exploit (Mui & Mailley, 2015).  Rationalization occurs when the perpetrator lowers their ethical 
values and justifies fraudulent behaviors (Brown, Hays, & Stuebs, 2016).  
An example best explains the elements of the fraud triangle.  In 2012, Rita Crundwell, the 
comptroller and treasurer of Dixon, Illinois was arrested for embezzling town funds (Udeh, 
2013).  During the following year, investigators discovered the extent of her fraud; Rita had 
embezzled money from Dixon, IL for 22 years, her theft totaled over $53 million (Carozza, 
2018; Janssen, 2017).  This embezzlement case resulted in the largest municipal monetary loss, 
nation-wide, in U.S. history (Daigle et al., 2017).  Citizens, employees, and fraud investigators 
have questioned how she was able to perpetrate her crime for that amount of time (Carozza, 
2018). 
Because Rita was the comptroller and the treasurer, she performed the majority of the 
town's financial duties including: maintaining custody of checks, signing checks, keeping invoice 
and bank records, performing reconciliations, and picking up the mail (Udeh, 2013). This severe 
lack of segregation of duties enabled Crundwell to control every aspect of her crime.  The 
element of opportunity was strengthened with the lack of due diligence by auditors and bank 
personnel (Hancox, 2014).  Bank confirmations identifying an unauthorized account, invoices 
with no Illinois Department of Transportation logo, invoices with typos and even dollar amounts, 
and no verification of assets purchased were a few recognizable red flags the auditors should 
have heeded.  Furthermore, the bank should have investigated the checks cashed by Rita that 
listed the recipient as "Treasurer" for hundreds of thousands of dollars (Apostolou, Apostolou, & 
Thibadoux, 2015).  Because Rita knew the controls within the city government were weak, the 
auditors were not doing their jobs adequately, and the banks were not following standard 
protocol, she was able to continue the fraud. 
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Examples of pressure to perpetrate fraud include: greed, maintaining an extravagant 
lifestyle, personal debt or expenses, and financial problems (Abdullahi & Mansor, 2018).  The 
pressure for Crundwell’s fraud was the desire to live beyond her means.  Crundwell used the 
stolen funds to finance her lifestyle, including multiple homes and vehicles, multiple horse-
farming operations for her championship horses, and extravagant jewelry (Daigle et al., 2017). 
Rita’s co-workers and horse-show acquaintances never knew how she funded her lifestyle; some 
believed her family was wealthy, others heard rumors that she inherited money from a deceased 
boyfriend (Pope, 2017).  Rita never said how she attained her wealth until the police caught her. 
With the embezzlement increasing year to year, it was clear she was doing so to fund her 
increasingly extravagant lifestyle.  
The final element, rationalization, is more difficult to understand as Rita never gave an 
interview explaining how she justified her fraud (Janssen, 2017).  However, research suggests 
that fraudsters commonly rationalize their actions by saying, "I was going to repay the money," 
"I was underpaid and deserved the money," or "I had to provide for my family" (Abdullahi & 
Mansor, 2018, p. 531).  Because Rita was funding her own lifestyle and exhibited no intention of 
repaying the funds over the 22-year period, onlookers might assume her rationalization came 
from receiving a low salary.  Jobs in the municipal government offer minimal pay and are often 
thankless (Pope, 2017).  Many individuals working in Dixon’s government had second jobs to 
make a decent living.  However, Rita had significant responsibility and did not believe she 
received adequate compensation, creating a rationalization for theft.  
Although the fraud triangle has been useful in understanding how and why occupational 
fraud occurs, theorists expanded it to mitigate the limitations it presents (Lokanan, 2015).  The 
fraud triangle fails to explain how companies can be accomplices to illegal acts through 
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endorsement or concealment of fraud (Cooper, Dacin, & Palmer, 2013). Lokanan (2015) 
explains that although rules exist to deter fraudulent behavior, managers sometimes pressure 
employees to meet goals by any means necessary, overlooking suspicious behavior.  To add 
depth to the triangle, researchers Wolfe and Hermanson added a fourth element, capability, and 
renamed the theory the fraud diamond in 2004 (Huber, 2017). 
The fraud diamond. The fraud diamond expands the fraud triangle by adding a fourth 
element, capability (Bakri et al., 2017).  Capability exists in different aspects; the professional 
position of the perpetrator, intelligence to recognize and exploit an opportunity, confidence, 
coercion skills, ability to sustain lies, and ability to manage the stress of perpetrating fraud over 
time (Mui & Mailley, 2015).  Capability closes the gap between opportunity and execution 
(Mangala & Kumari, 2015).  Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) believe that without capability, fraud 
would not occur.  This belief proves the fraud triangle inadequate to fully explain how and why 
occupational fraud occurs.  
Using Rita Crundwell, and expanding into the fraud diamond, capability existed in 
multiple facets.  Rita's position as comptroller and treasurer of the town allowed her to closely 
manage all financial aspects of the town (Pope, 2017).  Co-workers noted that Rita was the 
person to talk to when financial questions arose; if something was confusing on paper, she could 
explain it in a way that made sense.  Manipulating accounts and convincing others it was 
legitimate was a significant form of capability.  
Another facet of Crundwell’s capability was confidence.  Most embezzlers do not use 
vacation time; any time away from the office risks revealing the crime because they cannot cover 
their tracks (Kramer, 2009).  However, Rita Crundwell frequently took vacation time to attend 
horse shows (Daigle et al., 2017).  In 2011, she took her usual four weeks of paid vacation, and 
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an extra 12 weeks of unpaid vacation (Apostolou et al., 2015).  Her confidence in retaining 
control away from the office for weeks at a time was unique.  
Finally, her ability to manage the stress of fraudulent activities over the 22-year period 
was a capability that helped her succeed.  Throughout the time she was perpetrating her fraud, 
rumors spread about the source of her wealth, but she always acted as if it came from legitimate 
sources (Udeh, 2013).  Her ability to maintain the lies and manage stress related to the thefts 
contributed to her embezzlement. 
The fraud management lifecycle theory. Wilhelm developed the fraud management 
lifecycle theory in 2004 (Amasiatu & Shah, 2018).  The theory has eight components: 
deterrence, prevention, detection, mitigation, analysis, policy, investigation, and prosecution. 
Instead of explaining why fraud occurs, this theory seeks to prevent fraud by improving existing 
activities and managing detected fraud more effectively (Nabhan & Hindi, 2009).  The theory 
can analyze any type of occupational fraud; however, this project examines asset 
misappropriation.  The first two stages of the lifecycle are similar.  Deterrence is the inhibiting or 
prevention of activity by fear of consequences (Wilhelm, 2004).  Prevention is to hinder a person 
from acting.  Both components integrate successfully by maintaining high-security levels and 
introducing verification processes making perpetration more difficult. 
The next three components involve managing existing fraud. The first is detection, the 
actions involved in discovering fraud (Amasiatu & Shah, 2018). The next is mitigation, which 
involves all steps taken to limit the amount of loss related to the existing fraud by disallowing the 
fraud to proceed any further.  Mitigation techniques range from a verification of credit cards to 
lengthy employee investigations (Wilhelm, 2004).  Implementing mitigation techniques quickly 
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minimizes loss.  The third step is analysis, the study of how the fraud occurred, including 
situational and personal factors.  
The final three steps suggest actions to take after fraud detection; the three steps are 
policy, investigation, and prosecution (Ocansey, 2017).  Policy explores how fraud was able to 
occur given existing policies, and what changes will strengthen them to reduce future fraud 
occurrences (Amasiatu & Shah, 2018).  Investigation relates directly to the detection phase; 
when fraud or suspicious activity occurs, the investigator must support any claim with sufficient 
evidence.  A connection with law enforcement is vital during this phase as they offer resources 
that will discover the truth effectively (Wilhelm, 2004).  The final component is prosecution or 
issuing legal punishment to the perpetrator.  Conducting this step of the process is crucial for an 
organization to uphold its reputation against fraud and create higher levels of deterrence for 
future crimes (Wilhelm, 2004).  
The routine activity theory. Cohen and Felson (1979) developed the routine activity 
theory in 1979. Rather than examining the criminal, this theory concentrates on the victim and 
what situations, or aspects of their routine make fraud possible (de Melo et al., 2017). The theory 
posits that fraud occurs because of normal daily routines (Corcoran, Zahnow, & Higgs, 2016). 
Crime rates increased in the U.S. between 1947 and 1974, many theorists examined the 
perpetrator and believed the increase was due to the rise in people willing and able to perpetrate 
crimes.  However, Cohen and Felson (1979) believed the rise in crime was due to the victims' 
altered routines. Routines changed when women entered the workforce; with nobody staying 
home during the day, homes were more likely targets for crime.  The theory suggests that fraud 
risk is highest when there is a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the lack of a capable 
guardian (Mui & Mailley, 2015). 
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NFP asset misappropriation cases includes each component of this theory.  Because NFPs 
employ unpaid volunteer workers, there are various potentially motivated offenders increasing 
misappropriation risk (Groble & Brudney, 2016).  The environment of trust and lack of internal 
controls makes many NFPs viable targets for fraud (Harris et al., 2017).  Finally, according to 
McKeever and Gaddy (2016), the NFP sector is the smallest sector regarding employee count, 
hiring approximately seven times fewer employees than a for-profit entity.  Fewer employees 
make segregation of duties more difficult and decreases capable guardianship. 
In 2007, the Catholic Diocese of Richmond Virginia charged a Catholic priest with 
embezzlement (Pollock & Papiernik, 2017).  The priest suffered from chronic illnesses and was 
struggling financially to support a secret family that he had before becoming a priest in the U.S., 
making him a motivated offender.  After he became a pastor in the Diocese in 1993, he received 
a letter authorizing him to manage all financial issues of the parishes (Pollock & Papiernik, 
2017).  With this authorization, he opened an undisclosed bank account under the parish's name 
and began wiring money to his personal bank account.  The lack of segregation of financial 
duties made the Diocese a suitable target for the priest.  Finally, he managed incoming mail and 
making deposits of charitable giving.  Because nobody confirmed the deposits made, the Diocese 
did not have a capable guardian that could be trusted to act ethically.  The existence of a 
motivated offender, a suitable target, and lack of capable guardian increased the Catholic 
Diocese's fraud risk.  
Popular tools and techniques available to combat fraud. A variety of tools and 
techniques can help NFP organizations lower their fraud risk.  However, a 2014 leadership 
survey conducted by Marks Paneth indicated only 20% of NFP leaders have a risk assessment 
process in place, and 43% believe the cost of facilitating such processes is a major challenge 
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(McNee, 2015).  Risk assessment and the implementation of internal controls help prevent and 
detect fraud quicker.  Some forms of fraud detection, prevention, and management can be 
costly, however, there are inexpensive ways to lower risk that are effective. 
Risk assessment. Risk assessment reviews the changes in environment that impede a 
business from meeting its objectives (Trompeter, Carpenter, Desai, Jones, & Riley, 2013). 
Assessing risk is an auditing requirement; SAS No. 99 requires auditors to determine weaknesses 
enabling fraud to occur at each client.  Organizations conducting a risk assessment should 
identify a plan for detecting fraud, estimate the significance and likelihood of fraud, and 
determine actions to manage it (Al-Thuneibat, Al-Rehaily, & Basodan, 2015).  Because business 
conditions change constantly, risk assessment is necessary to detect threats (Kong, Lartey, Bah, 
& Biswas, 2018).  Research suggests that assessing risk and implementing risk management 
practices reduces unpredictability of financial performance (Al-Thuneibat et al., 2015).  
Bik and Hooghiemstra (2018) indicated that fraud risk assessment relies on professional 
judgment. However, judgments alone are not enough to prevent fraud, supplementing internal 
controls is vital (Kong et al., 2018).  Internal controls are an outcome of a thorough assessment 
used to minimize existing risks (Mohd-Nassir, Mohd-Sanusi, & Ghani, 2016).  Internal auditors 
can perform risk assessments, but bias could exist based on their relation to management (Wang 
& Fargher, 2015).  Hiring an auditing firm to perform an assessment can reveal weaknesses that 
internal auditors might overlook. 
Control environment. The control environment is the basis for internal control design 
(Rubino, Vitolla, & Garzoni, 2017).  According to Noland and Metrejean (2013), the control 
environment reflects top management's attitudes based on actions and policies.  The COSO 
framework lists the control environment as the first, and most important, component for 
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evaluating internal controls (Trompeter et al., 2013). It includes elements such as integrity, 
ethics, management's attitude (also termed "tone at the top"), organizational structure, delegation 
of authority, management philosophy, and professionalism of employees.  
According to Sow, Basiruddin, Mohammed, and Rasid (2018), management's interaction 
with internal controls determines their ability to prevent fraud.  Kong et al. (2018) believe the 
control environment is the organization's foundation for forming all control elements and reflects 
the corporate culture.  The control environment should make evident the tolerance and ethical 
commitment of the company to help management make strategic change decisions and manage 
risk.  This factor directly affects the mindset of employees and the strength of internal controls 
(Le & Tran, 2018).  If the control environment is strong, employee morale is improved, and 
opportunity for asset misappropriation decreases. A study by Le and Tran (2018) indicated that 
control environment was the strongest opposition to fraud.  Although a strong control 
environment is important, it needs support from strict internal controls to prevent and detect 
fraud. 
Internal controls. Internal controls are processes enacted by management and the board 
of directors to reasonably assure goal achievement, reporting, and compliance (Suh et al., 2019). 
They mitigate risk but do not detect fraud (Burchett & Morrow, 2017).  Controls set a standard 
for how to present data. Detection occurs when someone notices a deviation from standards. 
Although well-designed internal controls cannot eliminate all occupational fraud, they deter 
fraudsters by reducing opportunity.  According to the ACFE (2018c), internal control weakness 
is the cause for half of frauds surveyed.  The 2018 report reveals that auditing internal controls 
reduced fraud duration and loss by 50% (ACFE, 2018c).  Furthermore, asset misappropriation 
fraud occurred most when there was a lack of internal controls.  Examples of internal controls 
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are: segregation of duties, task rotation, whistleblower policies, effective audit teams, and 
vacation policies (Hollow, 2014; Kong et al., 2018). 
Whistleblower policies. Whistleblowing is the disclosure of illegal, immoral, or unethical 
acts by members of an organization to individuals who can affect change (Scheetz & Wilson, 
2019). According to the ACFE, whistleblowing is the most effective form of fraud detection, 
with tips revealing approximately 40% of fraud (ACFE, 2018c; Gao, Greenberg, & Wong-On-
Wing, 2015).  NFP studies indicate that organizations retaliate against whistleblowers 
(McDonnell & Rutherford, 2018).  A study conducted by Rothschild (2013), in the NFP sector, 
discovered that internal whistleblowers endured retaliation including: loss of job or forced 
retirement, negative performance evaluations, being monitoring more closely, blacklisted from 
receiving other jobs in their field, and criticism and avoidance by co-workers.  If the 
whistleblower used external means of reporting, retaliation increased 10-15%.  Employees are 
disinclined to report fraud if known consequences exist.  The ACFE recommends implementing 
anonymous hotlines to encourage employees to blow the whistle (Johansson & Carey, 2016). 
Research suggests anonymity encourages fraud reporting because perceived personal cost 
decreases. 
Psychological research theorizes that type of fraud effects whistleblower reporting 
(Scheetz & Wilson, 2019).  Social psychology explains that theft causes a personal gain, leading 
the whistleblower to attribute more responsibility to the fraudster. Financial statement fraud 
benefits the organization, leading the whistleblower to evaluate contextual factors, often leading 
to lower reporting because they attribute less responsibility to the fraudster.  This theory is 
consistent with conclusions from prior literature that whistleblowers are likelier to report asset 
misappropriation than financial statement fraud (Scheetz & Wilson, 2019). McDonnell and 
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Rutherford (2018) states that whistleblowers in NFPs observe misconduct multiple times before 
reporting.  Threat of retaliation decreases the speed at which whistleblowing occurs. However, 
NFPs with a whistleblower policy are 2.093 times likelier to detect fraud than those without 
(Kummer et al., 2015).  Despite the benefits, only 11.47% of NFPs utilize whistleblower 
policies.  Implementing such policies would reduce and detect asset misappropriation in NFPs 
faster.  
Segregation of duties. Segregation of duties is the separation of business practices to 
reduce fraud (Singh & Best, 2016).  A case of skimming involved a cashier at a small medical 
clinic; the cashier was responsible for managing and depositing cash (Kramer, 2015).  The 
organization violated the principle of segregation of duties because the functions of managing 
cash and cash records enabled the fraudster to perpetrate and cover their crime.  Research 
suggests that asset misappropriation fraud targets organizations with weak segregation of duties 
(Akkeren & Buckby, 2017).  
Size can limit an organization's ability to implement effective segregation of duties 
(Maguire, 2014).  Small and medium-sized NFPs often lack the number of employees needed to 
segregate duties adequately (McSwain, Wukich, & McSwain, 2015).  Because segregation of 
duties is a preventative internal control, implementation should occur if job duties can create 
improper behavior or collusion, making fraud likely (Liu, Wright, & Wu, 2014).  To overcome 
the lack of employees, Maguire (2014) suggests requesting the help of a board member to 
perform tasks including reconciliations or receiving the bank statement to properly segregate 
duties. 
Audit teams. Effective audit teams are vital for internal control development and fraud 
detection and prevention (Chang, Chen, Cheng, & Chi, 2019).  The ACFE (2018c) indicates that 
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internal audit teams discover approximately 15% of fraud, and external audit teams discover 
approximately 4%.  Being an active detection method, internal audits are likelier to uncover 
fraud.  The responsibilities of internal auditors are to “Examine, evaluate, and monitor the 
adequacy and effectiveness of internal control” (Chang et al., 2019, p. 1).  Research verifies that 
the size of internal control audit teams, number of certifications, work experience, and levels of 
education effect internal controls and number of deficiencies reported.  NFPs experience 
restraints for internal audit teams because of smaller, less qualified workforces (Vitan & 
Mihălţan, 2015).  A study by Domanski (2016) of 235 Polish NFPs discovered that 75.7% have 
an internal audit procedure, and 64.3% think it is effective in preventing and detecting fraud. 
Implementing internal audit procedures in NFPs in the U.S. could lower fraud risk. 
Task rotation. Task rotation, also called job rotation, is the cross-training of employees 
on various tasks and sporadic rotation of responsibilities (Jones, 2014).  Job rotation is a lateral 
change, never altering employee salary or hierarchical levels (Kampkötter, Harbring, & Sliwka, 
2016).  Rotation is a prevention and detection method (Mirinaviciene, 2014).  Fraud risk 
increases when employees stay in a position for an extended length of time (Jones, 2014).  When 
employees change tasks, they provide a new perspective and can likely detect issues previously 
overlooked (Jones, 2014).  
Employees build close relationships with customers and vendors, creating opportunity 
(Prabowo, 2014).  Employee rotation lowers theft possibilities by changing the employees’ 
duties and access to cash (Maguire, 2017).  Alternating employees’ jobs prevents manipulation 
of system weaknesses and concealment of fraud (Nawawi & Salin, 2018a).  Small organizations 
with limited employees, such as NFPs, struggle implementing task/job rotation (Andon et al., 
2015).  However, finding ways to do so can reduce fraud by approximately 23% (ACFE, 2018c). 
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According to the ACFE, less than 20% of companies with under 100 employees utilize task 
rotation.  Research indicates that task rotation can save approximately $30,000 annually, which 
is significant for NFPs with limited funds. 
Vacation policies. Vacation policies enable employers to require employees take time off 
throughout the year, or implement policies disabling employees from using vacation days outside 
the year earned (Jones, 2014).  Employees refusing to use vacation time is a red flag (Reurink, 
2018).  Many embezzlers do not take vacations because maintaining fraud requires constant 
attention (Kramer, 2015).  Vacation policies cannot prevent fraud alone, if nobody manages the 
responsibilities when the employee is away, the fraud will continue (Maguire, 2017).  However, 
time off disrupts the fraudsters’ routine and the employees managing the responsibilities often 
discover the fraud (Prins & Bhuse, 2018).  According to the ACFE (2018c), implementing 
mandatory vacation policies reduces fraud by approximately 23%.  Only 19% of the 2,690 cases 
reviewed had a vacation policy in place; those without vacation controls suffered an average loss 
of $30,000 more annually (ACFE, 2018c).  The FDIC recommends forced vacation policies for 
banks but are effective in all sectors of business (Prins & Bhuse, 2018).  
Potential themes and perceptions. The existing literature regarding occupational fraud 
and NFPs contains four themes and/or perceptions.  The themes and perceptions are: fraud is a 
growing problem, asset misappropriation is the most common occupational fraud, NFPs are 
more susceptible to fraud, and anti-fraud techniques lower risk.  The principal investigator 
found these themes consistent with assumptions made before reviewing literature and expects 
them to remain true during data collection.  
Increases in fraud was a theme in the existing literature. The ACFE estimates that the 
average organization loses 5% of its revenue from fraud (Kummer et al., 2015).  Bradley (2015) 
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states that NFP fraud is continually increasing.  The NFP sector is losing approximately $40 
billion annually to occupational fraud.  Moore (2018) believes that growth of occupational fraud 
around the world affects all members of society by financial and job loss. In one study, 
employers cut wages in two of their three plants and discovered that employee theft increased in 
the affected plants (Shepherd & Button, 2018).  Research reveals that fraud costs businesses 
billions of dollars annually and displays no signs of decreasing (Nawawi & Salin, 2018b). 
According to the ACFE, from 2016 to 2018, the total amount of fraud loss increased from $6.3 
billion to $7 billion (ACFE, 2014, ACFE, 2018c).  
Research states that asset misappropriation is consistently the most common occupational 
fraud perpetrated (Bakri, 2017; Hunt, 2014; Moore, 2018).  The ACFE (2018c) indicates that 
89% of the 2,690 cases studied included asset misappropriation, increasing from 83% of the 
2,410 cases from 2014 (ACFE, 2014).  In the NFP sector, asset misappropriation accounts for 
approximately 95% of fraud (Harris et al., 2017).  Although asset misappropriation is less costly, 
any amount of loss is significantly damaging for NFPs with limited resources (Archambeault et 
al., 2015).  
A common theme in the research was that NFPs are more susceptible to fraud. 
Archambeault et al. (2015), explain that NFPs often have weak controls, enabling asset 
misappropriation to be undetected.  NFPs are vulnerable to fraud because of the trusting 
environment, weak internal controls, reliance on volunteers, inexperienced workers, and 
difficulty verifying cash revenue (Kummer et al., 2015).  Risk increases in NFPs because they 
utilize volunteers instead of paid staff members (Akingbola, 2013; Groble & Brudney, 2016). 
NFPs often have a limited number of employees, making segregation of duties difficult 
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(Maguire, 2014).  The ACFE (2018c) also reveals that fraud victims are most often organizations 
with less than 100 employees, and they suffer the greatest financial loss. 
Research has revealed that anti-fraud techniques are effective risk reducers (Kummer et 
al., 2015).  The ACFE (2014; 2018c) analyzed 18 anti-fraud controls and discovered that 
implementation lowered fraud and shortened duration.  The report to the nations revealed losses 
occurred in organizations without anti-fraud controls were $15,000 - $140,000 higher than their 
counterparts that implemented the controls; they discovered that it was more common for 
companies with over 100 employees to have the techniques implemented (ACFE, 2018c).  Anti-
fraud controls result in a 54% reduction in fraud loss (Maguire, 2017).  However, it is more 
difficult for smaller organizations with fewer resources to maintain sophisticated anti-fraud 
controls (Cezair, 2009).  The lack of anti-fraud controls puts smaller organizations at greater risk, 
resulting in debilitating losses if fraud occurs (Moore, 2018).  However, studies suggest that the 
implementation of anti-fraud controls is not enough to prevent fraud, employers must preserve 
and operate them properly for them to be effective (Suh et al., 2019). 
Summary of the literature review. Reviewing existing literature on occupational 
fraud, the principal investigator identified a need for asset misappropriation research in NFP 
organizations. Occupational fraud effects “Nearly every organization” (Suh et al., 2019, p. 80), 
NFPs are not exempt from the phenomenon (Bradley, 2015).  Categories of occupational fraud 
include: corruption, financial statement fraud, and asset misappropriation (Timofeyev, 2015). 
According to the ACFE, companies suffer a 5% loss of revenues due to fraud annually (ACFE, 
2014).  Though it costs the least, asset misappropriation is the most common occupational 
fraud, occurring in 89% of cases and costing a median loss of $114,000 per year (ACFE, 2014). 
Harris et al. (2017), explains that there is a significant lack of research conducted regarding 
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asset misappropriation in NFPs.  
This review revealed that fraud is a problem in NFPs. Embezzlement in municipal 
organizations, skimming in youth athletic leagues, and check tampering in organizations for the 
disabled are all examples (Pennington, 2016; Rasmussen, 2019; Udeh, 2013).  Studying various 
theories about fraud has aided in preventing, detecting, and managing occurrences more 
effectively (Vousinas, 2019).  The principal investigator determined that each theory is not 
adequate to explain fraud in its entirety.  However, theory alliance, or the combination of 
theories, helps employers gain a more complete picture of what leads to fraud and how to protect 
against it (Otu & Nnam, 2018).  
Finally, the literature supported the idea that anti-fraud tools and techniques lower fraud 
risk.  The ACFE (2018c) proved that anti-fraud controls lowered risk and enabled fraud detection 
sooner.  The studies conducted comparing organizations that had controls to those that did not 
reveal the presence of controls lowered fraud in every instance.  Studies indicate that NFPs have 
fewer controls implemented, yielding higher fraud risk (Kummer et al., 2015).  Kummer et al. 
(2015) explain that fraud control policies, whistle-blower policies, and risk assessment are the 
most effective tools; these techniques are also the simplest and least expensive to implement, 
making them ideal for small businesses.  Literature supports the need for implementation of anti-
fraud controls. Various tools exist, and each business will find techniques that work if it actively 
seeks to prevent, detect, and manage fraud appropriately. 
Transition and Summary of Section 1 
This qualitative multiple case study explores the experiences that NFP accountants have 
had with asset misappropriation fraud in the workplace as well as whether or not they believe 
they were adequately prepared to manage such situations.  This study addresses the lack of fraud 
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prevention, detection, and management techniques that NFPs utilize.  It fills gaps in literature 
and research by reviewing techniques the NFPs utilize and providing insight into fraud 
prevention, detection, and management best practices.  Using the fraud triangle, the fraud 
management lifecycle, the white-collar crime theory, and the routine activity theory, the 
principal investigator will gain understanding regarding fraud in NFPs and identify potential 
improvements.  The principal investigator will address assumptions and delimitations that are 
specific to this project, and mitigate risks associated with them to obtain valid and reliable 
results.  
Reviewing literature revealed that fraud in NFP organizations is an ever-growing 
problem (Bradley, 2015).  The primary investigator seeks to enhance understanding of 
experiences accountants have had with asset misappropriation.  Utilizing existing research, and 
knowledge of the accountants, the principal investigator will develop best practices to implement 
to lower risk.  Because of the lack of research regarding fraud in NFPs, this study will fill gaps in 
literature that will help develop a better understanding of its effects and how to lower it (Harris et 
al., 2017).  Section 2 will explain in detail topics including: the role of the researcher, 
participants, research method and design, population and sampling, data collection, data analysis, 
and the reliability and validity of the study. 
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Section 2: The Project 
Section 2 identifies the tasks involved in conducting the study.  The principal investigator 
discusses the role of the researcher, participants, research method and design, population 
sampling technique and data collection, organization, and analysis techniques. Furthermore, the 
principal investigator discusses the reliability and validity of the study.  In this section, the 
principal investigator explains how the study will be conducted, and what will be done to 
maintain reliable and valid results after data collection and analysis. 
Specific Problem 
The specific problem addressed in this research is the significant level of fraud, 
specifically asset misappropriation, in NFP organizations within South Central Pennsylvania, 
and the subsequent losses experienced by NFPs each year.  The average organization loses 5% of 
their revenue to fraud each year (Kummer et al., 2015).  In NFP organizations, the most common 
fraud perpetrated is asset misappropriation, which makes up 90% of reported NFP fraud cases 
(Bradley, 2015; Johansson & Carey, 2016; Kennedy, 2018).  The principal investigator will gain 
understanding about the experiences NFP accountants have had with asset misappropriation 
using in-depth interviews, to improve existing practices and lower fraud.  
Coding and Themes 
Using coding, the principal investigator will discover themes and perceptions that exist 
between different cases of asset misappropriation.  These themes will fill gaps in existing 
literature regarding asset misappropriation in NFPs (Harris et al., 2017).  Using information and 
experiences provided by interviewees, the principal investigator will create best practices that 
NFPs of all sizes can utilize to lower fraud risk and limit asset misappropriation occurrences. 
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Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this qualitative multiple case study is to investigate the experiences of 
professional accountants in NFP organizations within South Central Pennsylvania who have had 
experiences with asset misappropriation.  This study explores methods that will improve fraud 
identification, management, and prevention tools and techniques within NFP organizations in 
South Central Pennsylvania.  To determine this information, the principal investigator will seek 
to answer various research topics by interviewing accountants who work in companies that have 
experienced asset misappropriation and their managers.  
The purpose of this study is to understand how accountants believe they were prepared 
for their experiences using various training tools and identify ways to improve their preparation. 
This study will also suggest how NFP organizations might better train employees regarding fraud 
prevention, detection, and management.  Finally, this study will be beneficial to other NFP 
organizations outside South Central Pennsylvania by educating accountants and leaders in 
improving fraud preparation techniques. 
Role of the Researcher 
The role of the principal investigator in this qualitative multiple case study was to 
identify potential participants, contact them, explain the purpose of the study, and coordinate 
interview times for willing participants.  Furthermore, the principal investigator was responsible 
for interviewing participants, gathering data, and analyzing the results. In qualitative research, 
the principal investigator is involved in all aspects of the study (Sanjari, Bahramnezhad, Fomani, 
Shoghi, & Cheraghi, 2014).  Qualitative principal investigators must accomplish various tasks: 
identify and communicate with participants, select the appropriate sample, collect, record, and 
secure data, and mitigate ethical concerns (Azzaro, 2018). 
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Interview questions were developed by the principal investigator to produce answers to 
designated research questions, which would help create an understanding of the problem studied. 
The purpose of the study was to identify potential improvements to accountants’ fraud detection, 
prevention, and management skills.  To do this, the principal investigator asked interview 
questions to identify the participant’s existing experience with fraud and its detection, 
prevention, and management.  Furthermore, the principal investigator asked participants opinion-
based questions regarding how their preparation could be improved.  The principal investigator 
collected the data and analyzed it across each case to identify commonalities and differences that 
will improve NFP accountants’ skills. 
The principal investigator identified potential participants using web searches and NFP 
websites including Charity Navigator to find qualifying organizations in South Central 
Pennsylvania.  Using the NFP websites, the principal investigator gathered contact information 
and emailed potential participants a letter stating the purpose of the study and asking for their 
participation.  After recruiting 15 NFP accountants willing to participate, the principal 
investigator conducted interviews.  Interviews were held in private, reserved rooms at locations 
near the participants’ work or home to eliminate inconvenience for the participants (Alase, 
2017).  The interviews were limited to 45-60 minutes per participant and were tape recorded; the 
principal investigator also took note regarding the participants’ reactions to questions.  To avoid 
researcher bias, the principal investigator allowed time for clarification of unclear or confusing 
statements by asking the participants questions in different ways or repeating the responses back 
(Sahloul, 2019). 
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Participants 
Using websites including Charity Navigator, the principal investigator identified qualified 
potential participants.  Participants were eligible to participate if they worked in an accounting or 
finance position of an NFP organization in South Central Pennsylvania and earned a Bachelor’s 
degree or higher.  After identifying qualified NFPs, the principal investigator used Google, NFP 
websites, and the Pennsylvania Association Nonprofit Organization (PANO) to gather email 
contact information.  The principal investigator sent a professional email to each potential 
participant outlining the purpose of the study, what would be required of them, and an informed 
consent form. 
Establishing a working relationship, or rapport, with participants is the goal of field 
research (Taylor, Bogdan, & DeVault, 2016).  Developing rapport involves creating a feeling of 
empathy for participants, encouraging and enabling them to be honest about experiences, and 
being a trustworthy person.  However, developing those relationships in research is a slow 
process (Taylor et al., 2016).  Humility and empathy help build rapport. Confirming that the 
principal investigator will not disclose information or negatively evaluate is another way to 
strengthen the relationship.  In this study, the principal investigator developed a working 
relationship by encouraging participants to ask questions about the study; interview locations and 
times convenient for the participants improved rapport.  Accommodating participants’ schedules 
and access encourages stronger relationships (Taylor et al., 2016).  Furthermore, the principal 
investigator maintained professionality, and informed participants that they were willingly 
participating and could remove themselves from the study if they so desired. 
Protecting participants’ privacy is vital to research. Due to the sensitivity of occupational 
fraud, and the harm it causes if publicized, the principal investigator took steps to protect the 
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identity and information of each participant.  The principal investigator recognized the 
importance of obtaining consent, maintaining confidentiality and privacy, and implementing 
appropriate reviews (Azzaro, 2018).  To obtain appropriate reviews, the principal investigator 
obtained IRB approval from their institution, which ensures that the research conducted protects 
the subjects and follows appropriate federal regulations (Liberty University, 2019). 
When potential participants were contacted, they were sent a consent form that explained 
how they are to be protected, their rights, scope, and span of the study, and personal information 
security.  To maintain confidentiality and secure participant information, coded identification 
was used to differentiate participants.  All data relating to participant identity, company name, 
and title was left out of the final results (Sahloul, 2019).  Additionally, all electronic data was 
stored on the principal investigator’s password protected laptop, and all physical data, including 
recordings, was stored in a locked location, as suggested by Wolf et al. (2015).  Finally, after the 
minimum required three years has passed, all data related to the study will be destroyed (DHHS, 
2019). 
Research Method and Design 
A qualitative research method was used for this study. Because the goal of the project 
was to develop a conclusion based on opinions and experiences, the qualitative method was 
appropriate (Azzaro, 2018).  Quantitative research methods seek statistical data to draw 
conclusions; this study focused on experiential data, making quantitative methods inappropriate 
(Larson-Hall & Plonsky, 2015).  The principal investigator identified qualitative as the most 
appropriate research method for collecting, reviewing, and analyzing the opinions and 
experiences of accountants who have managed asset misappropriation fraud within a NFP 
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workplace in South Central Pennsylvania. Research revealed a lack of literature related to asset 
misappropriation within the NFP sector; this study filled those gaps (Harris et al., 2017).  
Furthermore, this project was a multiple case study design, allowing the principal 
investigator to gather experiences of various accountants for comparison and analysis.  Each 
NFP was a case; the principal investigator compared and contrasted each case for themes using a 
within-case and across-case analysis technique (Di Mauro, Fratocchi, Orzes, & Sartor, 2018). 
Discussion of method. This project used qualitative research methods. Qualitative 
research explores the meanings attributed to phenomenon by participants (Creswell, 2014). 
This method analyzes opinions and views of the participants to form conclusions (Daher et al., 
2017).  In this study, the principal investigator examined the asset misappropriation experiences 
of NFP accountants to conclude how to improve fraud prevention, detection, and management 
preparation.  Because of the effects of fraud on NFP organizations, using qualitative methods to 
gather the perceived preparedness to manage fraud and opinions about improving prevention, 
detection, and management of such occurrences in the workplace was appropriate. 
Prior research indicates that qualitative methods are conducive to gathering the 
perceptions and experiences of fraud from participants (Akkeren & Buckby, 2017).  Because the 
qualitative method does not focus on statistics, it was ideal for gaining subjective information 
(Morse, 2015).  The qualitative method enabled the researcher to use subjectivity and 
interpersonal skills throughout the process (Sahloul, 2019).  After data was gathered, the 
principal investigator reviewed the information for themes by identifying commonalities and 
differences.  By considering participant opinions and perceptions, the principal investigator 
developed an understanding of the lived experiences of the NFP accountants and how to improve 
their preparation for fraud prevention, detection, and management. 
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Discussion of design. The principal investigator used a multiple case study design. 
Using this design, the principal investigator could analyze multiple cases to show various 
perspectives on the same phenomenon (Sahloul, 2019; Yin, 2009); examining multiple insights 
created a robust study.  This design method enabled the principal investigator to gather various 
experiences about NFP asset misappropriation and the level of preparedness accountants have 
for preventing, detecting, and managing it effectively.  Studying multiple cases helped the 
principal investigator identify what tools and techniques were most beneficial for NFPs to help 
lower their fraud risk and better prepare their accountants. NFP organizations outside of South 
Central Pennsylvania can use the conclusions to identify improvements and techniques that 
would be useful for their needs. 
There are different types of multiple case studies: exploratory, descriptive, and 
explanatory (Scholz & Tietje, 2002).  Descriptive case studies use an existing theory or model to 
guide data collection, because the principal investigator was not using a reference theory or 
model, this type of case study was inappropriate (Scholz & Tietje, 2002).  Furthermore, the 
explanatory case study tests cause-and-effect relationships (Scholz & Tietje, 2002).  Because 
each case can only falsify a proposed theory, and not provide additional information beyond the 
hypothesis, this design was inappropriate (Zainal, 2007).  This study followed the exploratory 
design.  Exploratory case studies are similar to pilot studies because they examine a phenomenon 
not widely addressed in existing research, and then develop new hypotheses (Fahy, 2013; 
Hollow, 2014; Scholz & Tietje, 2002).  Because asset misappropriation fraud in NFPs is not 
widely studied, and there is a lack of literature regarding it, this study sought to develop best 
practice theories to fill gaps in existing research using the exploratory design (Harris et al., 
2017).  The principal investigator gathered experiences and opinions from participants, analyzed 
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the data, and developed theories that would further the knowledge of fraud prevention, detection, 
and management in the NFP sector. 
Summary of research method and design. The principal investigator used a 
qualitative research method to gather experiences and opinions of participants related to fraud 
prevention, detection, and management.  Furthermore, the principal investigator used an 
exploratory multiple case study design, with each NFP accountant being a case.  Qualitative 
methods allowed the principal investigator to explore life experiences and perceptions of the 
participants through subjectivity.  By eliminating statistics, the principal investigator could 
compare and contrast the opinions of participants to compile best practices for fraud 
prevention, detection, and management.  Finally, by studying multiple cases of NFP fraud, the 
principal investigator identified generalizations about effective tools and techniques, potentially 
making the results beneficial for all NFPs, including those beyond the study population. 
Population and Sampling 
Identifying the population of the study was the first step in gathering useful information. 
The population consists of all individuals who meet specified criteria (Asiamah, Mensah, & 
Oteng-Abayie, 2017).  Although population specification is required for qualitative and 
quantitative methods, in a qualitative study the population is required to describe experiences 
with the studied phenomenon.  After establishing the parameters for the study population, the 
principal investigator obtained a comprehensive sample to achieve saturation (Malterud, 
Siersma, & Guassora, 2016).  
Saturation is the criteria researchers use to determine when sampling stops (Saunders et 
al., 2018).  Data saturation occurs when no new information, themes, or ideas emerge by 
completing more interviews (Boddy, 2016).  Small studies achieve saturation quicker than larger 
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ones; no method determines data saturation for all studies (Fusch & Ness, 2015).  The size of a 
study is dependent on the “Magnitude of the expected effect size” (Hackshaw, 2008, p. 1141). 
However, Hackshaw (2008) explains that a sample size of 20 is considered small for research 
studies.  Reaching data saturation is not determined by obtaining the right sized sample, but 
attaining the proper depth of data.  However, if researchers fail to achieve data saturation it 
negatively affects the quality of the research, specifically decreasing validity.  Marshall et al. 
(2013) identify a sample of 11 to 20 interview participants as an adequate number to reach 
saturation.  Based on this existing research, the principal investigator determined saturation could 
be achieved using 15 cases; this estimate was subject to change during the interview process.  
Unlike random sampling in quantitative research, qualitative researchers practice 
purposeful sampling, enabling them to find information-rich participants (Griffith, Morris, & 
Thakar, 2016).  The following sections will explain the population identification and sampling 
techniques used by the principal investigator.  
Discussion of population. The principal investigator’s population included only 
accountants working in an NFP in South Central Pennsylvania. Many NFP organizations hire 
bookkeepers instead of accountants to reduce payroll or consulting expenses; however, 
researching the difference between asset misappropriation in NFP companies with accountants 
versus bookkeepers is a consideration for future research.  Using the Nonprofit Resource 
Network (2008), the principal investigator was able to find that 1,551 NFP organizations were 
in operation in South Central Pennsylvania.  However, this source did not appear to have been 
updated since 2008, making it unclear how many of the identified organizations were still 
operating.  To gain a more complete list of NFPs within the study location, the principal 
investigator contacted the executive director of Pennsylvania Association of Nonprofit 
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Organizations (PANO) (PANO, 2019).  Furthermore, the principal investigator contacted 
GuideStar, an organization that offers a complete list of NFPs nationwide (GuideStar, 2019). 
The contact at GuideStar suggested an IRS website that provided a list of all NFPs in the 
nation.  Using this information, the principal investigator discovered that within the state of 
Pennsylvania, there were 75,529 NFP organizations (GuideStar, 2019; IRS, 2019).  However, 
when that search focused on South Central Pennsylvania, the population decreased to include 
11,303 organizations (IRS, 2019).  
Discussion of sampling. Although there is no set rule for the number of participants to 
have in a study, many researchers offer suggestions (Alase, 2017).  Creswell (2014) explains 
that the number of participants in a sample should depend on the type of design used.  He 
states, for a qualitative case study, only four or five cases need be included (Creswell, 2014). 
However, other researchers including Marshall et al. (2013) believe the number of participants 
should be between 15 and 25 to reach saturation.  Further research suggests that data saturation 
would become “Evident at six in-depth interviews and definitely evident at 12 in-depth 
interviews” (Boddy, 2016, p. 429).  Based on this research, the principal investigator 
determined that data saturation could be met by studying 15 cases.  This estimate was made 
subject to additional consideration and adjustment during the interview process. 
Purposive sampling includes non-random sampling techniques to ensure thorough 
coverage of the population (Robinson, 2014).  Snowball sampling, the technique used by the 
principal investigator, is a purposive sampling technique.  The principal investigator used the 
snowball method by seeking out potential participants by recommendations from other 
participants.  This method is used most often when there is a lower possibility of participants 
responding to advertisements or communications from an unknown individual because of the 
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stigma regarding the topic (Robinson, 2014).  The topic of fraud has negative connotations, and 
many individuals are hesitant to provide information if they are concerned about potential 
consequences from doing so (Groenitz, 2016).  
Each participant in the study had to meet three minimum requirements: work for a NFP, 
work in an accounting or finance position, and have earned a bachelor’s degree in accounting or 
related field.  Each time a participant was interviewed, the same process was replicated, allowing 
the principal investigator to realize when saturation occurred and no new themes or insights were 
provided (Sahloul, 2019).  To obtain the qualified participants, the principal investigator 
gathered contact information about each potential participant and sent an email explaining the 
project and asking for their participation.  Snowball sampling enabled the principal investigator 
to gather new participants to reach data saturation (Alase, 2017; Trotter, 2012). 
Summary of population and sampling. To gather the necessary data to identify the 
population of the study, the principal investigator used websites including PANO, GuideStar, 
and the IRS. Using these sites, the principal investigator discovered that 75,529 NFP 
organizations exist in Pennsylvania.  By filtering processes, the principal investigator was able 
to concentrate the subject population to 11,303 organizations within South Central 
Pennsylvania.  The proposed subject population was an estimate containing all potential 
participants for the study (Asiamah et al., 2017).  Using purposive snowball sampling 
techniques, the principle investigator identified 15 appropriate participants who could provide 
information-rich interviews.  
 To qualify as appropriate test subjects, participants were required to meet three 
requirements: work in an accounting or finance position, work for an NFP, and have earned a 
bachelor’s degree in accounting or a related field.  Potential participants were contacted by 
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email, and encouraged to send the invitation to individuals they believed would meet the 
participant criteria.  This process, known as snowball sampling, enabled the principal 
investigator to gain useful information from participants, despite the negative connotation related 
to the study topic (Robinson, 2014).  
Data Collection 
Data collection involves five tasks: gaining permissions, conducting a sampling strategy, 
determining a means of recording data, storing data, and anticipating ethical issues (Creswell, 
2013).  Before data was collected, the principal investigator obtained the necessary permissions 
to work with human participants from Liberty University’s Internal Review Board (IRB).  After 
receiving approvals and conducting purposive sampling, the principal investigator began face-to-
face interviews with each participant. Interviews are among the most commonly used data 
collection techniques in qualitative research; they enable the principal investigator to understand 
a phenomenon from the point of view of the participant (Moser & Korstjens, 2018).  
The following sections will identify the data collection instruments, the techniques used 
to gather data, and how the principal investigator organized the data obtained.  Furthermore, the 
principal investigator will discuss how the data was secured throughout the course of the project.  
Instruments. Tools used for data collection in qualitative research include: 
questionnaires, interviews, observations, and reading documents (Annum, 2017).  However, in 
qualitative research, the researcher is the key data collection instrument (Creswell, 2014; Xu & 
Storr, 2012).  As the main data collector, the principal investigator conducted semi-structured, 
face-to-face interviews with 15 participants. Before conducting the interviews, the principal 
investigator developed an interview guide (Appendix C), and conducted a field test of research 
questions.  Creating an interview guide enabled the researcher to develop a structure for how 
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the interview would proceed; the guide contained set questions that would direct the 
conversation towards the research topic (Kallio, Pietilä, Johnson, & Kangasniemi, 2016). The 
field test allowed the principal investigator to gather relevant feedback regarding research 
questions, including guidance to improve wording of questions for clarity.  
Researcher. In qualitative studies, the researcher is the data collector (Twining, Heller, 
Nussbaum, & Tsai, 2017).  Instead of taking statistical measurements, the principal investigator 
asks questions and interprets data given by participants (Antwi, & Hamza, 2015).  As the data 
collector, the principal investigator conducted interviews of participants.  Because data quality 
relies upon the appropriateness of the collection method, the principal investigator determined 
that in-person interviews would provide the highest quality data (Twining et al., 2017). 
Interviews capture the narratives of participants more effectively than questionnaires, and allow 
the principal investigator to better understand each individual’s experiences (Alshenqeeti, 2014). 
Each interview was audio-recorded by the principal investigator and transcribed into Microsoft 
Word documents for analysis. 
Open-ended questions. This study used open-ended questions to encourage participants 
to provide information-rich responses not limited by rating and/or dichotomous scales (Weller et 
al., 2018).  Open-ended questions eliminate the opportunity for the question to guide the 
participant towards a specific response (Sahloul, 2019).  Instead, they encourage thorough 
answers, allowing for clarification and elaboration of thoughts.  Çakir and Cengiz (2016) 
demonstrated that closed-ended questions encourage short, restricted responses, and open-ended 
questions promote complex and meaningful answers.  Because the principal investigator sought 
in-depth, meaningful information, open-ended questioning was appropriate.  
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There were three categories of questions asked in each interview.  The first set of 
questions focused on the participant’s professional and educational background. Although these 
questions do not help to answer any of the specified research questions, they help the reader of 
the study to understand the participants’ levels of professional and educational experience and 
proved that each participant fits the study requirements.  The second set of questions delved into 
the fraud prevention, detection, and management preparation of the study participants. Through 
research question two, the principal investigator seeks to identify how well the population is 
equipped for fraud occurrences.  
The third set of questions relates back to research questions one, three, and four.  All of 
these questions relate to asset misappropriation in NFPs within South Central Pennsylvania, the 
forms of it, how it is managed, and what the results are.  Asking the participants about specific 
instances in their organizations will answer each of these research questions. In the final set of 
questions, the principal investigators asked the participants to offer their opinions and 
perceptions about improving future fraud prevention, detection, and management preparation 
techniques. 
Interview guide. After further research regarding interview processes for qualitative 
research, the principal investigator created an interview guide (See Appendix C), a set of 
standardized questions to ask each participant (Wright, 2017).  An interview guide highlights the 
main ideas in the study, and is frequently used in semi-structured interviews to guide the 
conversation (Faber, Wind, & Frings-Dresen, 2016; Kallio et al., 2016). According to Pedersen, 
Delmar, Falkmer, and Grønkjaer (2015), an interview guide creates consistency across multiple 
interviews, and links the research problem, research questions, and existing literature.  The guide 
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should contain questions related directly to the research topic, as well as casual questions aimed 
at creating a comfortable environment for the interviewee. 
The first set of questions in the interview guide relate to the participants’ collegiate and 
professional background.  Asking questions such as “What type of bachelor’s degree did you 
earn?” and “What is your role at the organization?” help the researcher identify how well the 
participant fits the requirements of the study, and explores how much knowledge they have 
regarding the financial aspects of an organization.  In the second set of questions, the principal 
investigator addresses fraud prevention, detection, and management preparation. Asking what 
type of training the participant has regarding fraud, and whether or not they have been trained at 
their workplace creates a standard against which their fraud prevention, detection, and 
management skills can be measured.  These questions helped answer research question 2. 
Additionally, asking the participants if they believe they are adequately prepared to prevent, 
detect, and manage fraud helped the principal investigator understand any gaps in the 
participants’ preparation. 
In the third set of questions, the principal investigator sought to gain knowledge of the 
experiences the participants have had with asset misappropriation in the workplace.  The 
principal investigator asked whether the organization had experienced asset misappropriation, 
what type it was, how it was detected and managed, its duration, and what changes were made to 
procedures to prevent it in the future.  These questions answer the remaining three research 
questions posed by the principal investigator. Understanding the participants’ experiences allows 
the principal investigator to identify the types of asset misappropriation existing in NFPs in 
South Central Pennsylvania, the duration of the fraud, and how it was managed.  Furthermore, 
the principal investigator asked those participants who have not experienced fraud in their 
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workplace to identify organizational preventative measures.  This enabled the principal 
investigator to compare the procedures with existing literature and identify ways other NFPs 
could improve their processes. 
The last set of questions the principal investigator asked included: “What do you believe 
could be done to reduce asset misappropriation in your organization?” and “How do you believe 
you could be better prepared to manage asset misappropriation if it occurred in the future?” 
Although these questions do not pertain to a specific research question, they are vital in gaining 
the full perceptions of the participants.  These questions allowed the principal investigator to 
compile a list of best practices for NFPs to use to prevent future asset misappropriation. By 
detecting gaps in preparation, the principal investigator could review literature to identify how 
those gaps could be closed. 
The interview guide ended with the principal investigator asking if the participant had 
any other questions, or if there were any other questions not asked that are relevant to the study. 
These enabled the principal investigator to improve the interviews as time progressed.  Finally, 
the principal investigator offered contact information, should the participant have any questions 
or concerns, and obtained their contact information so answers could be clarified later, if 
necessary.  
Field test. A field test was conducted before interviews began to ensure the research 
questions and interview questions were clear and properly worded.  Field tests involve the testing 
of questions before they are presented to study participants to eliminate confusion and 
weaknesses (McCarthy, Ott, Ridolfo, McGovern, Sirkis, & Moore, 2018).  The principal 
investigator sought the participation of three accounting experts: an NFP accounting practitioner, 
an accounting professor, and the principal investigator’s dissertation chair.  Although these 
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individuals were not participants in the study, they offered valuable feedback on the research 
questions allowing for improved clarity and understanding. The feedback given strengthened the 
questions, improved terminology, and allowed for less confusion from participants during face-
to-face interviews. 
Data collection techniques. The principal investigator focused on two forms of data 
collection: document reviews and interviews.  In the early stages of the project, the principal 
investigator reviewed existing literature related to the topic of asset misappropriation, 
occurrences in NFPs, and tools and techniques used to prevent, detect, and manage such fraud. 
This data was used to develop the main research questions, as well as the in-depth interview 
questions.  Furthermore, after interviews were completed, the principal investigator used this 
data to triangulate information provided by the participants and confirm themes and findings.  
The main data collection technique used was semi-structured, in-depth interviews.  
Irvine, Drew, and Sainsbury (2013) suggest that telephone interviews create more uncertainty 
from the participant and result in less information richness provided.  Because of this, the 
principal investigator identified face-to-face interviews as the ideal data collection technique. 
Fifteen participants were chosen, each from a different NFP; each one was considered a case. 
Because replication is important in qualitative case study research, the principal investigator used 
an interview guide (See Appendix C) during each interview to ensure the same questions were 
asked of each participant (Sahloul, 2019; Vohra, 2014).  Asking the same questions enabled the 
principal investigator to gather similar data to compare and contrast during data analysis.  
After receiving approval from Liberty University’s IRB, the principal investigator began 
contacting accountants from NFPs in South Central Pennsylvania.  The principal investigator 
obtained a list of all NFPs in the specified location from the IRS, and sought contact information 
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for the organizations via Google and the Pennsylvania Nonprofit Organization Association.  
Each participant received an email containing information about the study and how to 
participate.  Snowball sampling enable the principal investigator to gain a variety of potential 
participants.  Participants were selected based on whether they met the requirements of the study, 
and their ability to provide rich information.  
Interviews were limited to approximately 45-60 minutes each, and were scheduled at a 
location convenient for the participant in a private room to ensure privacy and security of 
information.  Each interview was audio-recorded for later playback and transcription.  The 
principal investigator transcribed each recording within two days of the interview, and told the 
participants they would contact them if questions arose.  
Data organization techniques. Data was organized by the principal investigator from 
the beginning of the study.  The main technique used to organize data was a database.  A 
database is a common tool used for storing and processing data in research, it often uses a table 
format to relate information across different categories (Sestoft, 2011).  The principal 
investigator used three categories in the database: (1) interview narratives, (2) interview notes, 
and (3) transcription notes. 
Interview narratives. The principal investigator developed interview narratives for each 
of the fifteen participants.  The narratives were created by the transcription of the audio-recorded 
face-to-face interviews.  After an interview was completed, the principal investigator transcribed, 
verbatim, the conversation within two days.  
Interview notes. During each interview, the principal investigator took notes about the 
participants’ facial expressions or reactions to questions.  Listening to the recording of an 
interview allows the principal investigator to identify the tone of responses, however, body 
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language is also vital to observe. Researchers often take field notes to supplement audio-
recordings, allowing them to maintain notes on the impressions of the participants (Sutton & 
Austin, 2015).  Body language allows the researcher to identify how the participant feels about 
specific questions or topics; it also provides additional non-verbal information (Bampton & 
Cowton, 2002; Opdenakker, 2006).  To obtain more detail, the principal investigator took notes 
regarding body language to analysis compared to the narratives.  
Transcription notes. Furthermore, notes were taken during the transcription phase of the 
interviews to identify and organize emergent themes.  Because of the length of each 
transcription, it was more convenient for the principal investigator to take notes during the 
transcribing process.  Rather than having to rely on memory of each interview, note taking 
during transcription allowed the principal investigator to be more accurate in developing themes 
and perceptions.  As themes emerged, the principal investigator created a new column, making a 
note about the page and paragraph number of the interview narrative that addressed it using 
coded identifiers to indicate the specific transcription document. 
Privacy and data security. During the data collection process, specific steps were taken 
to ensure privacy and anonymity of each participant, as well as secure all data provided to the 
principal investigator.  Participant privacy was vital to receiving honest answers to the interview 
questions and securing data ensured privacy and anonymity.  The principal investigator utilized a 
two-step verification system to secure all data files and kept sensitive information, including the 
list of participants with their coded identifiers separate from the other data.  
Privacy. Specific measures were taken by the principal investigator to maintain the 
privacy of the participants.  The principal investigator conducted interviews in private reserved 
rooms in convenient locations and obtained informed consent from each participant before 
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recording the interviews with an audio-recorder.  After each interview, the principal investigator 
transcribed the conversation using a coded identifier for the participant to ensure anonymity. 
Finally, all data on the audio-recording device, and transcriptions were kept in a secure location.  
After a participant was chosen, the principal investigator communicated with them to 
identify the location they would like to meet for the interview.  After the location was chosen, 
the principal investigator called the location and reserved a private room for the interviews.  This 
step ensured the conversation would not be overheard, and gave the participant a sense of 
privacy and security.  Furthermore, the principal investigator explained to participants how they 
would remain anonymous to everyone but the principal investigator. In the transcription phase, 
the principal investigator made a master list of the participants and their coded identifier, which 
was secured in a locked safe separate from all related data.  Although there is minimal risk 
involved in partaking in the study, privacy and anonymity encourage participants to answer 
questions truthfully (Mühlenfeld, 2004).  
Before and after the interviews, the principal investigator explained that the data 
provided, and the audio-recordings are stored in a secure location only available to the principal 
investigator.  Furthermore, the participants were informed that no data provided would be shared 
with anyone unless explicit consent was received from them first.  Finally, the principal 
investigator explained to the participants that they were not forced to partake in the study, and 
they could choose to back out at any time, for any reason.  If the participant chose to disengage, 
the principal investigator explained that all data provided by them would be immediately 
destroyed.  
Data security. The data collected was stored using secure passwords.  According to 
Lancet (2013), a secure password must be at least eight characters containing numbers, symbols, 
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and a combination of upper and lowercase letters.  Furthermore, the password should never 
include easily deduced personal information. Using these guidelines, the principal investigator 
developed passwords that would not be easily guessed for their personal laptop, the Microsoft 
Word files containing sensitive information, and an external USB hard drive. With this strategy, 
the principal investigator had two copies of each document stored in separate locations, and 
maintained a two-step verification system to access all data.  The two-step verification system 
required a password to access the principal investigator’s laptop, as well as a separate password 
to access all individual data files.  
Additionally, the laptop and the external USB hard drive were securely stored at the 
principal investigator’s residence in a locked location, to which only the principal investigator 
had a key.  Finally, following IRB protocol, all documentation regarding the study will be 
maintained for the mandatory three years, after which time it will be destroyed. 
Summary of data collection. The principal investigator used two main data collection 
instruments: interviews, and a field test.  The principal investigator conducted interviews with 
each of the fifteen participants and transcribed the interviews to code into emergent themes and 
perceptions.  The field test was used before the interviews to improve clarity of the interview 
questions.  As data was collected, it was organized into three categories: interview narratives, 
interview notes, and transcription notes.  All categories were cross-referenced to develop a 
connection between the different sources of information.  Furthermore, participants’ privacy 
and anonymity were maintained and the data collected was secured using specific steps. 
Participants’ privacy was maintained by using private rooms for interviews, their anonymity 
was maintained by using a coded identification technique in the transcriptions and other 
personal data, and the data was secured using a two-step verification system on the principal 
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investigator’s computer and external USB hard drive. 
Data Analysis 
The process of analyzing data requires categorizing text and image data and reorganizing 
it (Creswell, 2014).  Creswell (2014) categorizes the process of data analysis into six steps: (1) 
prepare the data for analysis, (2) read through all of the data, (3) code all of the data, (4) create 
themes, (5) determine the most appropriate form of presentation of the themes, and (6) interpret 
the data.  The principal investigator used this six-step method as a primary data analysis 
approach.  
After following each step for all of the collected data, the principal investigator 
proceeded to compare the data across cases.  Sahloul (2019) explains that cross-case analysis 
identifies casual links between cases in a multiple case study.  Cross-case analysis helped 
identify common themes between participant responses (Bower, Dalgarno, Kennedy, Lee, & 
Kenney, 2015).  The principal investigator used cross-case analysis to determine links between 
the prevalence of asset misappropriation in NFPs and the fraud prevention, detection, and 
management preparations of the accountants at the organizations.  Furthermore, cross-case 
analysis enabled the principal investigator to identify common weaknesses in the NFPs’ existing 
fraud prevention, detection, and management systems. 
Step one – prepare the data. Preparing the data involved transcribing all audio-
recorded interviews into Microsoft Word format.  The principal investigator followed Sahloul’s 
(2019) member checking procedure by providing each participant with their respective 
transcription to confirm or correct responses.  Member-checking is a common technique used 
in qualitative research to improve quality using verification and validation of the participant’s 
responses (Birt, Scott, Cavers, Campbell, & Walter, 2016).  After the participants confirmed or 
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clarified transcription content, the principal investigator added notes and saved the checked 
Word files for subsequent coding. 
Step two – read the data. Memory cannot be relied upon; to eliminate errors caused by 
memory, careful review of the transcription enabled the principal investigator to refresh the 
ideas addressed by each participant (Stuckey, 2014).  Furthermore, reading the transcriptions 
helped the principal investigator to identify commonalties and differences between the 
participants’ experiences before coding.  Reviewing all prepared data also enabled the principal 
investigator to compare the transcription with interview notes taken during data collection to 
get a deeper understanding of each case.  Finally, the principal investigator added notes to the 
documents as they were reviewed, eliminating the need to rely on memory during coding. 
Step three – code the data. Coding is a popular data analysis method in qualitative 
research; it identifies themes and connects them to the data (Parameswaran, Ozawa-Kirk, & 
Latendresse, 2019).  In this project, the principal investigator used open and axial coding. Open 
coding is the primary method used to identify themes within data (Williams & Moser, 2019). 
After completing open coding with each interview, the principal investigator began axial 
coding.  Axial coding reorganizes the themes that emerged in open coding to create categories 
(William & Moser, 2019).  To accomplish both forms of coding, the principal investigator used 
Microsoft Excel®. 
Step four – develop themes. Themes were used as the major findings presented at the 
end of the study.  According to Creswell (2014), the principal investigator should use the data 
to develop five to seven themes.  Using this guidance, the principal investigator identified four 
major themes to answer the research questions, and five themes regarding discoveries beyond 
the scope of the study.  Each theme was listed in a table; principal investigator made notes 
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supporting the themes using specific quotations and ideas from the interviews.  Additionally, 
the principal investigator reviewed each interview in relation to the themes and identified 
connections between cases. Finally, the principal investigator identified how the different 
themes connected.  
Step five – data presentation method. The data collected and analyzed by the 
principal investigator were narratives.  Prior research explains that discussing the emergent 
themes in a paragraph format, including specific quotes to clarify ideas presented is ideal 
(Anderson, 2010).  However, the principal investigator also decided to create a visual, 
identifying the themes and sub-themes.  The table allowed readers to examine the data 
collected, and how the principal investigator organized the information to form the themes.  
The table identified each theme and sub-theme as well as the participants that supported them.  
Step six – interpretation of the findings. The principal investigator reviewed the 
interviews for key words and phrases to identify commonalities between the participants’ 
experiences.  Furthermore, the principal investigator created charts to detect similarities 
between the participants’ preparation before experiencing fraud, and how well they believed 
they were prepared.  Comparing the different preparation techniques aided the principal 
investigator in identifying gaps in existing training tools.  Additionally, the principal 
investigator created a chart to explain how the participants believed preparation could be 
improved.  The ideas of participants were compared to one another as well as to existing 
literature to identify which ideas had merit. 
Coding process. The principal investigator followed a two-step coding process. The 
first step in this process was open coding, followed by axial coding.  Open coding is a process 
used to identify key concepts or ideas within a set of collected data (Alhassan, Sammon, & 
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Daly, 2018).  The principal investigator detected emergent themes in the data that related 
specifically to the participants’ experiences with asset misappropriation and fraud preparation. 
Using a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet, the principal investigator captured each primary theme 
and assigned it a number.  The principal investigator created the theme in an Excel table and 
added the theme to the tab for the participant with the quote from which it emerged.  
After completing this step, the principal investigator began axial coding.  Rather than 
identifying emergent themes, axial coding reorganizes and refines themes identified in the open 
coding process (Williams & Moser, 2019).  During this phase, the principal investigator 
reviewed all of the primary codes, or themes, that had emerged from the data and identified 
connections between them.  Identifying similarities allowed the principal investigator to find a 
descriptive phrase that would connect similar ideas.  One of the steps in Tesch’s coding process 
involves creating a descriptive wording for topics that can be turned into categories as a means of 
grouping topics together and reducing the total number of themes (Creswell, 2014).  The 
principal investigator followed this guidance to create categories that identified major themes of 
the project. 
The principal investigator created the Excel spreadsheet to view more data 
simultaneously and maintain all data in a clean and orderly fashion.  Furthermore, the Excel 
spreadsheet allowed for effective coding of primary themes, which benefited the principal 
investigator during the axial coding phase. 
Summary of data analysis. The principal investigator followed Creswell’s (2014) six-
step process for data analysis: (1) prepare the data for analysis, (2) read through all of the data, 
(3) code all of the data, (4) create themes, (5) determine the most appropriate form of 
presentation for the themes, and (6) interpret the data. This process involved transcribing the 
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interviews from the audio-recordings and reviewing the transcriptions using a two-step coding 
process.  After all interviews were transcribed, the principal investigator read them using an 
open coding method.  Open coding helped the principal investigator to develop emergent 
themes based on key concepts and ideas (Alhassan et al., 2018).  Second, axial coding was 
conducted; this involved reviewing the concepts and ideas from open coding and creating 
categories based on connections between the emergent themes (Williams & Moser, 2019). 
The principal investigator used Microsoft Excel® to accomplish the coding.  Microsoft 
Excel® was used to organize the data in a central location that could be easily viewed. Using 
Excel® allowed more data to be examined simultaneously, and helped the principal investigator 
during the axial coding phase.  Being able to examine more data improved the principal 
investigator’s ability to make connections between ideas and form categories more effectively. 
Reliability and Validity 
Reliability and validity are two constructs by which instruments and results are measured 
to ensure the quality, or rigor, of research (Dikko, 2016; Hayashi, Abib, & Hoppen, 2019; Noble 
& Smith, 2015).  There are different techniques used to test for reliability and validity within 
research.  According to Noble and Smith (2015) qualitative research is often criticized for 
lacking rigor because it lacks transparency in its investigative procedures, and its results are 
based on opinion that are subject to researcher bias.  However, research proves that consistency, 
triangulation, and saturation, help maintain reliability and validity in qualitative studies (Cypress, 
2017); in this study, the principal investigator ensured each of these components were met to 
achieve rigor throughout the research process.  
Reliability. Reliability is the evaluation of consistency within a study, identifying the 
stability of the results by assessing whether it could be replicated over time (Hayashi et al., 
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2019).  Morse (2015) describes reliability as the ability to repeat a study and obtain the same 
results.  Because qualitative research is based on human participants and behaviors, reliability 
can be difficult to measure; there is possibility of measurements and observations being 
repeated incorrectly, or participants answering questions different ways if asked a second time 
(Cypress, 2017).  However, a margin of acceptable variability exists in the reliability of 
qualitative research due to reliance on human behavior (Leung, 2015).  Although reliability is 
more difficult to measure in qualitative studies, the main idea used to increase it is consistency, 
or replication (Morse, 2015).  
Consistency. Consistency involves a clear description of the research process enabling 
other researchers to replicate the study (Noble & Smith, 2015).  Because it is more difficult to 
prove, researchers identify consistency as a crucial aspect of reliability in qualitative studies 
(Hayashi et al., 2019; Leung, 2015; Noble & Smith, 2015) Noble and Smith (2015) believe that 
consistency should involve the documentation of “Challenges and issues assisted in maintaining 
cohesion between the study's aim, design and methods” (p. 35).  Documenting each part of the 
research process, including the obstacles, increases the level of replication.  The principal 
investigator began the study by documenting the expected steps to be taken to collect, analyze, 
and present data.  As the research proceeded, notes were kept that identified necessary changes 
and challenges, as well as how they were overcome.  Keeping documentation of these steps will 
enable future researchers to accurately repeat the study.  
In this study, the principal investigator maintained consistency by following an interview 
guide (Appendix C), conducting each interview the same way, and asking the same questions to 
each participant.  Furthermore, the principal investigator used a specific recruitment email that 
was sent to each potential participant (Appendix D), ensuring each individual received the same 
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information.  Additionally, the principal investigator followed the same schedule regarding 
transcription and member checking for each case.  To enable future researchers to identify the 
process and replicate the study with different populations, the principal investigator thoroughly 
documented the research process.  Documentation of processes yields further stability to the 
study (Sahloul, 2019).  
Validity. Validity is the idea that research is justifiable, meaningful, logical, and well 
founded (Cypress, 2017).  Furthermore, Noble and Smith (2015) measure validity based on 
how well findings reflect the data.  Validity is a required research rigor in both qualitative and 
quantitative research; however, it is simpler to prove in quantitative research because of 
statistical findings in the studies (Whittemore, Chase, & Mandle, 2001).  Qualitative research 
maintains diverse research methods and techniques, making validity difficult to identify using a 
set criterion (Hayashi et al., 2019).  Although assessing validity in qualitative research is a topic 
of concern, researchers have identified ways to improve validity assessment for such studies. 
Some of the techniques used to prove validity in qualitative research include triangulation, 
credibility, and data saturation (Cypress, 2017; Green, 2015; Hayashi et al., 2019; 
Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007; Whittemore et al., 2001).  
Triangulation. Triangulation is a research method that uses multiple data sources, 
theories, or methods to ensure the data, analysis, and results of a study are as accurate as possible 
(Abdalla, Oliveira, Azevedo, & Gonzalez, 2017; Fusch & Ness, 2015; Moon, 2019).  This 
technique reduces biases and coincidental associations, improving the confidence of data 
interpretations (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007).  Triangulation assumes that the more sources 
examined, the more likely a researcher is to obtain an accurate representation of the 
phenomenon.  Using triangulation, the principal investigator collected data from 15 different 
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sources as well as existing literature regarding the study topic. Collecting data from different 
participants enabled the principal investigator to obtain a deeper understanding of the 
phenomenon in questions (Hayashi et al., 2019). Furthermore, comparing the collected data to 
existing research and theories created the opportunity for a deeper interpretation of results 
(Green, 2015). 
Credibility. Credibility in qualitative studies exists when the participants’ experiences are 
explained accurately and truthfully (Cypress, 2017).  According to Hayashi et al. (2019), the 
value of research depends on the ability to prove credibility. Qualitative research is considered 
credible if readers who have experienced the phenomenon recognize the described experiences 
(Cope, 2014).  Transparency in each stage of the research process is vital to creating credibility. 
In this study, the principal investigator built credibility using member-checking and protection of 
the participants. 
Member checking. Member checking is technique used in qualitative research to 
establish validity; it is a process allowing participants to correct, expand upon, and check the 
accuracy of data collected from them to minimize misinterpretation (Birt et al., 2016; Brear, 
2019; Candela, 2019; Lub, 2015).  During member checks participants are asked to read and 
provide comments on the transcription of their interview (Brear, 2019).  The principal 
investigator transcribed each interview within two days of meeting with the participants.  The 
transcription was sent to the participant by email, and they were asked to confirm or contest the 
accuracy of the information provided; furthermore, they were encouraged to correct or expand 
upon any ideas they felt needed more information.  Performing member checks ensured that the 
participants’ meaning and perspectives were accurate and not accidentally altered by the 
principal investigator’s personal biases (Birt et al., 2016).  
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Participant protection. Participation protection involved both privacy and security of 
information. Credibility requires that the data collected and presented truthfully represents the 
experience of the participants (Whittemore et al., 2001).  If participants believe they will remain 
anonymous, and that their information will be secured, the likelihood of them answering 
questions honestly, and providing rich information increases (Mühlenfeld, 2004).  In this study, 
the principal investigator used different methods to ensure the privacy and protection of the 
participants. 
Interviews were held in private rooms at locations convenient to the participant. The 
private room was used to guarantee the interviews were not overheard; this was a method the 
principal investigator utilized to maintain privacy and encourage information-rich responses. 
Furthermore, the principal investigator received informed consent from the participants to 
partake in the study and allow audio recording of the interviews.  The consent documents 
informed the participants of their anonymity and protection.  
Additionally, the principal investigator increased credibility by building rapport with the 
participants and assuring them that their information would be secured.  Research suggests that 
building rapport helps interview participants to be more comfortable with the researcher; gaining 
the trust of the participants enables the researcher to collect accurate and credible data (Alase, 
2017).  Simply having good communication skills is not enough to build rapport, participants 
have to believe the researcher is trustworthy before they are likely to share their experiences in 
detail. All data was stored in a password-protected laptop and each interview was transcribed 
using password-protected Word documents; the principal investigator was the only one with 
knowledge of the passwords.  To promote honest answers the principal investigator also 
maintained coded identifiers ensuring anonymity of the participants in the research results. 
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Participants were informed of how their data would be secured and that they would not be 
identifiable by any information published in the results. The privacy and protection processes 
encouraged participants to provide rich information that allowed the principal investigator to 
obtain credible results. 
Data saturation. Data saturation is a technique used in qualitative research to build 
validity; researchers achieve data saturation through their sample size, continuing to sample until 
no new data emerges (Boddy, 2016; Hayashi et al., 2019).  Creswell (2014) believes data 
saturation can be achieved in qualitative case studies by examining four or five cases.  However, 
other research indicates that saturation cannot be achieved until fifteen participants have been 
interviewed (Marshall et al., 2013).  Considering both suggestions, the principal investigator 
believed data saturation could be reached after studying fifteen cases. Each case consisted of one 
participating accountant from each NFP organization.  
The principal investigator practiced purposive snowball sampling to obtain qualified 
participants who could provide information-rich interviews.  Because the depth of data collected 
is more important than the quantity, the principal investigator continued to gather information 
until data saturation occurred (Sahloul, 2019).  To ensure saturation was reached, the principal 
investigator replicated the interview process with each new participant until no new ideas, 
perceptions, or themes emerged. 
Summary of reliability and validity. Reliability and validity are two components of 
research rigor that add value to a study (Dikko, 2016).  Reliability is measured based on the 
stability of the results; repeatability is an important component of reliability (Morse, 2015).  To 
ensure reliability in this study, the principal investigator maintained consistency throughout 
data collection.  The principal investigator documented each step of the research process, and 
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utilized an interview guide to guarantee each participant was asked the same questions. The 
interview guide (Appendix C) and description of data collection steps allow potential future 
researchers to accurately perform the study in different locations and maintain reliability.  
Validity is the idea that research is justifiable, meaningful, logical, and well founded 
(Cypress, 2017).  To prove validity, the principal investigator used triangulation, credibility, and 
data saturation.  Triangulation occurs when the researcher uses two or more sources to ensure 
accuracy of data (Fusch & Ness, 2015; Moon, 2019).  In this study, the principal investigator 
collected data from 15 participants and existing research on the topic of asset misappropriation in 
NFP organizations. Cross-examining data collected between cases as well as with existing 
research confirmed results and theories. 
Furthermore, the principal investigator used credibility to increase validity.  Credibility 
exists when the data presented accurately depicts the experiences of the participants (Cypress, 
2017).  The principal investigator used member checking and participant protection processes to 
build credibility.  Member checking occurs when data collected is returned to the participants for 
confirmation or correction (Brear, 2019; Candela, 2019).  In this study the transcription of each 
interview was returned to the individual participant; they were asked to review it for accuracy. 
The principal investigator encouraged each participant to correct any mistakes, and expand upon 
ideas if they felt more information was needed. 
To enhance credibility, the principal investigator implemented participant protection 
processes, ensuring each individual of their anonymity and privacy.  The interviews were held in 
private rooms, which encouraged the participants to answer questions honestly.  Additionally, all 
information collected was stored on a password-protected computer; each Word document was 
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further protected with a separate password.  Although the study proved a minimal risk, offering 
protection to participants improved the richness of data (Mühlenfeld, 2004). 
Finally, to increase validity, the principal investigator ensured data saturation was met. 
To achieve data saturation information is collected from new participants until no new themes or 
ideas emerge (Boddy, 2016).  The principal investigator followed guidelines from different 
researchers to obtain a sample size of 15 participants, with the possibility of expanding if new 
information continued to be collected. To gather information-rich participants the principal 
investigator conducted purposive snowball sampling.  
Transition and Summary of Section 2 
Section 2 outlined the details of the project.  The principal investigator reiterated the 
purpose of the study, identifying the need for examination of existing fraud prevention, 
detection, and management techniques. Furthermore, the principal investigator identified the role 
of the researcher within the study, and the participants to be included in the study. To be 
considered for the study each potential participant had to be working in an accounting or 
financial position at a NFP organization and have earned a bachelor’s degree at minimum in 
accounting or other related field.  
The principal investigator identified the population of the study and conducted a 
combination of purposive and snowball sampling to identify and select qualified participants. 
After selecting participants, the principal investigator collected data using interviews and 
document review processes.  The principal investigator was the main data collection tool and 
was responsible for organizing and analyzing the data.  Open and axial coding were used to 
identify themes within the data.  
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Finally, the principal investigator identified reliability and validity measures to improve 
the quality of the study.  Using consistency, triangulation, credibility, and data saturation the 
principal investigator improved the reliability and validity of the project.  These techniques 
allowed the study to be replicated using different study locations by detailing the steps of the 
projects.  
Section 3 will examine the application of the study results to professional practice. 
Furthermore, it will identify how the results might affect change in the professional sector.  In 
section 3, the principal investigator will review the data and identify anticipated themes as well 
as actual themes and findings identified within the data.  Additionally, the principal will identify 
applications to professional practice, make recommendations for future action, and finally 
indicate recommendations for further study to expand the study. 
Section 3: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Change 
Section 3 contains the overview of the study and the principal investigator’s anticipated 
themes and perceptions before the study began.  Furthermore, the principal investigator discusses 
the findings of the study and the major themes identified during analysis.  Section 3 also contains 
a discussion of the applications to professional practice and recommendations from the principal 
investigator of action to be taken and future research theories to be explored. The section is 
concluded with the reflections of the principal investigator and a summary of the study. 
Overview of the Study 
Fraud is a problem within NFPs. According to Arshad, Asyiqin, Razali, and Bakar (2015) 
fraud in NFP companies has increased.  The approximate loss associated with NFP fraud 
increased from $90,000 in 2010, to $108,000 in 2014.  Further research proves that asset 
misappropriation loss in 2018 was approximately $114,000 per case (Denman, 2019). The ACFE 
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discovered that the average organization loses approximately 5 percent of their revenue to fraud 
each year (Jones, 2014).  NFP’s limited resources makes losing any amount of revenue to fraud 
devastating (Applegate, 2019; Case, 2008).  
NFP organizations are more susceptible to fraudulent activity because of the 
“…complexity of accounting…”, the trusting environment, and the shortage of financially 
knowledgeable employees (Applegate, 2019; Jones, 2014, p. 14).  Research proves that the most 
common fraud committed in NFPs is asset misappropriation, specifically theft of cash 
(Appelbaum, Kozlowski, Vasarhelyi, & White, 2016; Case, 2008).  A study conducted by the 
ACFE (2018) shows that 89% of frauds reported, are classified as asset misappropriation 
(Denman, 2019).  Because of the financial and reputational loss associated with fraud, it is vital 
that NFPs lower their fraud risk (Carver, Klein, Gistinger, 2015; Case, 2008). 
By reviewing existing research, the principal investigator identified a gap in literature 
regarding fraud in NFPs (Archambeault et al., 2014).  Additionally, minimal information exists 
aiding NFPs in lowering fraud risk and improving the skills of their accounting staff.  To achieve 
the purpose of this study, the principal investigator identified four research questions.  The first 
question sought to identify the forms of asset misappropriation occurring within the study 
population.  The second research question identified the types of preparation NFP accounting 
staff receives regarding fraud prevention, detection, and management.  The third research 
question was designed to indicate the duration of fraud in the study location before being 
detected and managed.  The final question enabled the principal investigator to identify how 
NFPs handle detected fraud. 
The principal investigator followed a qualitative exploratory case study design. 
Qualitative research methods enabled the researcher to gather information related to the meaning 
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individuals attribute to the phenomenon (Creswell, 2014).  The principal investigator sought to 
understand the experiences of those in accounting and finance positions within NFPs regarding 
asset misappropriation, making the qualitative design appropriate.  Furthermore, an exploratory 
case study design was utilized to gather multiple viewpoints on the same phenomenon. 
Exploratory studies, similar to pilot studies, explore a topic that is not widely addressed in 
existing research (Fahy, 2013).  By interviewing multiple participants, with varying experiences, 
the principal investigator was able to gain a more complete picture of the phenomenon. 
To complete the study, the principal investigator gained the necessary approvals from 
Liberty University’s IRB, and visited the websites of over 160 NFPs from the available 
population, obtained from the IRS database.  After gathering contact information, the principal 
investigator emailed and called potential participants.  After receiving responses, the principal 
investigator recorded whether participants were unqualified, meaning that they either did not 
work at a NFP in South Central Pennsylvania as an accounting or finance staff or did not earn a 
Bachelor’s degree in accounting or a related field, were uninterested in participating, or were 
willing to participate.  Next, the principal investigator scheduled a date, time, and location for 
each interview and assigned the participant a 2-letter coded identifier.  The recruitment process 
lasted from August 8, 2019 to September 23, 2019.  
Of the potential participants, 24% were unqualified, 13% were qualified but unwilling to 
help, and 53% never responded to the recruitment emails.  Of the 15 participants that accepted 
and scheduled interviews, only 1 was gained using snowball sampling.  Huang, Fernandez, 
Rhoden, and Joseph (2019) prove that email recruitment results in low response rates.  In their 
study, Huang et al. (2019) discovered that email recruitment resulted in a 1% response rate. 
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Throughout the recruitment process, the principal investigator was finding similar results, which 
led to telephone recruitment.  
When participants accepted the invitation, they were immediately scheduled for 
interviews.  The principal investigator conducted 8 of the 15 interviews after work hours, 
allowing time to recruit new participants during the day.  Each interview was similarly 
structured: the principal investigator welcomed the participants, explained the study’s purpose, 
and reiterated the confidentiality and security information before beginning the interview.  An 
interview guide was used, ensuring the same questions were asked of each participant.  After the 
formal questions were answered, the principal investigator allowed time for participants to 
suggest any additional questions or add any information they believed would benefit the study. 
The principal investigator concluded each interview by explaining the timeframe for 
transcription and member-checking, and thanking each individual for participating.  
After completing each interview, the principal investigator transcribed the recordings 
within 2 days and sent them to the respective participant for member-checking.  No coding was 
completed until the member-checked transcripts were returned, to ensure accuracy.  The 
principal investigator created a Microsoft Excel file that had a tab for each participant, allowing 
the organization of themes and data.  As new themes were identified, a new number was 
assigned to it.  The numbering system saved time by eliminating multiple themes that were 
similar but phrased differently.  Transcriptions were coded using the database of existing themes 
and the addition of new themes. Using open coding, data saturation was reached when no new 
themes emerged from the transcribed interviews (Boddy, 2016). 
The next step involved axial coding, or the reorganization of themes identified in open 
coding to create broader categories (William & Moser, 2019).  The categories were organized 
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around the four ideas presented in the conceptual framework; the fraud management lifecycle 
theory, the fraud triangle theory, the theory of white-collar crime, and the routine activity theory. 
Furthermore, the major themes were categorized according to which of the four research 
questions they answered. 
The data gathered supported the research that fraud is a problem in majority of NFP 
organizations, with 66% of the interviewed participants having experienced asset 
misappropriation . Furthermore, the data corroborated the statement made by Kummer et al., 
2015), that majority of NFP fraud occurs in small organizations.  However, the data collected 
contradicted the idea that limited staff and resources results in more instances of fraud.  Thirty-
three percent of the participants interviewed had not experienced asset misappropriation, of 
which the accounting staff were aware, and 5 of the 6 organizations discussed had two or fewer 
accounting/finance employees. 
Anticipated Themes/Perceptions 
Before beginning data collection, the principal investigator had expected to hear specific 
themes during the interviews.  These themes and perceptions were derived from real-life 
experience, and the extensive amount of research and articles reviewed during the literature 
review phase.  For example, the principal investigator expected to hear that organizations with 
fewer employees and resources struggle to implement adequate internal controls to avoid fraud.  
Additionally, there was an anticipation that larger organizations would be more willing to 
participate in the study than small.  This perception was based on the expectation that larger 
organizations have more staff members, allowing the time to meet for an interview.  Conversely, 
the principal investigator anticipated that most small NFPs would not have accounting or finance 
staff that fit the qualifications of the study. 
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The principal investigator anticipated a theme of inadequate fraud-prevention training, 
resulting in the unpreparedness to identify and manage fraud quickly.  Many small NFPs do not 
have spare resources (Applegate, 2019).  With limited resources, the principal investigator 
anticipated that few NFPs would offer fraud-prevention training to their employees.  Without 
having adequate fraud-prevention training, the principal investigator expected many participants 
to be unprepared for fraud prevention, detection, and management.  
Similarly, the principal investigator anticipated that the majority of participants would not 
have professional certifications.  With small budgets, NFPs cannot afford to pay the same high 
salaries that CPAs receive working in the for-profit or auditing industries.  This led to the 
anticipation that NFP accounting and finance staff would not have had fraud-prevention training 
beyond what was provided during their collegiate career. 
Another anticipated theme was that fraud is an ever-growing problem and the majority of 
NFPs have experienced it.  Existing research proves that fraud is increasing each year (ACFE, 
2014; ACFE, 2018c; Bradley, 2015, Nawawi & Salin, 2018b).  Based on data presented in 
existing studies, the principal investigator anticipated a similar theme to emerge. 
Finally, the principal investigator anticipated hearing that implementation of anti-fraud 
controls decreases fraudulent activities in NFPs.  Research indicated that, when more anti-fraud 
controls are in place, fraud was lowered and duration of detected fraud was shorter (ACFE 2014; 
2018).  The principal investigator anticipated participants who had experienced asset 
misappropriation to have taken steps to prevent it in the future.  Additionally, the principal 
investigator anticipated those NFPs with more controls to have fewer cases of fraud. 
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Presentation of the Findings 
The principal investigator required each participant to meet three criteria: work for a NFP 
in South Central PA, work in an accounting or finance position at that NFP, and have earned a 
Bachelor’s degree in accounting or a related field.  Because of the academic requirement, many 
within the population were not qualified to participate.  Of those who responded to the 
recruitment email or phone call, 50% stated that they were not qualified.  The requirements 
significantly limited the number of eligible participants.  
After selecting participants, they were issued a 2-letter coded identifier. This identifier 
ensured confidentiality by removing their name from the study.  Furthermore, all identifying 
information was also eliminated. The principal investigator assigned the following 2-letter 
identifiers to the participants: LC, PX, KT, AQ, SE, BV, CN, WG, GK, RG, FP, HZ, JF, IY, and 
OA. 
The demographic information gathered by the principal investigator included: age, 
gender, ethnicity, year and location of graduation, highest level of schooling, professional 
certifications, and role at the NFP.  Based on the data collected, the following observations were 
made about the study population (see Figures 2, 3, & 4): 
 Females made up only 40% of the participant sample, and 60% of participants were 
males (there were 15 participants).  
 Ninety three percent of the participants were Caucasian/Anglo-Saxon. Only 1 participant 
identified with a different ethnicity (Asian/Pacific Islander). 
 Only two of the participants obtained schooling beyond a Bachelor’s degree; they did not 
complete a Master’s degree. 
 Forty-seven percent of the participants were aged in their 50s. 
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 Participants’ ages ranged from 29 to 69, even though the study was open to anyone over 
the age of 18 who fit the study criteria. 
 Seventy three percent of participants had a professional certification, although 3 of the 
participants’ certifications were no longer active. The certifications held included: CPA, 
CFE, Nursing Home Administrator, and Personal Care Administrator. 
 All participants earned their Bachelor’s degree before 2012. 
 Eighty percent of the participants received a degree from a college or university in 
Pennsylvania. The remaining participants attended schools in Indiana, Delaware, and 
Virginia. 
 
Figure 2. Gender and Ethnicity of Participants 
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Figure 3. Age of Participants 
 
 
Figure 4. Professional Certifications of Participants 
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were grouped together to form nine major themes.  One major theme was identified for each of 
the research questions.  The remaining 5 themes related to discoveries beyond the scope of the 
dissertation proposal and are addressed in Appendix G. 
Additionally, within each major theme there existed minor themes. Regarding the theme 
for research question one, there were four minor themes.  Regarding the theme for research 
question two, there were four minor themes.  Regarding the theme for research question three, 
there were four minor themes.  Finally, regarding the theme for research question four, there 
were five minor themes. Table 1 identifies the four major themes according to the research 
question being answered.  Furthermore, Table 2 presents the minor themes according to each of 
the four major themes. 
Table 1. 
Major Theme According to Research Question 
 Research Question Major Theme 
RQ1 What forms of asset misappropriation fraud 
occur in NFPs within South Central 
Pennsylvania? 
Theft is common in NFPs 
RQ2 What preparations have NFP accountants 
within the study population had that would 
equip them for fraud prevention, 
identification, and management, if any? 
Various forms of fraud-prevention 
training will better prepare staff for 
preventing, detecting, and managing 
fraud 
RQ3 How quickly is asset misappropriation fraud 
identified and managed within NFPs in South 
Central Pennsylvania? 
Various factors affect detection time 
RQ4 Of the properly detected cases within NFPs, 
what was the outcome? 
Action should be taken after a fraud 
occurs to prevent it from happening 
again 
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Table 2. 
Minor Themes According to Major Theme 
Major Theme Minor Theme 
Theft is common in NFPs Cash/Credit Cards are easy to misappropriate 
Volunteers feel entitled 
A lot of fraud occurs against the mentally disabled 
When cash is not involved in the business there is less opportunity 
for fraud 
Various forms of fraud- 
prevention training will 
better prepare staff for 
preventing, detecting, and 
managing fraud 
Adequate fraud prevention/detection training is important 
Continuing Professional Education (CPE) Courses/Webinars are 
incredibly beneficial 
Who should receive fraud-prevention training? 
Building a community to learn from is helpful 
Various factors affect 
detection time 
Many External Schemes make finding information difficult 
Individual perpetrators are most common 
The size of the misappropriation affects detection time 
It is vital to be aware of red flags 
Action should be taken after 
a fraud occurs to prevent it 
from happening again 
Using outside resources to manage fraud is helpful 
Making changes internally is vital 
Budgeting and comparing budgets 
Surveillance helps deter fraud 
Take action when possible 
  
Theme 1. The first research question was, “What forms of asset misappropriation occur 
in NFPs within South Central Pennsylvania?” The data collected yielded one major theme: 
“Theft is common in NFPs.” After reviewing all of the transcriptions, the following breakdown 
of asset misappropriation type was discovered: 
Table 3. 
Asset Misappropriation Type by Participant 
Type of Asset Misappropriation Number of Participants Who 
Experienced It 
Check Tampering 1 
Expense Reimbursement Claims 2 
Theft of Cash 5 
Billing Schemes 2 
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Theft of Non-Cash Assets 4 
No Asset Misappropriation 5 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Breakdown of Asset Misappropriation Type 
Some interviewees had experienced multiple types of asset misappropriation within their 
respective organizations, or at previous NFPs; others had never experienced asset 
misappropriation in their NFP careers.  Based on collected data, theft of cash was the most 
commonly perpetrated form of asset misappropriation within the study location.  The results 
contradict current data presented by the ACFE that theft of cash occurs in approximately 11-15 
percent of cases (ACFE, 2014; ACFE, 2016d; ACFE, 2018c).  In the cases described, 36% were 
classified as theft of cash.  Additionally, participants who had not experienced theft of cash also 
indicated that, within the NFP sector, it is the easiest to commit.  For example, participant JF 
noted that, in their company, it is common for individuals to walk in and present a cash donation 
to a staff member, especially during the holidays.  He stated that, although generous donations 
are welcomed, “From a fraud standpoint, it’s a little bit of an opportunity.”  For this reason, it is 
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vital that NFPs improve awareness of fraud risk, and how it can be prevented, detected, and 
managed.  This major theme was delineated by four minor themes. 
Minor theme 1. The first minor theme was that cash and credit cards are easy to 
misappropriate.  Participant KT works at a NFP that helps intellectually disabled individuals 
maintain a normal lifestyle. This involves maintaining multiple homes in which the individuals 
live.  These homes contain staff members who are responsible for helping the residents with 
budgeting and grocery shopping.  Participant KT indicated that they have: 
People that are making $14-$15 an hour but they're going out to buy groceries, they are 
managing the money of people with intellectual disabilities. So you have plenty of little 
instances where, if I go to the grocery store and buy $100 of groceries how many dollars 
make it into the house? 
Because of the NFP’s nature, the majority of their asset misappropriations occur in small 
amounts of $100 or less, rather than larger thefts, making detection difficult.  Similarly, 
participant JF stated that receiving cash donations opens organizations up to theft. In order to 
prevent this type of asset misappropriation, participant JF believes that: 
All of those people need that foundational training. Not just to reinforce behavior and 
stuff like that, we do a lot of things with just trying to promote stewardship within our 
workforce, and how to manage our resources as effectively as possible. And part of that 
is also how we protect these assets. 
The minor theme “Cash and credit cards are easy to misappropriate” indicates a need to 
implement strong controls surrounding cash receipts and disbursements.  Of the 15 participants 
interviewed, 6 (40%) mentioned having a dual signature policy in place, and 4 (27%) indicated 
having any type of check register or dual counting for incoming cash and checks.  These low 
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percentages support the problem that accounting and finance staff at NFPs need improved 
training regarding fraud prevention, detection, and management. 
 Minor theme 2. The second minor theme was: “Volunteers feel entitled.” Participant IY 
explained that when volunteers help at a NFP for many years, “Some of them think they own the 
place.”  At the organization for which participant IY works, food was stolen from a warehouse 
by a volunteer.  In order to prevent this in the future, surveillance cameras were installed. 
Similarly, participant JF indicated that many of the people coming into their organization are 
volunteer groups, and, “It’s hard to sneak out with food and stuff like that. But we have to make 
sure that, from a control standpoint that we have adequate controls in place.”  
This minor theme supports the idea that, although volunteers are beneficial to NFP 
organizations, they are also an increased risk factor (Groble & Brudney, 2016; McDonnell & 
Rutherford, 2018).  Participant SE stated that their organization is small, consisting of 6 board 
members, and they utilize volunteers to help.  However, they do not leave the decision-making 
capabilities in the hands of those volunteers.  This study identifies circumstances in which 
volunteers might misappropriate assets, and how to mitigate associated risk.  
 Minor theme 3. The third minor theme that emerged was, “A lot of fraud occurs against 
the mentally disabled.” Three of the participants work for organizations that help those with 
mental or physical disabilities, and all three of the participants (100%) noted seeing fraud occur 
against those they served.  Participant KT explained that, when staff members are working with 
residents who are intellectually disabled, they might take advantage of their lack of financial 
knowledge and steal small amounts over time.  Similarly, participant SE discussed how the 
population they work with are poor, and receive Social Security Income for “disability and 
mental health” reasons. Unfortunately, she stated that they often hear people who are “helping” 
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these individuals say, “I’m going to hold your card for you…so nothing happens to it, for safe 
keeping.”  She then explained that the individuals “Were thinking that the person was really 
helping them, they give them their pin numbers and they go and take their money.”  Finally, 
participant RG stated that the elderly residents they serve have accused employees of stealing 
personal property.  Although sometimes, “The person’s medications were fueling some 
paranoia,” there were times were cameras had to be placed to identify the thefts.  
Although this theme does not relate directly to all organizations, NFPs operate to assist 
those in the community.  When assisting people, it is vital to identify their mental state, and alter 
the staff and volunteers accordingly, to protect the company, as well as those being served.  This 
theme proves a need for improved fraud prevention, detection, and management, specifically in 
organizations that service those unable to protect themselves adequately.  
Minor theme 4. The final minor theme identified for research question one was: “When 
cash is not involved in the business, there is less opportunity for fraud.”  The data collected 
proved that theft of cash is the most common form of asset misappropriation in the study 
location.  Participant BV stated that, at their organization, they had “Numerous checks taken” 
from their mail.  In the example of participant KT, cash was stolen directly from residents over 
long periods of time.  Furthermore, regarding the issue of working with cash, participant OA 
said, “Cash is always an issue.” Participant WG said that at their organization, “There's no cash, 
it is very difficult to have fraud here.”  He further explained that he believes at NFPs, “Cash 
controls are probably the main thing where they might be lacking.”  Furthermore, participant SE 
mentioned that their organization rarely accepts cash donations, and that “Not accepting cash is a 
really good thing” because when a company accepts cash, “It opens up that office for theft.” 
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Another example of theft of cash was from participant GK; the organization had a snack 
bar with a small cashbox for purchases not made by credit card, and the money from the cashbox 
was stolen twice.  She explained that the company does not “Have a lot of cash that comes in and 
out, a lot of things are just charged to people’s accounts.”  From that view point, their fraud risk 
was minor.  However, improvements can still be made to lower that risk.  Participant LC noted 
that their organization does not get much cash, but it is all kept in a dual control safe as an extra 
safeguard.  Finally, participant AQ stated that “The biggest risk would be large amounts of cash 
leaving the organization.” 
This minor theme further proves the problem the principal investigator addressed.  Asset 
misappropriation is a problem amongst NFP organizations, and cash needs to be protected with 
strong controls (Archambeault et al., 2014).  However, many organizations prefer to receive cash 
donations, rather than goods (Ülkü, Bell, & Wilson, 2015).  Preparing accounting and finance 
staff to prevent, detect, and manage potential related fraud is vital. 
Theme 2. The second theme that emerged answered research question two: “What 
preparations have NFP accountants, within the study population, had that would equip them for 
fraud prevention, identification, and management, if any?”  The second major theme was: 
“Various forms of fraud-prevention training will better prepare staff for preventing, detecting, 
and managing fraud.”  The following information was discovered, from the data, regarding the 
types of fraud preparation that the participants had received: 
Table 4. 
Types of Fraud Preparation Received by Participants 
Type of Preparation Number of Participants who Received It 
CPE Courses 11 
Collegiate Auditing Course 10 
Training from Prior Organizations 5 
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Reading Articles in the Journal of 
Accountancy 
1 
Collegiate Business Ethics Course 1 
AICPA/CFE Fraud Course 2 
Conferences/Presentations from Groups 
Outside the Organization 
2 
Training at the Organization 3 
No Training Received 2 
 
Although some of the participants had received more than one form of fraud-prevention training, 
two stated they had received no fraud prevention, detection, and management training.  This 
theme supported the problem that NFP accounting and finance staff need improved fraud 
prevention, detection, and management training.  
Furthermore, the principal investigator asked questions regarding what types of topics 
have been beneficial to learn over the course of their careers.  The participants indicated the 
following topics as being vital to proper fraud prevention, detection, and management: 
Table 5. 
Fraud Preparation Topics 
Topics Participants Indicated as Beneficial to Successful Fraud Prevention, Detection, and 
Management Preparation 
Professional Skepticism 
Case Studies 
Real-life Experience 
Auditing Courses 
Attitude of Employees 
Cyber Crime 
Tone at the Top 
Supervisor Oversight 
 
Eleven participants (73%) indicated the importance of learning and implementing professional 
skepticism.  Participant AQ works for a religious organization and he mentioned, “Even people 
who are Christians does not mean that they’re not tempted to commit fraud.” Similarly, 
participant IY explained that although many of the employees are Christians, “That doesn’t 
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always mean anything,” Christians might still commit fraud.  Furthermore, participant CN 
believed that, “Lack of healthy skepticism creates an environment where fraud or 
misappropriation would be otherwise more likely to occur.”  He went on further to state that “A 
healthy skepticism would go a long way.” Participant SE stated that, “You have to take the 
time…you can look at somebody and think they’re the most trustworthy person ever.”  However, 
that does not mean you should not review their work and complete proper audit checks to ensure 
accuracy and honesty.  Participant JF summarized the need for professional skepticism well, 
stating that “Every organization has to take seriously the fact that anybody can be that next 
perpetrator.”  In reviewing the transcriptions, professional skepticism was the topic that came up 
the most regarding proper fraud prevention, detection, and management preparation.  
The other topics that participants indicated as being vital include learning from case 
studies and real-life experience, and putting the lessons from them into practice.  One participant 
indicated that he makes his interns review specific cases of fraud and discusses them with them. 
He believes that people leaving college and entering the workforce do not have a healthy 
professional skepticism; showing them real-life examples of fraud helps them understand what 
can take place in an organization.  Other participants believed that the best experience, 
unfortunately, came from having identified and managed fraud themselves.  Although the 
principal investigator’s goal is to lower fraud risk, using experiences and examples has proven 
beneficial in helping professionals understand the risks and weaknesses in organizations similar 
to theirs.  Understanding the mistakes of other organizations, can benefit NFPs by enabling them 
to improve weaknesses other companies overlooked. 
The various topics addressed by participants proves the importance of utilizing different 
training techniques to improve the ability of accountants to prevent, detect, and manage fraud. 
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Individuals learn differently, and not all forms of training provide the same level of education. 
Seeking out different forms of education and training will help accountants learn about more 
topics, and better prepare themselves in the long-run.  Within this theme there were four minor 
themes that emerged. 
Minor theme 1. The first minor theme identified was: “Adequate fraud prevention and 
detection training is important.” Nine participants (60%) mentioned the importance of adequate 
fraud-prevention training. Participant PX stated that “More training is always good.” 
Additionally, participant KT noted that they are, “Always looking for good education and…fraud 
detection is always important for us.”  
Conversely, participant GK revealed that she had no fraud-prevention training.  She 
stated that, “Training of staff could be better,” and that the organization does not have a standard 
regarding fraud-prevention training.  She stated that further training would be necessary for her, 
and other staff, to manage fraud adequately.  This minor theme indicates the need for adequate 
fraud-prevention training for individuals in accounting and finance roles.  Although many 
participants felt prepared to manage fraud if it were to occur, some felt that they were unprepared 
due to lack of training and education.  By informing individuals of available training and 
education, their ability and confidence regarding fraud prevention, detection, and management 
will enable them to lower their organization’s risk. 
Minor theme 2. The second minor theme that emerged was that, CPE courses and 
webinars are beneficial training tools.  From a convenience standpoint, participant FP said, “I 
think webinars are good because you can do them at your desk.  Generally, they are free or low 
cost depending on who’s offering them.”  Additionally, participant LC indicated that webinars 
and CPEs are approximately 2 hours, and they teach a lot of information that is transactional for 
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professionals.  Participant JF also stated that there are CPEs and webinars that directly address 
problems that NFPs encounter.  Although there are few regarding fraud in NFPs, “A lot of those 
nonprofit focused sessions are really around designing controls for organizations that can’t 
properly segregate all those processes.”  
Four participants had never taken CPEs or webinars.  Of these individuals, 75% showed 
an interest in obtaining information regarding finding CPEs and webinars to benefit their fraud 
preparation.  One participant explained that their organization has a specific online library with 
webinars on a variety of applicable topics.  However, she stated that the system offers no 
webinars on the topic of fraud prevention, detection, or management, and that learning those 
topics would be beneficial to her and others.  This minor theme enabled the researcher to further 
support the idea that CPEs and webinars teaching fraud preparation are beneficial for the 
working professional.  Research proves that these self-directed forms of learning are increasing, 
and offer individuals more convenience, efficiency, and flexibility in their learning (Curran et al., 
2019).  Utilizing these tools will help accountants in NFPs better prepare themselves for 
potential fraud occurrences. 
Minor theme 3. The third minor theme, “Who should receive fraud training?” was 
addressed by 100% of participants, as it was a specific question in the interview guide.  When 
asked, 53% believed that everyone in the organization would benefit from some level of fraud-
prevention training.  The remaining 47% of participants believed that leadership and accounting 
staff should be the main recipients of fraud-prevention training; with emphasis on anyone who 
had access to checks, transactions, or financial data. However, the majority of participants 
believed it did not matter what your role was; fraud is a company-wide issue. Participant KT 
stated that he had, “Seen fraud perpetrated at all levels of the organization, or tolerance of it even 
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at various levels of the organization.”  Participant CN noted that, “Fraud detection and 
prevention is everybody’s responsibility.” Additionally, participant RG believed that fraud-
prevention training should explain, “Not only how to detect it, but what constitutes it. What the 
consequences could be.” 
This minor theme supports the problem that accountants need improved fraud prevention, 
detection, and management training.  Only 3 participants (20%) stated that their organization 
offered them fraud-prevention training since being hired.  Although most participants had 
received training of some kind, it was not common that the organization specifically provided the 
opportunities for them to learn those topics.  Addressing the question of who should receive 
training made the participants think critically about their organizations and identify which roles 
involve the most fraud risk, and whether or not employees need fraud-prevention training. 
Additionally, by showing participants the various forms of fraud-prevention training and 
preparation available, they might choose to improve their education on fraud topics and better 
prepare themselves for potential occurrences. 
Minor theme 4. The last minor theme was only discussed by two participants (13%); 
“Building a community to learn from is helpful.” Participant SE explained that there are NFP 
groups and professional organizations that help provide information to other NFP professionals 
about pertinent topics.  She also indicated the importance of speaking with people, who had 
experienced fraud and undergone the process of detection and management.  Participant LC 
stated that attending conferences is beneficial to fraud preparation and education.  He stated that 
the State Accounting Association and the Pennsylvania Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(PICPA) offer fraud-prevention training to accounting professionals.  Joining a community, 
whether NFP focused or not, can improve professionals’ knowledge on various topics.  Learning 
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about the groups and professional organizations that are established for NFPs, can improve the 
training that individuals in financial positions receive, and give them a contact to ask questions if 
something arises that they do not know how to manage adequately. 
Theme 3. Theme three, “Detection takes various forms,” answered the third research 
question: “How quickly is asset misappropriation fraud identified and managed within NFPs in 
South Central Pennsylvania?”  After interviewing the participants, the following breakdown of 
fraud duration was indicated from those that experienced asset misappropriation: 
Table 6. 
Detection Time by Participant 
Participant Length of time before detection 
AQ 1 day 
BV 1 month 
CN Months to years 
GK 1-2 days 
IY Unsure 
JF 1 day 
KT Unsure for most cases, but longer than desired 
OA Unsure 
RG 1 month 
WG 1 day 
 
Based on the data, 40% of participants who experienced fraud detected it within one to two days, 
30% were unsure of the duration before it was detected, and 30% stated that the fraud lasted a 
month or more.  These statistics prove the need for improving the ability of those in accounting 
and finance positions to prevent, detect, and manage fraud.  Additionally, the participants 
explained the various ways the frauds were detected.  The principal investigator identified the 
following statistics based on detection data from the fourteen cases of asset misappropriation 
described by the ten participants who had experienced such occurrences: 
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Figure 6. Fraud Detection form by Percentage 
The statistics are contrary to what the ACFE presented regarding initial fraud detection. 
According to the ACFE, tips, or whistleblowing, is the most common form of detection, 
occurring 40% of the time.  However, this study indicates that whistleblowing occurs less 
frequently in NFPs (ACFE, 2018c).  Furthermore, the ACFE identifies management reviews and 
accidental detection occurring approximately 7-13% of the time.  The principal investigator 
discovered that reviews and accidental detection occurred in approximately 29% of cases.  The 
results, although contrary to what the ACFE discovered, prove that fraud preparation 
improvement is necessary for NFP professionals.  Using the findings of this research, the 
principal investigator will compile ways to improve existing skills as well as identify fraud 
education that professionals can take.  
Minor theme 1. The first minor theme that emerged was, “Many external schemes make 
finding information difficult.” Three of the 10 participants (30%) who experienced asset 
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misappropriation indicated that the perpetrators were external to the organization. The results 
support the findings of PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PwC’s Global Economic Crisis Survey,” 
2014), that fraud by external perpetrators occurs approximately 44% of the time.  As the 
principal investigator asked additional questions regarding the fraud, responses were vague 
regarding the number of perpetrators.  The commonality between the lack of details regarding 
external perpetrators proves that information is more difficult to obtain when the perpetrator is 
not internal.  One participant who had experienced fraud perpetrated by an employee indicated 
that the organization narrowed down the suspects, but because of lack of surveillance, it was 
difficult to specifically identify the perpetrator.  This minor theme proves the need for improved 
education regarding surveillance of assets, and monitoring of employees to detect and prevent 
fraud. 
Minor theme 2. The second minor theme identified was, “Individual perpetrators are 
most common.” Based on the data provided, 13 of the 14 (93%) instances of asset 
misappropriation were perpetrated by a single individual.  Only 1 (7%) instance involved 
multiple perpetrators.  The findings support existing research stating that collusion is uncommon; 
Greenlee et al. (2007), explains that collusion occurs in approximately 18.6% of fraud cases.  
The data collected proves the increased need for NFP employees and employers to be 
aware of the attitude of new hires.  Participants indicated that teaching professionals about 
looking at the attitude of employees is important to fraud prevention.  Participants FP and IY 
stated that one reason they believed the NFP they work for has successfully avoided asset 
misappropriation is because they are intentional about hiring good people. Furthermore, 
participant JF expressed the importance of communicating to employees the importance of 
ethical behavior. He stated, “People who are there for 30 years, they might be great employees, 
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and you might think that they are really productive, but are they there for the right reason?” 
Because the majority of asset misappropriation involves a single perpetrator, knowing the 
attitudes of employees is vital to fraud prevention.  Being aware of who is hired, and continually 
communicating the company’s views on ethical behavior, as well as consequences for unethical 
actions will lower fraud risk.  The results of this minor theme prove the need for improved fraud-
prevention training and preparation, specifically regarding professional skepticism and 
identifying employee attitudes.  
Minor theme 3. The next minor theme directly correlates to the duration of fraud; “The 
size of the misappropriation affects detection time.”  This theme emerged throughout participant 
KT’s interview.  He mentioned that many of the asset misappropriations they detect last longer 
than they would like to admit, because people are stealing little amounts over time.  He stated 
that, “Honestly it's that the person gets greedy and all the sudden we see that the food budget in 
this home is much higher than all the other homes."  
Participant SE spoke about an incident she experienced at another NFP organization, and 
how greed was a major factor in detecting that fraud as well.  Although the example does not fall 
within the study location, she does use the experiences she gained regarding fraud prevention, 
detection, and management to improve the NFP she started in South Central Pennsylvania, and to 
be more prepared as a business owner.  These experiences prove the need to improve fraud 
preparation for NFP professionals, and also that there is a desire within accounting and finance 
positions to improve their organizations and lower fraud risk.  
Minor theme 4. The final minor theme within theme three is, “It is vital to be aware of 
red flags.” This minor theme emerged among 20% of the participants interviewed.  Participants 
LC and JF both hold a CFE license, making them more aware of specific red flags.  Participant 
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LC mentioned that the ACFE releases “A profile of the fraudster.”  Within this profile, he said 
that, “The ACFE discusses different stats and they talk about how things are caught, it is mostly 
through anonymous tips.”  Awareness of red flags helps professionals prevent fraud.  Participant 
JF believed that if employees are aware of the red flags, and they are honest individuals, they 
would be more likely to report the activity quickly.  Both participants express the importance of 
teaching employees what red flags are.  Participant LC noted that in his time as an auditor, 
employees outside of the finance functions were the ones who noticed red flags, such as lifestyle 
changes.  Because you do not have to be in a finance position to identify red flags, organization-
wide awareness would benefit all NFPs.  
Participant WG explained that, with the attempted asset misappropriation he experienced, 
paying attention to detail was what helped the organization avoid fraud.  In his experience, the 
external perpetrator was sending fake emails to him, and other CFOs before him, using his boss’ 
email address.  Participant WG said that the emails typically said, “Send money, I'm busy I am in 
a meeting, but we have to send ‘x’ amount of dollars to so and so.”  He stated that this short 
email is something his boss would say, because he is often busy and sends short emails to 
accomplished tasks.  However, with a closer examination of the email, it could be seen that the 
address was fake. Furthermore, he stressed the need to pay attention to other details as well.  For 
example, the emails he received were signed with his boss’ full name, and he questioned it 
because his boss never signed his full name to emails.  He expressed the need for common sense 
in situations such as those, as well as a questioning mind when something seems out of the 
ordinary.  
The beliefs and experiences of the participants all prove the need for improving the 
ability of NFP professionals to identify red flags.  Whether the individuals being trained are in 
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finance positions or not, the results prove that awareness of common warning signs is needed for 
all employees.  Furthermore, warning sign awareness and training should be stressed for 
employees in positions managing financial matters, as they may be a direct target as well.   
Theme 4. The fourth theme enabled the principal investigator to answer the final 
research question, “Of the properly detected cases within NFPs, what was the outcome?” The 
final theme identified was, “Action should be taken after fraud occurs to prevent it from 
happening again.”  Only 1 of the 10 (10%) participants who experienced fraud was unsure of 
any changes made internally.  However, that participant was not involved in the management of 
the fraud because it was managed at a higher level, and it was an external perpetrator that 
remained unknown.  Six of the 10 (60%) participants indicated that perpetrators were 
terminated after the fraud was caught in at least one of the instances they described.  The other 
three (30%) participants indicated that internal policy and procedural changes were made to 
avoid being future victimization.  The actions taken after fraud was detected reveal that NFP 
accounting and finance professionals are aware of management and prevention policies that 
lower fraud risk.  However, after this study is completed, NFP professionals will have more 
guidance regarding preventing fraud before it occurs. 
Minor theme 1. The first minor theme was, “Using outside resources to manage fraud is 
helpful.”  Participant CN stressed the importance of using the media and the authorities to 
manage detected fraud.  He described three specific instances of asset misappropriation and 
explained that in two, they “Worked with an outside private investigating group…That 
individual came in and did interviews of the perpetrator, and in one case just secured a 
confession and it went on from there.”  He noted that the authorities, including the police and 
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other investigative agencies have expertise that their organization lacks, making them more 
qualified to detect the fraud quicker.  
Participant CN explained that their organization, being a religious NFP, is “In the mercy 
business,” and the justice system is, “in the justice business.”  Because of the opposing goals, 
they, “Let law enforcement handle that in the best manner and means that they deem appropriate. 
But when that happens, it tends to get into the news, and we tend to publish that.”  Although they 
try to stay out of the investigation, their organization encourages the use of the media to bring the 
fraud to light.  This way of thinking is diametrically opposed to existing research, which states 
that most NFP organizations manage fraud internally as a means of maintaining reputation and 
lowering costs associated with publicizing the fraud (Harris et al., 2017).  Additionally, research 
suggests that the majority of NFPs avoid including any major authorities to limit the public 
consequences of their involvement (Bonny et al., 2015; Bromley & Orchard, 2015).  
The mindset of participant CN’s organization is not popular opinion.  However, they 
believe that making a public spectacle of any fraud allows them to repeat their views to the 
public that fraud is not tolerated, no matter the size, and it will be dealt with appropriately. 
Participant CN believes that following this pattern will show donors that they are doing their best 
to be good stewards of all funds given to them, and yield increased donations.  
Minor theme 2. The second minor theme discussed in eight of the interviews was, 
“Making changes internally is vital.”  The eight participants who talked about this minor theme 
had experienced fraud.  If fraud occurs in an organization and changes are not made to safeguard 
against that, risk is not managed adequately and the company is more likely to experience a 
similar situation again.  Participant BV explained that checks were stolen from the NFPs 
outgoing mail, and to prevent this, they no longer leave mail out after business hours, and ensure 
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the timely processing of incoming mail. Similarly, participant GK explained the decision to 
remove the cashbox from the snack bar to eliminate theft of cash from occurring again.  Both 
practices remove the cash and/or checks from the hands of those who have previously 
perpetrated fraud.  
Participant CN described various business practices that have been implemented in the 
main office, as well as in the parishes and schools they oversee.  Additionally, a survey is 
required to be filled out regularly indicating the extent to which different practices are being 
conducted.  Similarly, participant KT explained that, many of their funding sources are 
governmental and, “They require that a plan of correction be put in.”  They also provide 
education regarding various procedures and reviews of those procedures.  Both participants focus 
on the practices of the organization and how to strengthen them, to prevent fraud. 
Participants WG and RG described the implementation of new procedures to prevent 
fraud.  In participant WG’s example of the external perpetrator requesting money via email, he 
explained that a new approval process was put in place for any money leaving the organization. 
Similarly, participant RG explained, regarding the fraudulent billing claim, that a new triple-
check process was implemented to ensure accuracy of each claim submitted. The implementation 
of new processes strengthened the organizations and provided an extra level of protection from 
future misappropriation.  
The final two participants who addressed this theme spoke about monitoring procedures 
implemented.  Participant IY stated that a surveillance system was installed in the warehouses to 
monitor the receipt and disbursement of physical assets.  Similarly, participant OA described a 
new serial number system.  Using the new system, every piece of equipment either rented, 
leased, or owned by the organization received a specific serial number that correlates directly to 
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the asset software that the participant maintains.  These internal changes ensure the strict 
monitoring of existing assets.  
All of the changes made support the need for a strong control environment.  The control 
environment is the foundation for the organization; it enables strong policies and procedures to 
function properly and lower fraud risk (Kong et al., 2018). Although 8 of 10 participants who 
experienced fraud noted changes made within their organization in reaction to the fraud, this still 
proves that fraud is a major problem for NFPs.  The results show beneficial ways to prevent 
fraud from occurring in other NFPs before they experience similar occurrences. 
Minor theme 3. The third minor theme is, “Budgeting and comparing budgets.”  Three 
(20%) participants mentioned creating budgets and comparing actual to budgeted expenses 
throughout the year.  Participant LC stated that budgeting is important for their organization, and 
that a comparison of budget to actuals is completed monthly.  He said that it is a way for each 
department to evaluate how their funds are being spent.  Additionally, it prompts the questions, 
“This is what we said we're going to do, how does it lineup? Is it low? High? And why is it low 
or high?"  Comparing budgets to actuals monthly enables department heads to review purchases 
and question unusual activity. 
Participant HZ stated, “I am constantly reviewing the financials and making sure that 
things are matching the budget or my forecast.”  Although this is part of her job duties, it is a 
good practice to conduct.  She stated that by doing this frequently, data entered into their systems 
is double-checked regularly.  By comparing forecasts and actual expenses, accounting staff are 
more likely to identify fraud and common mistakes, and correct them before they become a 
problem. 
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Finally, participant CN explained that at month end, when the books are closed out, 
budgets are compared to actual expenditures.  He also stated that best practices have been 
implemented in all of the schools and parishes that the central office oversees, asking for the 
same practices to be conducted.  However, surveys and reviews are used regularly to ensure 
those practices are taking place.  Participant CN stated that, “Analytical review and high-level 
reviews of those types of activities or unusual fluctuations, I think create the right control 
environment, along with the tone from the top.” 
Comparing budgets to actuals is a practice that more companies should be conducting. 
Only 20% of participants mentioning budgeting proves the need for this study.  Using the 
findings, the principal investigator will compile best practices for NFPs to utilize to lower their 
fraud risk; comparing budgets should be included.  More NFP professionals should be aware of 
the importance of budgeting and comparing actual expenditures, to help them spend their 
resources wisely and to detect fraud sooner.  Jones (2014) explains that NFPs often have tight 
budgets. Risking the loss of any resources on fraud should be avoided; budgeting and reviewing 
expenses lowers that risk. 
Minor theme 4. Another minor theme identified was, “Surveillance helps deter fraud.” 
Five participants (33%) noted the benefit of including surveillance cameras at the organizations. 
However, only 1 participant confirmed that cameras were a fraud prevention and detection 
technique being utilized before the fraud occurred; the other participants noted the benefit of 
cameras after experiencing asset misappropriation.  Kramer (2015) supports the importance of 
monitoring to lower fraud risk, specifically the monitoring of areas in which cash is processed. 
Participant JF stated that cameras are used at the front desk and any other places that cash and/or 
checks are controlled.  However, he mentioned that they, “Are there to more deter that kind of 
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thing than to catch it when it happens.”  He explained that the standard operating procedures in 
place are meant for preventing and identifying fraud, but the cameras add an extra level of 
monitoring.  
Participants CN and RG spoke about the use of cameras to detect suspected fraud within 
the NFPs.  In both interviews, the participants explained that someone was under suspicion 
within the organization, either stealing cash or non-cash assets.  To identify the perpetrators, 
cameras were installed and monitored.  Unlike participant JF’s experience of using surveillance 
as a deterrent, both participants CN and RG’s organizations utilized cameras as a fraud detection 
and management tool.  
Finally, participants IY and GK addressed the need for surveillance after a fraud had 
occurred to prevent it in the future.  Participant IY explained a situation in which a volunteer was 
stealing items from a warehouse.  After the theft was detected, video cameras were installed in 
the warehouses and the volunteer was asked to not return.  After the situation was managed, 
installed cameras were monitored regularly to prevent that type of fraud.  Participant GK 
explained a different scenario in which a temporary employee was stealing cash from the 
unmonitored snack bar.  After the fraud was detected and managed, she stated, “We suggested a 
camera.  It has not been approved yet.”  Unlike participant IY’s organization, the management at 
participant GK’s NFP have not seen high value in adding a camera, and made other adjustments 
to avoid similar frauds.  However, she noted that, even with the changes that were made, it 
would be valuable for management to take some of their suggestions. 
This minor theme further proves the problem that fraud preparation is lacking in NFPs 
within South Central Pennsylvania.  Although beneficial changes have been made in many 
organizations after discovering fraud, they would have been able to avoid, or detect the asset 
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misappropriation quicker had monitoring techniques been implemented as preventative 
measures.  The data proves a need for NFPs to utilize monitoring techniques to safeguard their 
assets adequately, and deter future fraud occurrences. 
Minor theme 5. The final minor theme is, “Take action when possible.” Nine of the ten 
participants who experienced asset misappropriation explained how the fraud was managed 
regarding the employee, or internal changes.  However, 5 (33%) explained additional action that 
was taken beyond punishment of employees and internal changes.  Participant JF explained that, 
after the perpetrator was terminated, limited information was shared with employees.  He 
expressed that: 
You don’t want to spread a lot of gossip and rumors about departed employees. But we 
did communicate to employees that, to some degree, this person violated policies around 
not taking things…and they were dealt with in accordance with procedures in our 
handbook. 
Furthermore, he explained that communicating with employees sends the signal that 
management cares about protecting the organization from fraud, and it will not be tolerated.  In 
this instance, the theft was only for a small amount of postage, but participant JF said: 
It was the fact that this person felt like they either had the right to take this, or were 
somehow entitled to it, or felt that they could just get away with it.  And that is absolutely 
against our core values, and we don’t want those types of employees working in our 
organization. 
Taking the additional actions to reiterate policies, procedures, and company values to employees 
helps to deter fraud.  Participant CN had a similar mindset regarding communicating the 
punishment of fraud.  However, he believed that utilizing the media and making the punishment 
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public news was vital to deterring others from attempting to perpetrate fraud against the 
organization.  He said that if employees were aware of the consequences, they would be less 
likely to consider perpetrating fraud. 
 Participant WG explained that their organization attempted to find the external 
perpetrator by tracing the IP address from the email.  Unfortunately, the IT staff said nothing 
further could be done at that point.  Similarly, participant AQ noted that because the perpetrator 
was external to the company, they could not gain information about the extent of the attempted 
fraud beyond what was discovered.  Because the organization did not know how the information 
used was gained by the perpetrator, it was difficult for them to put any changes into place to 
prevent such attempts in the future.  
Finally, participant RG explained that, when the billing fraud he experienced was 
discovered, they contacted their attorneys to get ahead of the problem.  The NFP sought attorney 
advice regarding self-reporting the false billing claim, and remedying the problem before the 
federal government discovered the errors and took action against them.  By taking this step, the 
company maintained their positive reputation with the government agency being billed.  
 Although the actions taken by these five participants were beneficial, the results prove 
that the majority of NFP accounting and finance staff are not aware of additional steps to take 
beyond punishment, to prevent future fraud.  The data gathered reveals beneficial steps that 
organizations experiencing similar situations could take to better protect themselves. 
Relationship of themes/patterns to research questions.  Each of the 4 major themes 
discussed related directly back to the four research questions the principal investigator sought 
to answer.  Furthermore, each of the themes related to the theories developed in the conceptual 
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framework. The major themes that emerged helped accomplish the goals of the study. 
 The first research question was, “What forms of asset misappropriation fraud occur in 
NFPs within South Central Pennsylvania?” The major theme identified was, “Theft is common 
in NFPs.”  The 4 minor themes further enabled the principal investigator to understand how each 
of the 4 theories identified in the conceptual framework led to theft within NFPs.  The fraud 
management lifecycle theory uses stages to develop detection tools that lower risk in an 
organization (Adomako, 2017).  However, the results proved the statement that NFPs “Often fail 
to manage ongoing risks” (Gentenaar & Solomon, 2015, p. 26).  Because there was a lack of 
effective controls, there was increased opportunity for perpetrators to steal from the companies 
(Roden et al., 2016).  Two participants, GK and PX, specifically noted the significant lack of 
segregation of duties within their respective NFPs.  Furthermore, in the example of participant 
BV, the routine of leaving mail unattended significantly increased opportunity.  Similarly, the 
examples given by participant CN prove the lack of capable guardianship in religious 
organizations, as well as the idea that persons of power might perpetrate fraud (Lokanan, 2015; 
Thornhill et al., 2016). 
 There was one major theme to answer the second research question: “What preparations 
have NFP accountants within the study population had that would equip them for fraud 
prevention, detection, and management, if any?”  The major theme was, “Various forms of 
fraud-prevention training will better prepare staff for preventing, detecting, and managing fraud.” 
The minor themes included: 
 Adequate fraud prevention/detection training is important 
 CPE courses/Webinars are incredibly beneficial 
 Who should receive fraud-prevention training? 
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 Building a community to learn from is helpful 
Each of these minor themes expressed the need for various forms of training.  Not all 
organizations, or individuals, are the same.  Providing various options to obtain training and 
education is beneficial.  The fraud triangle theory states, to reduce fraud, the triangle must be 
interrupted (Archambeault et al., 2014).  Although the majority of participants had received some 
form of fraud preparation, there were two that had none.  This lack of training and education 
increases fraud risk for those NFPs.  
 The third major theme, “Various factors affect detection time,” enabled the principal 
investigator to answer the third research question: “How quickly is asset misappropriation fraud 
identified and managed within NFPs in South Central Pennsylvania?” The minor themes 
included: 
 Many external schemes make finding information difficult 
 Individual perpetrators are most common 
 The size of the misappropriation affects detection time 
 It is vital to be aware of red flags 
Each of the minor themes further explained how detection time could vary within the study 
population from 1 day to 1 or more months.  Not all fraud is perpetrated in the same way, 
meaning that routine reviews of processes and procedures will help prevent fraud.  The fraud 
management lifecycle theory, although it focuses on discovering fraud, is also beneficial in 
preventing fraud through professional skepticism regarding processes. 
 Finally, the fourth theme, “Action should be taken after a fraud occurs to prevent it from 
happening again,” enabled the principal investigator to answer the final research question: “Of 
the properly detected cases within NFPs, what was the outcome?” The minor themes included: 
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 Using outside resources to manage fraud is helpful 
 Making changes internally is vital 
 Budgeting and comparing budgets 
 Surveillance helps deter fraud 
 Take action when possible 
There were ten participants in the sample that experienced asset misappropriation fraud, and each 
of them indicated the changes that were made within the organization as a result.  The fraud 
management lifecycle theory stresses the need to follow specific steps to manage fraud: 
deterrence, prevention, detection, mitigation, analysis, policy, investigation, and prosecution 
(Adomako, 2017; Ocansey, 2017).  Each participant explained how the fraud was detected as 
well as techniques related to mitigation, analysis, policy, investigation, and prosecution after 
proper detection.  By following the steps properly, each participant described how the NFP 
mitigated future fraud risk and improved the organization. 
Summary of the findings. After completing 15 interviews, the principal investigator 
determined that data saturation had been reached, as no new information was being provided by 
participants.  Additionally, the data gathered was triangulated by comparing the cases, and 
identifying commonalities and differences amongst participant responses.  Furthermore, the 
principal investigator compared the opinions and suggestions provided by participants with 
existing research regarding fraud preparation to ensure accuracy.  
The principal investigator discovered that theft was the most common form of asset 
misappropriation occurring in NFPs within the study location.  Theft of cash constituted 36% of 
the fraud cases experienced and theft of non-cash assets represented 29% of the cases.  Only 1 
participant experienced check tampering, and two participants experienced expense 
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reimbursement schemes and billing schemes.  Furthermore, the data revealed that 33% of the 
participants had not experienced asset misappropriation. Additionally, the data revealed that 5 of 
the 10 participants were able to identify the asset misappropriation within 1-2 days.  However, 
two of the participants noted that the fraud lasted upwards of 30 days before it was detected, and 
3 participants were unsure how long the fraud lasted.  Those that were unsure of the duration of 
the fraud were either not at the organization when it occurred, or had experienced the fraud from 
an external source and were not able to identify enough information after detecting the fraud to 
know how long it lasted. 
The results also indicated that the 87% of participants had received some form of fraud 
preparation.  In Table 4, each form of preparation received is identified, along with the number 
of participants who received it.  However, interviews revealed that CPE courses (73%) and 
collegiate auditing courses (67%) were the main forms of preparation received.  Furthermore, 
only 33% of the participants received fraud-prevention training from their organization.  The 
results indicate that NFPs do not spend resources on training their employees to prevent, detect, 
and manage fraud adequately.  
Finally, the findings of the study indicate that fraud is managed after it is discovered.  In 
all of the cases with internal perpetrators, the result was termination of the employee, as well as 
changes to internal processes and policies to improve fraud prevention.  In two of the three cases 
of external fraud, changes were made to processes.  Participant BV explained how mail 
containing checks was no longer left unattended. Additionally, participant WG stated that the 
company switched banks and implemented new processes for requesting the issuance of funds. 
In the one that did not result in a change, the perpetrator was external and unsuccessful in their 
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attempt to perpetrate the fraud; the organization was not aware of any way that the fraud could 
have been prevented further. 
The results of this study prove that fraud is a problem in NFP organizations and improved 
preparation of accounting and finance staff is necessary to lower risk.  Although 93% of the 
participants believed they are prepared to manage fraud if it were to occur in the future, 
weakness was shown regarding fraud prevention. Educating professionals in accounting and 
finance positions at NFPs regarding improving fraud prevention will yield lower fraud risk and 
increased protection of NFPs’ limited resources. 
Applications to Professional Practice 
The results of this study will benefit NFP employers as well as NFP accounting and 
finance staff.  Additionally, the results will indirectly benefit accounting educators. NFP 
employers will better understand their organizations’ fraud and fraud-prevention training 
weaknesses.  By understanding the data, employers can determine how to train their finance 
staff, as well as others, to properly prevent, detect, and manage fraud.  Preparing staff increases 
knowledge, and lowers the NFP’s fraud risk.  Furthermore, the study proves that NFPs benefit 
from investing time and resources into properly training staff regarding fraud-prevention. By 
providing adequate training, either internally or externally, fraud occurrences will decrease, 
enabling NFPs to better meet their missions. 
Furthermore, the results will benefit financial professionals working at NFPs, by 
educating them on the importance of fraud-prevention training, and providing ways to receive 
training.  If NFP financial staff seek preparation and education on fraud topics, they will increase 
their ability to prevent, detect, and manage fraud in the workplace.  Additionally, by obtaining 
further education on fraud topics including, segregation of duties, professional skepticism, 
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cybercrime, and case studies, they will be more equipped to identify, and improve, weaknesses 
within their respective organizations.  Small NFPs with 1-20 employees would specifically 
benefit from fraud-prevention training regarding segregation of duties in small organizations. 
Moreover, accounting educators will indirectly benefit from the study results by 
identifying weaknesses within accounting curricula regarding fraud and fraud-prevention.  By 
improving accounting students’ collegiate education, they will be better prepared for licensure 
examinations and a career in accounting after graduation.  Educators aim to provide a well-
rounded curriculum, instilling knowledge in students to benefit them after graduation.  This 
study reveals that fraud and fraud-prevention are not topics of priority within collegiate courses. 
All of the participants interviewed indicated that learning more about fraud prevention, detection, 
and management in their collegiate courses would have benefited them.  Although the principal 
investigator’s goal was not to discover ways to improve accounting education, it was an indirect 
benefit of the results.  
The data proves that skepticism is vital to prevent fraud.  Three of the 15 participants 
work for religious organizations, and another stated that a majority of their employees are 
Christians.  However, each participant noted that just because someone claims a specific faith, 
does not mean they cannot commit fraud.  Matthew 4:6 (ESV) shows that even Satan quotes 
scripture.  Professionals should apply their fraud prevention, detection, and management training 
to all people, not just those that seem questionable.  Additionally, Luke 16:10-11 says,  
One who is faithful in a very little is also faithful in much, and one who is dishonest in a 
very little is also dishonest in much. If then you have not been faithful in the unrighteous 
wealth, who will entrust to you the true riches? 
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Employers are responsible for preparing their staff to manage fraud and protect their 
organization.  When employers are faithful and take care of the company properly, the results 
will be rewarded.  The principal investigator identified a need for improved fraud-prevention 
training.  If employers, employees, and educators take that need seriously, fraud instances should 
decrease, and NFPs should prosper. 
Finally, the results of this study fill a gap in existing accounting literature. Minimal 
research exists regarding fraud in NFPs (Archambeault et al., 2014; Harris et al., 2017).  This 
yields a lack of literature on prevention, detection, and management of fraud within the sector. 
This study fills a gap related to the experiences NFP financial professionals have had with asset 
misappropriation in the workplace.  Furthermore, the principal investigator identifies fraud-
prevention training to help NFP financial professionals prepare for future occurrences.  By using 
the themes and principals identified, organizational leaders can improve their staff’s fraud 
prevention, detection, and management training, lowering fraud risk (Bradley, 2015).  
Recommendations for Action 
The principal investigator identified 3 recommendations for action, one for each group 
impacted by the results.  First, the principal investigator recommends that NFP employers 
provide a source of fraud prevention, detection, and management training to their staff, focusing 
on financial staff.  The principal investigator suggests the following options: 
 Identify online webinars and/or CPEs teaching fraud prevention, detection, and 
management topics through sources including CPA Academy and Auditing firms, and 
have employees take them. 
 Identify and join nonprofit groups and professional organizations that offer conferences, 
or courses on fraud-prevention topics, and attend relevant opportunities. 
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 Search for conferences or seminars regarding fraud-prevention offered by larger 
organizations such as the AICPA, ACFE, or state accounting agencies, and request that 
employees attend. 
To be effective, the principal investigator suggests that employers communicate the 
importance of fraud prevention, detection, and management training to their staff.  Furthermore, 
employers should require their staff, to attend a conference or seminar, or listen to a webinar or 
CPE once every year. By having staff stay up to date on fraud-prevention topics, NFPs will be 
prepared for future occurrences and lower their fraud risk (Carroll, 2015).  
 The second action the principal investigator recommends is that NFP finance 
professionals take responsibility for their own education beyond college.  There are auditing 
firms that work with NFPs, and offer online webinars on relevant NFP fraud related topics. 
Furthermore, larger organizations including the ACFE offer webinars, CPEs, and conferences 
regarding fraud prevention, detection, and management topics.  The principal investigator 
recommends that NFP accounting and finance professionals seek courses offered by the CPA 
academy, for-profit and NFP auditing firms, and larger state and nation-wide organizations to 
educate them on fraud related topics.  By seeking education, employees have the opportunity to 
find relevant courses that are of interest to them.  Utilizing available sources will prepare them to 
avoid fraud, as well as manage occurrences quickly and appropriately. 
 The final recommendation the principal investigator provides is that academic institutions 
offer courses teaching fraud prevention, detection, and management, or integrate such topics into 
existing courses more thoroughly.  Integrating case studies of fraud into curriculum will improve 
education on the topic.  Participants indicated that learning real-life experiences aided in their 
ability to properly prevent fraud.  Because of this, the principal investigator recommends 
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academic institutions integrate case studies into their accounting curriculum.  Additionally, the 
principal investigator recommends that the following topics be taught with an increased focus on 
their relationship to fraud and fraud prevention: 
 Professional skepticism 
 Attitudes of the employees 
 Cyber crime 
 Tone at the top 
 Supervisor/managerial oversight 
NFP professionals indicated that these topics were vital in their understanding of fraud 
prevention, detection, and management.  By integrating them into existing accounting 
curriculum, or creating a new course in which to discuss them in-depth, students will benefit. 
Furthermore, employers of the accounting students will benefit from hiring professionals with 
increased knowledge.  Finally, academic institutions will benefit by better preparing their 
students, leading to increases in pass rates for licensure examinations after graduation.  
Recommendations for Further Study 
Gaps continue to persist within existing research and literature concerning fraud in NFP 
organizations, and how to prevent, detect, and manage NFP fraud adequately.  Filling such gaps 
is vital to improving knowledge for practicing NFP professionals, and lowering fraud risk. The 
principal investigator recommends that future researchers: 
 Explore the experiences that NFP accounting and finance staff have with financial 
statement fraud and corruption, 
 Explore the experiences that NFP accounting and finance professionals who do not have 
a Bachelor’s degree in accounting have with fraud, 
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 Identify which academic institutions offer courses on fraud education and how their 
graduates perceive their preparation, 
 Explore the opinions of auditors of NFPs regarding how the organizations could better 
prevent fraud, 
 Compare the perceived preparation of accounting students who receive fraud education to 
those who do not, 
 Study a specific form of asset misappropriation, identifying in which types of NFPs it is 
most prevalent, 
 Explore the experiences of specific types of NFPs (i.e. religious, healthcare, or higher 
education) to identify which forms of fraud are most prevalent, 
 Compare forms of fraud occurrences to the sizes of NFP organizations, 
 Conduct the same study in a different geographical location to identify any differences in 
results 
 Conduct a study identifying the effectiveness of CPE on the ability of NFP financial staff 
to prevent, detect, and manage fraud 
The principal investigator believes that expanding the study boundaries will reveal more 
information regarding how NFPs, and NFP professionals, can better prevent, detect, and manage 
fraud. 
Reflections 
Before beginning research, the principal investigator had preconceived ideas as to how it 
would progress, and what would be involved.  However, not all of those ideas were true to the 
process.  Before beginning the dissertation, the principal investigator knew that it would be time 
consuming, exhausting, and involve hard work and dedication.  However, the principal 
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investigator believed that Sections 1 and 2 would be the most tedious portions, and that the 
research phase would be straight-forward . As recruiting began, and the principal investigator 
sorted through the population, she realized it would involve as much hard work and dedication as 
the first two portions.  The principal investigator anticipated that more individuals would be 
willing to participate, and that follow-up recruiting attempts would unnecessary.  This was 
proved incorrect at the beginning of recruitment and continued throughout the research process. 
Additionally, as interviews began, the principal investigator worried that transcribing 
multiple sessions in one week would be difficult.  However, the principal investigator was able 
to find dictation tools, making the process much simpler.  Although transcriptions took 1-2 hours 
per participant, using the tools available made the process less frustrating and tiresome. 
Furthermore, the principal investigator was surprised by the amount of work involved in 
coding transcriptions.  Before the research began, the principal investigator anticipated that 
coding would be easy; by following the interview questions, relevant themes would emerge to 
answer the research questions.  However, as interviews progressed, the principal investigator 
realized that many participants provided information beyond the bounds of specific questions 
asked. Although this was expected, and beneficial, it made coding more complex.  Additionally, 
it added more detail than was anticipated, requiring an appendix for the data discovered outside 
of the scope of the study.  The principal investigator enjoyed learning the information each 
participant shared.  However, it added to the staggering amount of data being collected, and 
made the coding process more complex and intricate.  Proverbs 14:23a states, “In all toil there is 
profit,” (ESV).  Keeping this in mind, the principal investigator overcame obstacles encountered 
in the research process, knowing that all the hard work put forth would be worthwhile. 
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Personal biases. Before conducting research, the principal investigator held preconceived 
ideas regarding participant responses.  Because of the amount of literature reviewed for Section 
1, the principal investigator anticipated that the sample would fit into similar “boxes”.  The 
principal investigator believed that smaller organizations were more likely to experience fraud. 
However, this bias was proven incorrect in various cases.  Learning that four of the NFPs had 
between 1 and 20 employees, and had not experienced asset misappropriation was unexpected 
due to difficulties that small NFPs have with integrating adequate segregation of duties.  
 A second personal bias was that NFP accountants and finance staff would be 
professionally certified.  However, 73% of participants had a professional certification; 10 had 
earned their CPA license.  The principal investigator believed that NFPs could rarely afford to 
hire someone with an advanced degree or professional certification.  Additionally, she believed 
that most NFP accountants had only earned a Bachelor’s in accounting, or had not taken an 
accounting course in their schooling.  Discovering this preconceived idea to be wrong was 
encouraging.  Although the data identified weaknesses in fraud prevention, detection, and 
management skills, it was reassuring that many NFPs seek qualified individuals to fill accounting 
and finance positions.  
Effect of researcher on participants. During the interviews the researcher had minimal 
effect on the participants.  The questions asked in the interview guide were direct, eliminating 
potential bias from the principal investigator.  Furthermore, the principal investigator purposely 
avoided responding with personal opinion.  However, the principal investigator could have had 
an effect on the demeanor of the participants by providing a quiet, private space, and reiterating 
the security and confidentiality of all responses.  Furthermore, the principal investigator thanked 
each participant for taking time out of their schedule to meet, and introduced themselves to 
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strengthen rapport between the participant and the principal investigator.  In this manner, the 
principal investigator may have had an effect on the participants.  
Changes in thinking. Throughout the research process, the principal investigator 
experienced evolution of thought.  During recruitment, the principal investigator often became 
frustrated at receiving negative responses to emails or phone calls.  However, over time the 
principal investigator realized that obtaining valuable participants was necessary to achieve a 
complete and thorough study, and those who responded negatively would not have been 
beneficial because of their disinterest in the topic, or lack of qualifications.  Proverbs 16:3 was a 
continual source of encouragement, stating, “Commit your work to the Lord, and your plans will 
be established” (ESV).  During times of discouragement, the principal investigator discovered 
that praying and trusting in the Lord’s plan brought about success and progress. Changing the 
mindset from discouragement to reliance on the Lord was pivotal in the research process. 
Finally, it was encouraging to see how many people were interested in the topic chosen. 
The principal investigator believes that fraud is unbiblical and needs to be prevented. 
Furthermore, the principal investigator has been impacted by NFPs in numerous ways.  NFP 
organizations are not always prepared to manage fraud adequately, and the principal investigator 
finds value in assisting them in that mission.  Psalm 37:21 says, “The wicked borrows but does 
not pay back, but the righteous is generous and gives.”  NFPs seek to aid their communities, and 
the principal investigator believes preventing, detecting, and managing fraud properly will 
enable them to be even more generous in their aid.  Furthermore, God calls each person to utilize 
the gifts He has given to them (1 Peter 4:10, NIV).  The principal investigator believes that 
accounting and teaching are her gifts; to follow Christ is to use those gifts and help others 
whenever possible. 
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Summary and Study Conclusions 
This study used a qualitative exploratory case design to gather the experiences that NFP 
financial professionals have had with workplace asset misappropriation, and their level of 
preparation regarding fraud prevention, detection, and management.  The principal investigator 
conducted semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with 15 participants in private spaces. 
Participants were obtained through purposive sampling; a non-random sampling technique used 
to ensure thorough coverage of the population (Robinson, 2014).  The principal investigator 
recruited participant until data saturation was achieved. Additionally, the principal investigator 
reviewed 183 sources regarding the problem of fraud in NFP organizations and proper 
prevention, detection, and management tools.  The gap in existing research regarding fraud in 
NFPs and how to improve the abilities of financial staff to prevent, detect, and manage it 
confirms the need for this study. 
Each participant was given an opportunity to describe their experiences relative to the 
increasing levels of fraud in the NFP for which they work.  Additionally, they were asked to 
describe the types of fraud-prevention preparation they have had prior to experiencing fraud, and 
explain how it helped or hindered their abilities to adequately manage the situation.  Using four 
research questions, the principal investigator was able to understand the types and duration of 
asset misappropriation occurring within the study location as well as how it has been managed, 
and the levels of fraud preparation had by the participants.  After interviewing the participants, 
the principal investigator better understood their assessment of the problem. 
After conducting open coding, axial coding, and cross-case analysis, 4 major themes 
were identified, answering the research questions.  Reviewing each major theme enabled the 
principal investigator to accomplish the purpose of the study.  Additionally, 5 major themes were 
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identified that presented discoveries beyond the scope of the study.  Within each of the themes 
there were minor themes identified; there were 35 minor themes.  The discoveries beyond the 
scope of the study enabled the principal investigator to form a collection of practices and ideas to 
improve fraud-prevention knowledge and offer tools and techniques to lower fraud risk in NFPs 
of all sizes. 
The participants’ responses proved that asset misappropriation fraud is a problem within 
the NFP sector; the most common being theft of cash and theft of non-cash assets.  The principal 
investigator discovered that most asset misappropriation cases lasted 1-2 days, or 30 or more 
days, depending on the size of the fraud.  Additionally, the principal investigator identified 
termination of the perpetrator as the most common management technique.  However, 8 of the 
10 cases discussed, also involved internal procedural changes, limiting future risk.  Finally, the 
participants indicated that fraud prevention, detection, and management preparation was not a 
priority for their organizations.  Although the majority of participants had received preparation in 
some form, either through CPE, auditing courses, or organizational training, they all expressed 
weaknesses in the training offered to them.  
The data presented benefits NFP employers, NFP employees, and accounting educators. 
The principal investigator recommends that NFP employers and employees take more 
responsibility regarding fraud-prevention training; various opportunities are available to financial 
professionals and are not utilized.  Although each case of asset misappropriation was managed 
with fraud prevention, detection, and management preparation, the number of cases experienced 
could decrease.  Increasing the knowledge of those protecting the company’s assets yields 
increased prevention of future fraud.  
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Additionally, the principal investigator recommends a more rigorous education regarding 
fraud topics.  Only 1 participant had received fraud-prevention training in their collegiate 
careers, and 100% of participants acknowledged the benefit of adding fraud courses to collegiate 
education.  By implementing fraud prevention, detection, and management topics into existing 
courses, or creating new courses to teach such topics, accounting graduates will be better 
prepared for their careers.  Furthermore, academic institutions will benefit by increasing the 
knowledge provided to graduates, which is needed to pass licensure examinations.  Because 
licensure examinations require significant knowledge from the test taker, increasing the topics 
taught to students will better prepare them to pass them after graduating. 
The principal investigator studied the topic of asset misappropriation and NFP financial 
professionals’ preparation by examining the fraud management lifecycle theory, the fraud 
triangle theory, the white-collar crime theory, and the routine activity theory.  The participants 
all expressed the need to manage discovered fraud adequately.  Each explained how cases of 
fraud had been managed in their respective NFP, and how it was being prevented in the future. 
Additionally, using the fraud triangle theory, participants explained that there are additional ways 
to lower opportunity in the organization.  By limiting opportunity, the fraud triangle is 
interrupted, and risk is decreased (Macgregor & Stuebs, 2014).  Regarding the white-collar crime 
theory, 73% of participants expressed the importance of improving professional skepticism 
amongst staff.  NFP organizations are known for having a trusting environment (Kummer et al., 
2015).  Increasing the awareness of staff towards fraud and potential perpetrators improves their 
prevention and detection abilities.  Finally, regarding the routine activity theory, one participant 
indicated the need for their NFP to change their procedures regarding daily routines.  Because 
Running Head: FRAUD IN NOT-FOR-PROFITS 156 
their routines were well-known, their organization experienced fraud; changing their processes 
lowered fraud risk. 
Fraud is an ever-growing problem in NFP organizations (Bradley, 2015).  The principal 
investigator believes this study identified weaknesses in the fraud prevention, detection, and 
management preparation and education of financial professionals in NFPs, and that addressing 
those weaknesses will yield lower fraud risk.  Additionally, the principal investigator discovered 
the lack of application of known practices by NFP financial professionals.  The findings 
identified significant insights regarding the problem.  
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Appendix A: Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Format from: Sahloul, 2019). 
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Appendix B: Fraud Tree 
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Appendix C: Interview Guide (Research Questions) 
 
Introduction 
 The principal investigator introduces themselves, welcomes the participant, and thanks 
them for voluntarily participating 
 The principal investigator briefly discusses what the study is about and the goals of its 
completion, as well as the definition for asset misappropriation 
 The principal investigator explains that the interview will be visually and audio recorded 
for transcription 
 The principal investigator explains how data will be secured and kept confidential 
 The principal investigator obtains necessary signatures on the informed consent 
document 
 The principal investigator asks if the participant has any questions before beginning the 
interview 
Questions for Participants 
The first set of questions asked will seek to understand your professional and educational 
background 
1. What is your gender? 
2. What is your ethnicity? 
3. What is your age?  
4. When did you earn your bachelor’s degree? 
5. Where did you earn your degree? 
6. What type of bachelor’s degree did you earn? 
7. What is the highest level of schooling you’ve received? 
8. How long have you worked in the NFP sector? 
9. Do you hold any professional certifications? Which ones? 
10. What is the name of the organization for which you work? 
11. What type of organization is it? What do they specialize in? 
12. Is the organization small, medium, or large regarding number of employees? Small 
being 1-20; medium being 21-50; and large being 51 or more 
13. What is your role at the organization? 
14. How many years have you been working in your current position? 
The second set of questions seeks to identify your fraud prevention, detection, and 
management preparation prior to having experienced fraud in the workplace. 
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15. What are your duties and responsibilities regarding prevention, detection, and 
management of occupational fraud? 
16. Have you received fraud prevention, detection, and management training of any kind? 
17. Have you taken any continuing professional education courses, lectures, webinars, 
etc. regarding fraud in the workplace? 
a. Did you know these types of courses are available to you? 
b. Would you be interested/willing to take these short courses to better prepare 
yourself? 
18. Did you take any fraud prevention, detection, and management courses in your 
schooling? 
a. Did they cover fraud prevention, detection, and management in NFPs, or for-
profit organizations? 
19. Did you receive training regarding fraud prevention, detection, and management since 
being hired? 
a. Do you believe the training was sufficient? 
20. How do you perceive the “tone at the top” within your organization? 
21. Do you believe you are prepared to manage fraud if it occurred based on your 
preparation? 
The third set of questions seeks to identify specific instances of asset misappropriation in 
your workplace and how it was detected and managed, as well as prevention techniques 
implemented as a result. 
22. Has your organization experienced asset misappropriation fraud? 
a. What type of asset misappropriation was it? 
b. How many perpetrators were involved? 
c. How was the fraud detected? 
d. How long did the fraud last before it was detected? 
e. How was the fraud managed? 
f. Were any changes made to internal procedures after discovering the fraud? 
23. Does your organization currently employ any fraud prevention, detection, and 
management techniques? What are they? 
a. What types of internal controls exist within your organization? 
24. Is there proper segregation of duties in your organization? If not, can you give me an 
example?  
25. If your organization has not experienced asset misappropriation of which you are 
aware, how do you believe they are successfully preventing it? 
The final set of questions seeks your opinion on preparation for preventing, detecting, 
and managing fraud in NFPs in the future. 
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26. What do you believe your role and responsibility of asset misappropriation 
prevention, detection, and management should be? 
27. What do you believe could be done to reduce asset misappropriation in your 
organization? 
28. Are there fraud prevention, detection, and management policies (vacation, rotation, 
whistleblower, etc.) that you know of that your organization is not implementing? Do 
you think it would benefit them to introduce them? 
29. What types of internal controls do you believe should be implemented to reduce fraud 
in NFP workplaces in general? 
30. How do you believe you could be better prepared to manage asset misappropriation if 
it occurred in the future? 
a. Should there be courses provided at the collegiate level to improve 
preparation? What fraud topics should be addressed? 
b. Should on-the-job training be more extensive? 
31. Do you believe on-the-job training regarding asset misappropriation fraud prevention, 
detection, and management could be improved? How? 
a. What do you believe is the best way to train employees about preventing, 
detecting, and managing asset misappropriation? 
b. Who should receive fraud training? 
Closing 
 The principal investigator thanks the participant for answering the questions and taking 
part in the study 
 The principal investigator answers any remaining questions the participant has 
 The principal investigator provides contact information to the participant 
 The principal investigator obtains contact information from the participant for potential 
clarification of data 
 The principal investigator ends the interview  
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Appendix D: Recruitment Email 
[Insert Date]  
 
To: [Recipient] 
 
Dear [Recipient]: 
 
As a graduate student in the School of Business at Liberty University, I am conducting research 
as part of the requirements for a doctoral degree. The purpose of my research is to investigate the 
experiences of professional accountants in not-for-profit organizations within South Central 
Pennsylvania who have had experiences with asset misappropriation as a means to understand 
how to improve fraud prevention, detection, and management preparations individuals in the 
field receive, and I am writing to invite you to participate in my study.  
 
If you work in an accounting or finance position at a not-for-profit organization in South Central 
Pennsylvania and have earned a bachelor’s degree, or higher, in accounting or a related field and 
are willing to participate, you will be asked to partake in a face-to-face interview with me. You 
will be asked questions regarding your experience with fraud prevention, detection, and 
management preparation, as well as your experiences with asset misappropriation in the 
workplace. 
 
The interview will last 45-60 minutes and will be conducted in a private room at a public library 
or other private location that is convenient for you. Your name and other identifying information 
will be requested as part of your participation, but the information will remain confidential. 
 
After completion of the interview, the audio-recording will be transcribed into a Microsoft Word 
document within 2 business days. After transcription is complete, I will email a copy of the 
document to you for you to review. At this point you will be asked to review the transcribed 
interview for verification of answers and clarification if needed. 
  
To participate, contact me at gprobinson@liberty.edu to schedule a date and time for the 
interview.  
 
A consent document is attached to this email. The consent document contains additional 
information about my research, please sign the consent document and return it to on or before the 
time of the interview. 
  
If you have further questions regarding my research or would like to participate in the study, 
please respond to this email within seven days.  
 
You are more than welcome to send this invitation to any other qualifying individuals you 
believe would be interested. 
 
Sincerely, 
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Gabrielle Fish 
Liberty University Doctoral Student 
 
Contact: gprobinson@gmail.com 
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Appendix E: Informed Consent Form 
CONSENT FORM 
Improving Accountants’ Ability to Identify, Manage, and Prevent Fraud in Not-for-Profit 
Organizations 
Gabrielle Fish 
Liberty University 
School of Business 
 
You are invited to be in a research study about the preparation that not-for-profit accountants 
receive in fraud prevention, detection, and management and how tools and techniques can be 
improved to advance their skills before asset misappropriation occurs. You were selected as a 
possible participant because you work in an accounting or finance position at a not-for-profit 
organization within South Central Pennsylvania and have earned a bachelor’s degree, or higher, 
in accounting or a related field. Please read this form and ask any questions you may have before 
agreeing to be in the study. 
 
Gabrielle Fish, a doctoral candidate in the School of Business at Liberty University, is 
conducting this study.  
 
Background Information: The purpose of this study is to investigate the experiences of 
professional accountants in NFP organizations within South Central Pennsylvania who have had 
experiences with asset misappropriation to gain an understanding of how to improve the fraud 
prevention, detection, and management preparations individuals in the field receive. 
 
Procedures: If you agree to be in this study, I would ask you to do the following things: 
 
1. Participate in a face-to-face interview with me. The interview will consist of me asking 
you open-ended questions about your experiences with fraud prevention, detection, and 
management preparation as well as your experience with asset misappropriation in the 
workplace. The interview will take approximately 45 to 60 minutes to complete and will 
be audio-recorded for later transcription. 
2. Review the transcribed interview for clarification. Throughout the interview I will state 
any answers back to you that need clarification to avoid confusion. However, the audio-
recording of the interview will be transcribed within 2 days of completing the interview 
and will be sent to the email contact you provide. You will be asked to read the 
transcription as a means of verifying your answers. You will be asked to provide 
feedback regarding the transcription within 2 business days of receiving the document. 
Feedback can include clarification of any answers you feel necessary or questions you 
have for me. 
 
Risks: The risks involved in this study are minimal, which means they are equal to the risks you 
would encounter in everyday life. 
 
Benefits: Participants should not expect to receive a direct benefit from taking part in this study.  
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Benefits to society may include lowering fraud risk in not-for-profit organizations through 
improved fraud prevention, detection, and management preparation. Most of the revenue of not-
for-profits is donation based, coming from the taxpaying individuals in society. This study will 
help lower fraud risk, enabling donors to feel more confident that their donations are being used 
properly and helping the organizations meet their goals. 
 
Compensation: Participants will not be compensated for participating in this study. 
 
Confidentiality: The records of this study will be kept private. In any sort of report I might 
publish, I will not include any information that will make it possible to identify a subject. 
Research records will be stored securely, and only the researcher will have access to the records. 
I may share the data I collect from you for use in future research studies or with other 
researchers; if I share the data that I collect about you, I will remove any information that could 
identify you, if applicable, before I share the data. 
 
 Interviews will be held after work hours in a private room at a public library or other 
location to maintain privacy and confidentiality. Furthermore, each participant will be 
assigned a coded identifier that is used to identify the participant in the published 
documents. Furthermore, any other data that could connect the participant with the study, 
such as company name, will not be included in the published document.  
 
 All electronic data related to the study will be stored on the principal investigator’s 
personal laptop. The laptop will have a strong password for protection, and each Word 
document containing data will have a separate password. All data will be backed up on an 
external USB hard drive; The USB will be stored in a secure location at the principal 
investigator’s home that only they know about. Furthermore, the USB will require a 
password to access any research data. Finally, the principal investigator will maintain a 
list connecting the participant with their coded identifier; this list will be stored in a 
locked location in the principal investigator’s home. Only the principal investigator will 
have access to the data. 
 
All data collected during this study will be eligible for use in future presentations. After 
the minimum federal requirement of three years has passed all data pertaining to the 
study will be destroyed. 
 
 Each interview will be recorded using an audio-recording device and transcribed within 2 
days. Recordings will be stored on a password locked computer for a minimum of three 
years and then erased. Only the researcher will have access to these recordings. 
 
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study: Participation in this study is voluntary. Your decision whether 
or not to participate will not affect your current or future relations with Liberty University. If you 
decide to participate, you are free to not answer any question or withdraw at any time without 
affecting those relationships.  
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How to Withdraw from the Study: If you choose to withdraw from the study, please contact 
the researcher at the email address/phone number included in the next paragraph. Should you 
choose to withdraw, data collected from you, will be destroyed immediately and will not be 
included in this study.  
 
Contacts and Questions: The researcher conducting this study is Gabrielle Fish. You may ask 
any questions you have now. If you have questions later, you are encouraged to contact her at 
gprobinson@liberty.edu. You may also contact the researcher’s faculty chair, Dr. Stanley W. 
Self, at swself@liberty.edu.  
 
If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study and would like to talk to someone 
other than the researcher, you are encouraged to contact the Institutional Review Board, 1971 
University Blvd., Green Hall Ste. 2845, Lynchburg, VA 24515 or email at irb@liberty.edu. 
 
Please notify the researcher if you would like a copy of this information for your records. 
 
Statement of Consent: I have read and understood the above information. I have asked 
questions and have received answers. I consent to participate in the study. 
 
 The researcher has my permission to audio-record me as part of my participation in this 
study.  
 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Signature of Participant        Date 
 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Signature of Investigator        Date 
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Appendix F: IRB Approval 
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Appendix G: Discoveries Beyond the Scope of the Study 
There were five major themes identified that did not answer one of the intended research 
questions, but provided information beneficial to improving the abilities of NFP accountants 
regarding fraud prevention, detection, and management. Table 8 lists the additional themes and 
their respective minor themes. 
Table 7.  
Additional Themes and Minor Themes 
Theme Minor Theme 
Minimal staff in small organizations 
makes integrating proper internal controls 
and segregation of duties difficult 
With a small staff, segregation of duties can be 
hard 
Having a small staff makes everything harder 
Tone at the top is impactful  
Accountants are not well prepared for 
fraud occurrences 
Accountants are not prepared enough 
Did not know CPE was an option 
Fraud training often gets put on the back-burner 
Bigger companies are likelier fraud targets  
There are ways to deter fraud that should 
be utilized 
There is always more that can be done 
Being audited requires the analysis of internal 
policies regarding fraud prevention, detection, 
and management 
Fraud Education would be helpful 
 
Theme 1 
The first theme beyond the scope was: “Minimal staff in small organizations makes 
integrating proper internal controls and segregation of duties difficult.” Thirteen of the 15 
participants (87%) made comments related to this. Research suggests that small NFPs have 
weaker internal controls and less segregation of duties due to their lack of resources (McNeal, 
2019; Ohalehi, 2019); the participants’ comments prove this.  In this study, data revealed that 
60% of the participants worked for NFPs employing 50 or fewer employees, and that 53% 
worked for NFPs employing 20 or fewer employees.  Statistics reveal that the majority of NFPs 
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are classified as small businesses.  Because existing research shows that weak internal controls 
and segregation of duties effects small organizations most, the study is of importance.  Taking 
the time to identify ways to improve the abilities of NFP accounting and finance staff will 
strengthen internal controls and segregation of duties within NFPs. 
Minor theme 1. The first minor theme identified was: “With a small staff, segregation of 
duties can be hard.”  Two of the participants indicated that the NFP they work/volunteer for has 
no form of segregation of studies. Participant PX stated: 
The treasurer does everything. He writes the checks, makes the deposits, and pays all the 
bills, the whole nine yards. And he’s the only one that does that. So, outside of me 
reconciling the bank statements and doing just the review of the data, the separation of 
duties at this point is nonexistent. 
Furthermore, participant HZ stated that every year the auditors make a comment that the 
organization has no segregation of duties because it is so small.  When the principal investigator 
asked if participant HZ felt that there was any way to improve the issue, she stated, “Not really, 
because we’re so small, and my assistant is just part time.  So, there’s not really a lot of work to 
make that happen.” Similarly, participant BV stated, “We have a small accounting staff, there’s 
only 2 of us, so segregation of duties can be difficult.”  
Although majority of the participants (87%) indicated that the NFP they work/volunteer 
for has some level of internal control and segregation of duties, many believed that being small 
meant they were not as secure as larger companies. Participant WG stated, “We segregate our 
duties pretty significantly, not as good as a bigger company, but we do a fairly good job of that.” 
Regarding their yearly audit, participant RG said, “As much as we have a small staff, like most 
small nonprofits, there’s usually some kind of finding on separation of duties because there just 
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aren’t enough staff to really separate it.”  Furthermore, he stated that segregation of duties “is 
kind of tough” for smaller organizations.  Additionally, participant GK indicated that they, 
“don’t have that many employees in the office, so it’s very hard to have consistent checks and 
balances.”  Participant CN indicated that in the main office, there is enough staff to segregate 
duties, but in the parishes, specifically the smaller ones, they do not have “sufficient staff to 
achieve good, adequate segregation of duties.”  This statement is consistent with existing 
research that states that churches have a difficult time segregating duties because of lack of staff 
and volunteers (Thornhill et al., 2016).  
Although most participants believed segregation of duties was difficult because of their 
size, the larger organizations indicated that they were fortunate to have adequate staff because 
they knew small NFPs often struggle with that.  Participant KT said, “I have enough staff to do a 
lot of the checking and things like that, that are necessary for an organization our size.  When 
you’re smaller it’s just so much harder.”  Similarly, participant LC said, “We’re fortunate to have 
multiple staff members so we can spread a lot of those duties across multiple people.”  However, 
he did further state that, no matter the size of the organization, there are always processes that 
can be implemented to improve segregation of duties, such as preparing and reviewing bank 
reconciliations.  
 The prevalence of the belief that small organizations are not as equipped to properly 
segregate duties is part of the problem being addressed.  By providing ways for finance staff to 
improve their fraud prevention, detection, and management abilities, they will also learn about 
ways to implement proper segregation, regardless of the organization’s size.  Although full 
segregation of duties may not be a possibility for some NFPs, it is vital to learn and implement, 
the tools and techniques that are viable for each organization to better protect against fraud. 
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Minor theme 2. The second minor theme identified was: “Having a small staff makes 
everything harder.”  Two participants specifically identified this issue.  Participant PX shared the 
concern that having a staff made up entirely of volunteers creates a significant restraint on time, 
and willingness to go above and beyond what is required.  During his interview, the principal 
investigator asked if there was more that could be done within the organization to better prepare 
volunteers to prevent, detect, and manage fraud, or to lower existing risks. Participant PX stated, 
“Again, limited time, would they be willing to do that…that’s a whole other issue.”  When 
working with a staff of volunteers, time is a valid concern that must be considered when 
identifying and implementing new fraud preparation requirements. 
 Additionally, participant IY explained that when working with a small staff, many 
individuals have multiple job responsibilities, making it difficult to implement certain 
techniques.  She spoke directly to the idea of task rotation, and how challenging it would be for 
their organization because of the numerous duties and time constraints of each employee.  She 
indicated that when employees take vacation time, often a volunteer will come in to perform 
duties because other employees already have too much to do.  
 Although reducing workload in a NFP with minimal staff is difficult, it is important to 
consider the options before ignoring them. Small staff is an obstacle for many NFPs.  However, 
the data collected shows that, even in the smallest organization, there are ways to reduce fraud 
risk and improve the organization.  
Theme 2 
The second theme that emerged beyond the scope of the study was: “Tone at the top is 
impactful.”  Because the participants’ perception of tone at the top was a specific interview 
question, every participant commented on the tone of their NFP.  Eleven of the participants 
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(73%) specifically mentioned that the tone is positive, or ethical.  The remaining participants 
indicated that the NFPs were incredibly busy, fraud was not a pressing topic to upper 
management, or that the tone varies depending on the person.  Because tone at the top refers to 
the attitude of senior management toward financial controls, it is vital in promoting integrity and 
honesty within the business (Lail, MacGregor, Stuebs, & Thomasson, 2013).  Gunz and Thorne 
(2015) state that the tone at the top is a key factor in identifying and preventing fraud in 
companies.  Due to its role in fraud prevention, creating an ethical tone at the top in NFPs is 
crucial. 
Research states that the tone at the top must not simply be imposed on an organization, 
but it needs to be communicated down throughout the company and reinforced through 
management’s actions, practices, systems, and structures (Gunz & Thorne, 2015).  Participant 
KT stated: 
Given that the top sets the guidelines I would say it's pretty healthy. We are policy driven 
and precedent driven, so everything that we do is not special, we avoid special 
circumstances, we don’t have special employees that can do certain things other ones 
can’t. Our finance committees are specifically interested in making sure that we meet 
internal controls. 
This comment reveals that the tone at the top is seen throughout the organization, not just at the 
top levels of management.  Furthermore, participant JF explained the importance of continual 
communication of the tone being set to employees.  He stated that after an occurrence of asset 
misappropriation, all staff was spoken to regarding the issue.  He explained that communicating 
the problem with the employees reiterates that, “That kind of behavior is not acceptable and that 
should be something everybody understands.”  If the fraud were to be managed quietly and 
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employees were unaware, they would not fully grasp the tone management was setting.  By 
communicating with them, the tone at the top was made clear. 
Although majority of participants believed the tone at the top within their NFP was 
positive, there were a few that did not believe the same.  Participant GK explained that with the 
minimal staff and minimal asset misappropriation being experienced, fraud-prevention was not a 
top priority for management.  Additionally, participant CN indicated that the tone of each church 
varies by bishop.  He explained that some bishops understand the importance of protecting 
assets, and others choose to believe that everyone within the church is trustworthy and their time 
is best spent elsewhere.  Research proves that not creating and reinforcing an ethical tone is a 
consistent factor in increased fraud occurrences (Lail et al., 2017).  The results indicate that a 
positive tone enables NFPs to either avoid fraud, or detect it much quicker than a poor tone at the 
top. 
Theme 3 
 The third theme that emerged from the collected data was: “Accountants are not well 
prepared for fraud occurrences.”  Five of the participants (33%) commented on the lack of 
preparation that accountants receive regarding fraud prevention, detection, and management. 
Fraud-prevention training was only offered within 5 of the NFPs, and 1 participant indicated that 
it was not sufficient training.  The significant lack of employer’s focus on fraud prevention, 
detection, and management training puts their employees at a disadvantage for properly 
protecting assets and managing situations when they arise.  
This theme further proved the problem, that fraud is a problem in NFPs and their 
accounting and finance staff need increased education and training.  The following minor themes 
further explain why accountants are ill-prepared to prevent, detect, and manage fraud. 
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Minor theme 1. The first minor theme identified was: “Accountants are not prepared 
enough.”  Participant HZ explained that any form of training: on the job, fraud-prevention 
training, CPE, or a collegiate course would be beneficial to her because she had never received 
that training.  The principal investigator discovered that two participants had never received any 
fraud-prevention training.  Additionally, another participant received minimal training through a 
collegiate course.  Lack of preparation can lead to increases in, and longer duration of fraud 
occurrences.  It is vital that all accountants receive fraud prevention, detection, and management 
training to properly perform their job duties. 
Furthermore, regarding the on the job training of preventing, detecting, and managing 
asset misappropriation, participant RG stated, “Outside from maybe the auditors who come in to 
do the job, there’s not a lot of expertise on it.”  Participant KT spoke directly to this issue; he 
stated that in his auditing career, before working in the NFP sector, “Our audit procedures were 
much more robust…than current audit procedures are.” Because he identified a gap in fraud 
prevention, detection, and management training, he implemented a process with his accounting 
interns to improve their knowledge of how fraud can occur and how to properly detect it.  By 
discussing specific cases with the interns, they gain knowledge of real-life cases and a 
foundation of fraud training.  
Research reveals that, in 2011, only 7 of 201 (3%) universities sampled within the U.S. 
offered undergraduate fraud courses, and only 8 of the 201 (4%) universities offered fraud 
courses in graduate programs (Aliabadi, Dorestani, & Qadri, 2011).  The significant lack of 
education provided to accounting students increases their unpreparedness to prevent, detect, and 
manage fraud after beginning their careers.  The principal investigator identified collegiate fraud 
education as having been a form of training that every participant (100%) believed would have 
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benefited them.  The data collected indicates that fraud-prevention training can be, and should be 
improved for NFPs to better protect their limited resources and meet their mission effectively.  
Minor theme 2. The second minor theme that emerged was: “Did not know CPE was an 
option.”  CPE is an easy and convenient way for professionals to learn more about various 
topics. However, 3 of the participants (20%) stated that they did not know CPE was available to 
them.  Each of the three individuals had not earned any professional licenses and had not 
considered the option of taking CPE.  Professionals who earn licenses, such as a CPA, are 
required to take a specific number of CPE hours annually, or bi-annually.  The data reveals that 
those who do not earn licenses are unaware that CPE is available to them.  Regarding the 
question of whether the participants knew CPE was available, they stated, “Never really thought 
about it, honestly,” (participant OA), “I guess not,” (participant HZ), and “No” (participant GK). 
Participant GK went on further to state that even if she did want to take CPE courses, they would 
have to be at her own expense because she did not believe the NFP would pay for that.  
Based on the data, there is a significant lack of communication with unlicensed 
professionals regarding the availability of education and training.  The principal investigator 
shared with each of the participants multiple ways that they could find free, or low-cost CPE 
courses and webinars that would provide beneficial fraud-prevention training.  However, the 
principal investigator firmly believes that there should be increased communication with 
unlicensed professionals about such courses.  Although it is required of licensed professionals, 
they should not be the only ones made aware of such opportunities.  Not communicating 
education and training opportunities to unlicensed individuals puts them at a disadvantage to 
prepare for fraud, or other issues they may experience in their careers.  Based on the results, the 
principal investigator believes that communicating availability of CPE resources should occur at 
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the collegiate level.  As all participants took accounting courses, it would be ideal to make 
known beneficial resources to students so they will know about them later in their careers. 
 Minor theme 3. The final minor theme that emerged was: “Fraud training often gets put 
on the back-burner.”  Participant OA stated, “There are always so many other pressing issues 
within the day-to-day business that, I think, honestly that aspect probably gets pushed to the side 
a little bit.”  Additionally, participant GK explained that, with the lack of staff at the NFP, 
management chooses not to put their money and efforts into fraud prevention and detection. 
Although NFPs have limited resources and need to decide how money would be best spent, 
ignoring fraud-prevention training is detrimental.  In a study comparing fraud detection 
conditions in the U.S. and Canada, fraud risk management training was the business practice 
needing the most improvement (Drogalas, Pazarskis, Anagnostopoulou, & Papachristou, 2017). 
Furthermore, Drogalas et al. (2017) state that for fraud to be properly detected internally, 
continuous training, including the review of fraud cases, is vital.  Additionally, research indicates 
that fraud awareness training for managers and employees is the most important element in fraud 
prevention and detection (Halbouni, Obeid, & Garbou, 2016).  This minor theme reveals that, 
although fraud-prevention training is not viewed as a top priority for NFPs, it needs to be taken 
seriously and improved to effectively lower fraud risk. 
Theme 4 
 The fourth theme that emerged beyond the scope of the study was: “Bigger companies 
are likelier fraud targets.” Three of the participants (20%) commented on this.  Participant RG 
believed that because the NFP he worked for was small, there was less exposure to fraud issues, 
such as asset misappropriation. Similarly, participant WG stated,  
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We're not a big company at all, we’re a little company, and so because of that a lot of 
things are visible, so it’s hard to really get away with anything here. At least of that kind 
of a nature. 
Furthermore, participant HZ stated that she believed fraud was harder to hide within a smaller 
organization, especially when there is checks and balances being conducted by upper 
management. 
 The statements made by the three participants directly opposes the findings from a study 
reviewing 2,690 cases of fraud (Drew, 2018).  Drew’s study revealed that check tampering, 
skimming, and payroll frauds occurred more frequently in small organizations.  His findings also 
identified that 29% of frauds occurring in small businesses were perpetrated by an owner or 
executive, and only 16% of all fraud at large businesses were perpetrated by that population 
(Drew, 2018).  This theme reveals a gap in understanding of how fraud can be perpetrated, and 
hidden within smaller organizations.  Of the participants interviewed, 60% worked for NFPs 
employing 50 or fewer individuals.  This data suggests that there is an increased risk for fraud 
within NFPs because of their size, as well as their lack of professional skepticism and 
understanding of how fraud can occur.  
Theme 5 
 The final theme that emerged from the data collected was: “There are numerous things 
that can be done to deter fraud.”  This idea was addressed by 100% of the participants.  The 
interview contained questions regarding how NFP organizations could be improved regarding 
fraud prevention, detection, and management, ensuring that participants would think about 
common weaknesses within NFPs, and identify ways to mitigate the risks associated with them. 
Some of the suggestions provided by the participants included: 
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 Make sure to hire qualified individuals 
 Management should take suggestions into consideration 
 Oversight is vital 
 Task rotation should occur more often than on an as needed basis 
 Positive Pay can be implemented 
 Limit banking access for employees 
 Bank reconciliations should be conducted monthly and reviewed 
 Utilizing third-party vendors 
 Implement strong segregation of duties 
 Have an audit done annually, or have a board member review the books if the NFP is too 
small for a necessary audit 
 Eliminate the use of wires for making payments 
 Implement controls over non-cash donations 
 Increase controls over cash 
 Have a two-signor policy for checks 
 Improve fraud-prevention training for all employees 
 Expand resources, such as hiring more employees to improve segregation of duties 
Although some of the suggestions would be difficult for small NFPs to implement, there are 
ideas that are viable, and beneficial, for NFPs of all sizes to implement.  The fact that each 
participant knew of some techniques that would benefit NFPs was encouraging.  The principal 
investigator discovered that the uncommon suggestions were from individuals with multiple 
professional licenses, such as a CPA and a CFE. Increased education regarding fraud topics 
yielded unique suggestions, even if their particular NFP was not implementing them.  The minor 
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themes to be discussed delve into ideas that were more commonly mentioned throughout the 
interviews and why they would be beneficial. 
Minor theme 1. The first minor theme identified was: “There is always more that can be 
done.”  This idea was addressed regarding the preparation of participants as well as the 
implementation of tools and techniques within NFPs.  Eighty percent of participants indicated 
that more could be done by them, or their organization to prepare for, or reduce fraud.  
Participant AQ stated that increased awareness through fraud-prevention training and education 
would benefit the organization.  Furthermore, taking more responsibility for noticing suspicious 
activity and reporting it would be helpful.  Furthermore, participant BV explained that there are 
processes in place that are not conducted as frequently as they should be.  Additionally, he 
described a product offered by banks called positive pay, which would benefit them regarding 
segregation of duties and payments made. Regarding training, he stated: 
Training brings the issue to the forefront, so you’re more likely to do something if you 
are seeing that training all the time than if it’s just off to the side. So, I would say 
awareness is probably pretty big. 
Participant CN also stressed the need for improved fraud-prevention training of pastors not in 
finance roles, overseeing financial matters. Similarly, participant FP indicated that better training 
should be provided for the office manager regarding awareness and review of documents. 
Participant GK also stressed the need for further fraud-prevention training of all staff, not just 
financial roles.  
Participant JF stated, “There’s always more to do, truthfully.” He mentioned that, 
although the organization has training for their staff, “every day something new is on the 
horizon, so we have to continue to be prepared.” Similarly, participant LC said, “I think there's 
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always additional procedures that we could probably put in place.”  He explained that task 
rotation could be improved.  Their organization, like others’, often conducts task rotation as 
needed, such as when staff take extended vacation time.  However, implementing task rotation 
more frequently would lower fraud risk by enabling NFPs to detect potential fraud quicker 
(Jones, 2014).  
Participant OA stated, “I would say that there's always room for improvement, nothing is 
foolproof.”  She explained the need for increased transparency regarding fraud stating, “The 
potential for problems exist all over the place…any information I could get would be helpful.” 
Furthermore, participants admitted that there are processes that provide opportunity for fraud. 
Participant WG explained that their director of accounting manages banking and reconciliations. 
Although he believes they have the weaknesses adequately managed, he did state that, “If there 
were something going on she could probably cover it up.” To prevent potential fraud, he 
suggested that another staff member be hired to help with reconciliations and other tasks that 
need segregation.  Similarly, participant PX suggested that their NFP find an assistant treasurer 
to segregate duties.  The treasurer at their NFP manages all of the financial matters, aside from 
the bookkeeping, significantly increasing fraud risk.  Obtaining another board member to 
conduct some of the tasks would segregate duties and decrease fraud risk. 
 The participants agreed that no process is perfect, and the ever-changing nature of fraud 
requires the re-evaluation of processes regularly.  The results supported the problem that NFP 
financial professionals need improved preparation regarding fraud prevention, detection, and 
management.  Although participants provided beneficial ideas, it appears there is a gap between 
fraud-prevention knowledge and implementation of techniques.  
Running Head: FRAUD IN NOT-FOR-PROFITS 224 
Minor theme 2. The second minor theme was: “Being audited requires the analysis of 
internal policies regarding fraud prevention, detection, and management.”  Only 2 of the 
participants were small enough that an audit was not required.  However, the other 87% 
indicated that audits were conducted annually.  Although four participants stated that auditors 
specifically say that they are not responsible for detecting fraud, they still believed the audit to be 
beneficial for fraud prevention.  Every audit involves a risk assessment, the testing of internal 
controls for material weakness (Auditing Standard No. 5, 2019).  Although auditors are not 
responsible for detecting fraud, they can offer suggestions to improve existing controls. 
Participant PX spoke of another NFP position he held and how their auditors made suggestions 
to improve their segregation of duties.  The organization had a 2-person accounting staff, making 
segregation difficult, but their auditors offered useful advice that was implemented to improve 
controls.  Additionally, participant RG explained that their auditors typically issue a finding 
regarding segregation of duties.  He explained that when findings occur, changes are made based 
on the auditor’s suggestion.  
The results prove that having a yearly audit helps lower fraud risk in NFPs.  Additionally, 
audits provide assistance in strengthening internal controls and obtaining useful suggestions to 
improve segregation of duties.  This study reveals a need for NFPs to have an audit conducted 
annually, and seek the advice of auditors to improve the fraud prevention, detection, and 
management abilities of the organizational staff.   
Minor theme 3. The final minor theme identified was: “Fraud education would be 
helpful.”  The principal investigator specifically asked participants their opinions regarding the 
implementation of fraud courses at the collegiate level.  All of the participants (100%) expressed 
that adding fraud education to accounting programs, either as electives or required courses, 
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would benefit accounting students’ preparation.  Additionally, they all indicated that they would 
have benefited from fraud education in college.  
Regarding fraud education at the collegiate level, participant JF said, “I think it should be 
something that’s almost mandatory.”  He believes that accountants are going to encounter fraud 
at some point in their careers, and having the knowledge beforehand is important.  Participant 
OA stated that, “It really wasn't a topic that was brought up very much at the time,” and 
providing education at that level would be beneficial. Similarly, participant FP said, “It would be 
nice to have had a collegiate level course. I don’t know why they didn’t.”  Additionally, when 
asked if a fraud education course would have been beneficial, participant WG said, “Absolutely, 
I think fraud is one of those things that we should pay more attention to and don't know enough 
about how to do it.”   Participant SE explained that in collegiate courses, the education is broad, 
and providing more specific information would be helpful to future accountants.  
The data proves the need for increased fraud prevention, detection, and management 
education.  One participant (7%) had received fraud education in college; this reveals a gap in 
accounting curricula that needs to be addressed.  After the publicized fraud at Enron and 
WorldCom, accounting professionals sought fraud education to better prepare themselves 
(Kramer et al., 2017).  However, fraud is an ever-increasing challenge, and education is 
continually needed.  By adding fraud-prevention courses to accounting curricula, professionals 
entering the workforce will be better prepared to identify, manage, and prevent fraud at their 
workplaces. 
